STILES v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1922-08-17No. No. 3294

154 Ga. 86

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The jury's resolution of the evidentiary conflicts regarding the victim's dying declarations against the defendant's alibi and accidental death evidence, the trial judge's determination of the challenged juror's competency, and the trial judge's discretionary decisions were not abused and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Defendant Stiles was convicted of murder based primarily on dying declarations made by the deceased victim. The defendant argued that the victim was intoxicated and under the influence of narcotics when making these statements, that the declarations were unreasonable, and that he lacked motive to commit the crime. The defendant also presented witnesses, including family members, who testified he was eating supper at the time of the fatal shooting, and introduced evidence suggesting the victim may have shot himself accidentally. The court held that weighing the credibility of conflicting evidence—the victim's dying statements against the defendant's alibi and accidental death evidence—falls squarely within the jury's province, not the appellate court's role.

The defendant further challenged the competency of one juror based on alleged bias and prejudice, claiming the juror had stated beforehand that he would convict the defendant because there was too much killing occurring. The trial judge heard conflicting affidavits on this matter: witnesses for the defendant asserted the juror made prejudicial statements, while the juror himself denied these allegations and provided an account of his whereabouts that suggested the attacking witnesses were mistaken. A fellow juror corroborated the challenged juror's narrative. The trial judge found the juror competent, and the appellate court declined to reverse this finding absent an abuse of discretion. Finally, the defendant did not request a jury instruction on impeachment by contradictory statements, so the trial judge's failure to charge on that topic provided no basis for a new trial.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Weight and credibility of dying declarations versus conflicting alibi and accident evidence
Juror competency and bias based on alleged prejudicial statements
Appellate standard of review for jury verdicts and trial court discretionary findings
Failure to request jury instruction on impeachment by contradictory statements

Procedural posture

This is an appeal from a murder conviction, challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting the verdict, the competency of a juror based on alleged bias, and the trial judge's failure to charge on witness impeachment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Hines, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.)

It is urged that the verdict is without evidence to support it. The State relies solely for conviction on dying declarations made by the deceased. These declarations made out a case of murder. But counsel for the defendant urge that these dying statements were made when the deceased was intoxicated and under the influence of narcotics. It is further insisted, that these dying declarations are unreasonable, and that there was no reason or motive for the defendant to have taken the life of the deceased. These were matters for the jury. We cannot take onr seats in the jury-box, and decide the weight and credit to be given to these ■declarations of the dead man. We would be usurping the province of the jury.

The defendant introduced members of his family and a witness not of his household, who testified that the defendant was at his supper-table, eating his supper, at the time the fatal shot was fired. There was testimony from his witnesses of a statement of the deceased, that the latter accidentally shot himself. The conflict between the statements of the deceased and the evidence of the witnesses for the defendant, tending to establish an alibi and the accidental homicide of the deceased, was sharp. We know of no better tribunal for the solution of such conflicts than a jury of the vicinage. The credit to be given to these dying declarations was a question for the jury. They have resolved the conflict between them and the evidence tending to establish an alibi and an accidental homicide, in favor of these statements; and as the trial judge has approved their finding, his discretion will not be interfered with. Hall v. State, 124 Ga. 649, 651 (52 S. E. 891).

‘The competency of one of the jurors to try this case was challenged in the first special ground of the motion for new trial. This challenge was based upon the ground of the juror’s bias and prejudice against the defendant. It was shown by the affidavits of two witnesses that this juror had declared on the day before the defendant was tried, that, if he was on the jury, he would hang the defendant, that there was too much killing going on, and that it had to be stopped. The State made a counter-showing, and introduced the affidavit of the juror in which he denied making the statements attributed to him in the affidavits of the witnesses for the defendant. In his affidavit the juror gave a narrative of his movements during the day upon which the witnesses for the defendant say he made the statements tending to show his bias and prejudice against the defendant, from which narrative the inference might be drawn that the attacking witnesses were mistaken in their evidence. A fellow-juror corroborated this narrative of the attacked juror. There was thus engendered a conflict in the evidence on this issue. The trial judge became the trior of this issue; and his finding that the juror was competent will not be reversed, it not appearing from all the facts that the judge abused his discretion. McCrimmon v. State, 126 Ga. 560 (55 S. E. 481).

In the absence of a proper request to charge upon that subject, the failure of the trial judge to charge the law touching impeachment of a witness by contradictory statements furnishes no ground for the grant of a new trial. Crawley v. State, 150 Ga. 586 (5) (104 S. E. 410).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Gilbert, J., absent.