JACOB SCHMITT v. JOHN SCHMITT

Minnesota Supreme Court1905-04-20No. Nos. 14,202—(2)

94 Minn. 414

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment for defendant John Schmitt, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the father's oral promise to gift the land constituted a valid gift supported by sufficient acts of part performance, including John's entry and occupation, his construction of substantial improvements, and expenditures made with the father's knowledge.

Jacob Schmitt sued John Schmitt (his brother) to recover eighty acres of land in Brown County. Their father, a resident of Illinois, had originally acquired the property and placed both sons on it with the expectation they would work the land together and pay taxes. After the brothers had conflicts, the father promised John that if he married a specific woman, the father would give him the eastern eighty acres and help finance building improvements. John married as requested, took possession, built a substantial house, and made other valuable improvements to the land. The father also sent money to John's father-in-law for additional improvements.

Jacob argued the arrangement was always a landlord-tenant relationship with the father entitled to rent, citing the father's ongoing demands for payment. However, John denied this characterization. Two successive juries found in John's favor, and the trial court refused to grant a new trial. John's possession, the improvements he made, his immediate occupancy following the promise, and his marriage to the woman the father designated were deemed sufficient acts of part performance to bring the case within recognized exceptions to the statute of frauds, even though the original oral promise could not stand on its own.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an oral promise to gift real property is enforceable when supported by acts of part performance
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove acceptance of a gift of land rather than a landlord-tenant arrangement
Whether entry into possession, substantial improvements, and expenditures satisfy the part-performance exception to the statute of frauds

Procedural posture

After two jury trials resulted in verdicts for defendant John Schmitt, the trial court denied plaintiff Jacob Schmitt's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and Jacob appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

LOVELY, J.

Ejectment to recover eighty acres of land in Brown county. Defendant had a verdict. Plaintiff paid the costs of the first trial, and upon demand obtained a second hearing under the statute, when defendant again succeeded. There was a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial upon the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict and for errors of law occurring at the trial. The blended motion was denied, and this appeal is from that order.

A careful examination of the entire record indicates that the only question which is it our duty to determine on this review is the sufficiency of the evidence. It appears from the record that one John Schmitt, Sr., who was a resident of Illinois, was the father of two sons, Christ Schmitt and John Schmitt, Jr., the defendant. The father had means, and was desirous of locating these sons in Minnesota. He secured title to a quarter section of land in Brown county, on which there were buildings and improvements. He placed the boys on the land with the probable idea that they were to work it together, pay the taxes, he to receive rental therefor to some extent. There is evidence tending to show that the boys did not get along amicably with each other — that John could not work with Christ — and in the spring of 1891 the latter quit the farm, and went to a place owned by another brother, for whom he worked some months. In the meantime taxes had accumulated. The father learned of this fact, and came to Minnesota, evidently displeased with the management of affairs, and in an interview with the defendant promised that, if he would get married to a certain lady, he would divide the land, give defendant the east eighty, and help him to put up buildings, which he and his wife could occupy as a home. The boy promised to get married as desired by the father, which he did; then went into possession of the land. The father afterwards sent $200 to the father of the wife of defendant, which was used in improvements upon the land. Defendant continued to retain possession, and erected á house thereon, with other betterments of substantial value. As against these claims of defendant it was insisted that the relation between the two brothers and the father was that of landlord and tenant, that it had never changed, that the father was continually demanding pay for rental, which demands and claims were consistent only with such relationship; and we are urged upon the well-settled principle that to establish a parol gift there must be clear and conclusive proof, that the evidence in this case was not of so satisfactory a character as would justify the court in allowing the verdict to stand.

A very careful and thorough examination of the entire evidence leads us to the conclusion that the issues of fact as to the acceptance of the donation by the father to the defendant, which was disputed, and upon which there was a sharp conflict, were proper matters for the consideration of the jury. While there is much persuasive force in the arguments urged by appellant in favor of the view that the son did not accept and act upon the gift of -the father, but held the eighty upon which he lived under a promise to pay rent, this was clearly denied by. the defendant, and his testimony was in some respects supported by other witnesses. While the parol gift of the land was void under the statute of frauds, yet the part performance by the defendant in expending moneys in the construction of the house, his immediate entry and occupation after the promise, within the knowledge of the father, were sufficient to bring the case within the exceptions which have been recognized and established by this court. Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 29 N. W. 135; Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197, 39 N. W. 146, 46 Minn. 100, 48 N. W. 605. Two juries have sustained the donation of the father. The learned trial court, after carefully considering the entire record, has approved their finding in that respect, and we are unable to say that its action in refusing a new trial should be reversed.

We have considered the other assignments of error, and are satisfied that none of them are well taken, nor of sufficient materiality to require specific notice.

Order affirmed.