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CAMPBELL v. BOARD OF DRAINAGE COMMISSIONERS OF CEDAR CREEK DRAINAGE DISTRICT et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1923-07-14No. No. 3403
156 Ga. 64

Summary

Holding. The trial court's refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction was proper because Campbell possessed an adequate remedy at law through the claims process available for tax executions. The judgment is affirmed.

Campbell sold land to Morgan under a bond for title in 1917, retaining legal ownership while Morgan took possession and made partial payments. A drainage district was later created that included the property; Morgan was notified as a party to the district proceedings, but Campbell was not. The tax collector issued a fi. fa. (tax execution) against the land based on drainage district assessments levied against Morgan, and the land was advertised for sale. Campbell sued to enjoin the sale, arguing the drainage court lacked jurisdiction over him since he was not a party to the district proceedings and that a sale would violate due process.

The court held that Campbell had an adequate remedy available through the normal claims process used for tax fi. fas, which would have allowed him to contest the validity of the execution at trial. Because an adequate legal remedy existed, Campbell was not entitled to the equitable remedy of injunction, regardless of whether the fi. fa. might ultimately be found invalid.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a property owner not named as a party to drainage district proceedings may be bound by assessments issued against the property
  • Whether injunction is an appropriate remedy when an adequate legal remedy exists to contest a tax execution
  • The availability of the claims process as a remedy for challenging validity of a tax fi. fa.

Procedural posture

Campbell appealed the trial court's denial of his request for an interlocutory injunction to stop a tax sale on land levied upon by a tax collector acting on behalf of a drainage district.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Atkinson, J.

In December, 1917, S. E. Campbell, a resident of Newton County, sold a described tract of land located in Jasper County to J. Guy Morgan for a stated price payable in nine annual payments of five hundred dollars each. The vendor executed a bond for title, and received purchase-money notes. The vendee entered possession of the land in pursuance of the bond, and paid four of the notes, defaulting as to the next two, and moved away, thus leaving five of the notes unpaid. A drainage district was created under the provisions of the act of 1911 (Acts 1911, p. 108), and the act of 1913 (Acts 1913, p. 85), in a proceeding commenced on November 5, 1919. The land sold to Morgan was included in the district. Morgan was a party to the proceedings to establish the district, but Campbell was not a party and did not have actual knowledge as to the location of the drainage district or that it would affect the land. The viewers appointed under the provisions of the act assessed Morgan as one of the landowners $564 on property in class A and $43.71 on property in class E. On the basis of such assessment the tax-collector issued a fi. fa. against the land, to pay for installments of interest due for the year 1922 on the drainage bonds issued for the drainage district that were duly validated by judgment of the superipr court on September 20, 1920. The fi. fa. was levied on a portion of the land as the property of and in the possession of Morgan, and the land levied upon was advertised for sale. On May 27, 1922, after the levy, Campbell instituted a suit against the levying officer, the tax-collector, and the board of drainage commissioners, to en join the sale, on the ground that the drainage court was without jurisdiction as to the plaintiff and his property, because he was not a party to the proceedings, and that a sale under fi. fa. would deprive plaintiff of his property without due process of law. The judge refused an interlocutory injunction, and the plaintiff excepted.

“ When property is levied on under a tax fi. fa. issued either by the comptroller-general or tax-collector, it may be claimed by a third person and tried in the same manner as other claims are, except that the claimant shall give a bond and security for the eventual condemnation-money, and if found subject, such claimant and his sureties shall be in all respects liable as on appeal bond.” Civil Code (1910), § 1159. The fi. fa. was a tax fi. fa. issued by the tax-collector, as authorized by the act of 1918 (Acts 1918, p. 147, sec. 2), and the remedy provided in the code section was available to the plaintiff.

A claimant may set up invalidityof the fi., fa., on the trial of the claim ease. Wheeler v. Martin, 145 Ga. 164 (88 S. E. 951).

The plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law; and having such, whether or not the fi. fa. was void, injunction was not an appropriate remedy. Douglas v. Jenkins, 146 Ga. 341 (91 S. E. 49, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 322); Racine Iron Co. v. McCommons, 111 Ga. 536 (36 S. E. 866, 51 L. R. A. 134).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.