FONTAINE v. UNITED STATES

Supreme Court of the United States1973-04-02No. No. 71-6757

411 U.S. 21393 S. Ct. 146136 L. Ed. 2d 1691973 U.S. LEXIS 86SCDB 1972-090

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court so that the petitioner may receive an evidentiary hearing in the district court on his § 2255 motion challenging his guilty plea as coerced.

In November 1969, Fontaine pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery after waiving his right to counsel and to grand jury indictment. The trial judge complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by questioning Fontaine in open court about whether his plea was voluntary and knowing. Fontaine was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Over a year later, Fontaine filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming his plea was coerced by fear, police tactics, physical abuse from a gunshot wound, mental illness, and prolonged interrogation. He submitted medical records documenting his hospitalization around the time of his plea.

The district judge denied the motion without holding a hearing, reasoning that because the Rule 11 requirements were satisfied, Fontaine could not challenge his guilty plea collaterally. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court rejected this approach, holding that a guilty plea induced by coercion remains vulnerable to collateral attack regardless of Rule 11 compliance. The Court found that Fontaine's detailed allegations about coercive circumstances, supported by documentary evidence, required a factual hearing before the district court could determine whether he was entitled to relief.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a coerced guilty plea may be challenged collaterally under § 2255 despite Rule 11 compliance
Whether Rule 11 questioning creates a per se bar to collateral attack on guilty pleas
Whether detailed factual allegations of coercion require an evidentiary hearing before summary denial

Procedural posture

Fontaine sought certiorari review of a Sixth Circuit decision that affirmed the district court's denial of his § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per Curiam.

On November 13, 1969, the petitioner was arraigned in a federal district court upon a charge of robbery of a federally insured bank. He executed a written waiver of his right to counsel and to a grand jury indictment, and pleaded guilty. Before accepting the plea, the trial judge, proceeding under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, addressed the petitioner personally. The petitioner acknowledged in substance that his plea was given voluntarily and knowingly, that he understood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and that he was in fact guilty. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 464-467; cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242. The judge then accepted the guilty plea and subsequently sentenced the petitioner to 20 years in prison.

On August 6, 1971, the petitioner filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence on the ground that his plea of guilty had been induced by a combination of fear, coercive police tactics, and illness, including mental illness. The District Judge who had accepted the petitioner’s plea and sentenced him to prison considered the motion but denied it without an evidentiary hearing; the District Judge reasoned that since the requirements of Rule 11 had been met, this collateral attack was per se unavailable, stating: “When the trial court has so questioned the accused about pleading guilty, the petitioner cannot now be heard to collaterally attack the record and deny what was said in open court.” The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same grounds.

Petitioner seeks certiorari to review that judgment; he urges that under the plain wording of § 2255 and our decision in Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. Petitioner’s motion for relief under § 2255 sets out detailed factual allegations regarding alleged circumstances occurring after his arrest and before his appearance in court. Those allegations describe physical abuse and illness from a recent gunshot wound that required hospitalization which was documented by records tendered in support of his petition. The records also showed that a month following the plea he was again hospitalized for heroin addiction, for aggravation of the earlier gunshot wound and for other severe illnesses. Petitioner further alleges that prolonged interrogation continued during the period preceding his plea. All of this, he claims, coerced his confession, his waiver of counsel, and the uncounseled plea of guilty. It is elementary that a coerced plea is open to collateral attack. Machibroda v. United States, supra, at 493. See also Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275; Diamond v. United States, 432 F. 2d 35, 39; Crow v. United States, 397 F. 2d 284, 285-286. It is equally clear that § 2255 calls for a hearing on such allegations unless “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief . . .

We need not take issue with the Government’s generalization that when a defendant expressly represents in open court, without counsel, that his plea is voluntary and that he waived counsel voluntarily, he “may not ordinarily” repudiate his statements to the sentencing judge. The objective of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, of course, is to flush out and resolve all such issues, but like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an opportunity to prove the allegations.

On this record, we cannot conclude with the assurance required by the statutory standard “conclusively show” that under no circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief under § 2255; accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court to the end that the petitioner be afforded a hearing on his petition in the District Court.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice White dissents.

He had been arrested by state officers and had been in the custody of state police and in state jurisdiction until the time of the federal charge.

The petitioner has also urged in this Court that his plea must be vacated because the transcript of his pleading fails to disclose an intelligent waiver of counsel. But this claim was not raised in the Court of Appeals or in the petition for certiorari, and we accordingly express no view upon the question.