Jones v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1922-10-11No. No. 3290

154 Ga. 423

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The trial court did not err in its jury instructions on provocation and confessions, in allowing a sequestered witness to testify despite violating the sequestration order, in excluding evidence of the deceased's violent character, or in the verdict itself, which was supported by sufficient evidence.

Jones was convicted of a crime and challenged his conviction on multiple grounds. He argued that the trial court's jury instruction on provocation and voluntary manslaughter was legally incorrect, claiming that killing someone while they attempt serious bodily harm should constitute justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. He also objected to the court's instruction regarding confessions as vague and misleading, contended that a sequestered witness who violated the sequestration order should have been excluded from testifying, and asserted that the court wrongly prevented him from introducing evidence about the deceased's violent character.

The court found each of Jones's arguments without merit. The jury instruction on provocation and manslaughter tracked the statutory language and was proper. The instruction on confessions, when read in context, was sufficiently clear and could not mislead the jury. A witness who violated a sequestration order remains competent to testify and is subject only to contempt sanctions rather than exclusion. Evidence of the deceased's violent character was properly excluded because nothing in the record established that the deceased was the initial aggressor. The evidence presented at trial adequately supported the jury's verdict.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether killing during an attempted serious personal injury constitutes justifiable homicide or voluntary manslaughter
Clarity and prejudicial effect of jury instruction on confessions
Competency of sequestered witness who violated sequestration order
Admissibility of evidence regarding deceased's character for violence

Procedural posture

Jones appealed his conviction, raising multiple trial errors for appellate review.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Gilbert, J.

1. Error is assigned on the following charge to the jury: “ But, says the law, if the deceased, the man killed, committed an assault upon his person, or an attempt to commit a serious personal injury upon him, or some other circumstance equivalent to an assault or an attempt to commit a serious personal injury on him, and by reason of such assault the defendant’s anger was suddenly aroused — that violent impulse of passion which the law presumes to be irresistible, and, smarting under that passion provoked by some act I have just defined upon the part of the deceased, he took the life of the deceased, he would be guilty of voluntary .manslaughter, unless the jury trying the case (and you are the judges of that) should believe that there had been sufficient time, that a sufficient interval of time had elapsed, between the assault and the provocation given by the dead man, for the voice of reason and humanity to assert itself.” The criticism against the charge is “ That if in fact one is attempting to commit a 1 serious personal injury upon,’ and the assailant is killed, it would not be voluntary manslaughter, as the excerpt of this part of the charge says it would be, but under the law it would be justifiable homicide.” The charge is substantially in the words of the statute, and is not erroneous.

2. Error is assigned on the following excerpt from the charge of the court: “ All I can say is, the law declares that in order to justify a conviction based upon an alleged confession, they must in and of themselves independently connect the accused with the perpetration of the offense, without reference to the alleged confession.” The criticism is that the charge is “vague, uncertain, and indefinite, and tends to mislead the jury.” The excerpt quoted is only a part of the charge of the court on the subject of confessions, and, considering the charge as a whole, it is not vague, uncertain, or indefinite, and could not tend to mislead the jury. The charge is therefore not subject to the criticism made.

3. Error is assigned because the court allowed a witness for the State, an officer, who had been put under the rule for sequestration of witnesses, to testify, over the objection of counsel for the defendant that said witness had remained in the court-room within the hearing of the testimony of other witnesses for the State. Meld, that the witness was not disqualified, and the complaint made furnished no cause for excluding his testimony. He was merely amenable to the court for contempt in disobeying its order. May v. State, 90 Ga. 800 (17 S. E. 108), and authorities cited.

4. The court did not err in refusing to allow evidence introduced by the accused as to the character of the deceased for violence, it being-shown nowhere in the evidence that the deceased was the assailant, and such evidence could not be predicated on the statement of the accused. Brooks v. State, 150 Ga. 732 (3) (105 S. E. 362).

5. The evidence authorized the verdict.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Graham & Cornwell, for plaintiff in error.

George M. Napier, attorney-general, John A. Boylcin, solicitor-general, Seward M. Smith, assistant attorney-general, and E . A. Stephens, contra.