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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin Zuleta HERRERA, Defendant-Appellant

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit1974-12-05No. No. 74-1831
504 F.2d 859

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed Herrera's conviction, holding that the manner of his arrest and return to the United States—whether or not it violated international protocols or foreign sovereignty—did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to prosecute him under settled Supreme Court doctrine.

Benjamin Herrera escaped from a federal penitentiary while serving a narcotics sentence. Approximately fifteen months later, he was apprehended in Peru by American and Peruvian agents, held for five days, and then transported to Miami where he was taken into federal custody. Herrera was convicted in district court of escape in violation of federal law.

On appeal, Herrera challenged the court's jurisdiction to try him, arguing that his arrest in Peru constituted an illegal kidnapping and abduction that violated international law, Peruvian territorial sovereignty, and the applicable U.S.-Peru extradition treaty. He also raised claims of ineffective counsel, double jeopardy concerning forfeiture of good-time credits, and excessive sentencing. The court rejected all of these arguments, finding that established Supreme Court precedent permits prosecution regardless of how a defendant is brought within U.S. territory, provided he is physically present and subject to the court's authority.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether an illegal arrest in a foreign country divests a U.S. court of jurisdiction
  • Whether violation of an extradition treaty affects prosecutorial jurisdiction
  • Whether international law violations limit federal court authority
  • Whether counsel was ineffective at trial
  • Whether forfeiture of good-time credits constitutes double jeopardy

Procedural posture

Herrera appealed his conviction for escape from federal prison after being arrested abroad and returned to the United States without following formal extradition procedures.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from the conviction of appellant by the district court sitting without a jury on a charge of escape from the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 751(a). Appellant was serving a sentence at the time of the escape for violation of the narcotics laws. Following his escape he was able to make his way to Bogato, Colombia, his home. Some fifteen months later he was arrested in Peru and returned to Miami where he was placed in American custody.

In the words of appellant:

“I was travelling in our airplane from Santiago to Quito. The airplane stopped at Lima, Peru. He stopped over to refuel, and two American agents, one named Verdugo, and two Peruvian agents, those agents took me out of the airplane to meet another person, and I was accused to be escaped from one American prison.”

He also stated that he stayed in Peru five days and was then taken to the airport and “deported” to the United States. He described the trip from Lima to Miami as follows:

“Q When you came from Peru to Miami, was there a Peruvian police officer with you ?

“A Yes, one from Peru and one from the United States.”

The escape was not disputed. The principal assignment of error is the contention that under present standards of due process, the district court was divested of jurisdiction over appellant by virtue of the illegality of his arrest in Peru and subsequent delivery to the federal authorities in Miami. The argument is that he was kidnapped and forcibly abducted in contravention of federal statutes, and in a manner which violated the territorial integrity of Peru contrary to the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States. He also urges a loss of jurisdiction by reason of the failure of the United States to follow the orderly processes of extradition under the treaty between the United States and Peru.

It is settled by both Supreme Court decisions and decisions of this court that these contentions are without merit. Ker v. Illinois, 1886, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421; Frisbie v. Collins, 1952, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541; United States v. Caramian, 5 Cir., 1972, 468 F.2d 1370, 1371; United States v. Vicars, 5 Cir., 1972, 467 F.2d 452, 455; United States v. Cotten, 9 Cir., 1973, 471 F.2d 744, 748; Hobson v. Crouse, 10 Cir., 1964, 332 F.2d 561.

We have considered the case of United States v. Toscanino, 2 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 267, en banc rehearing denied, two judges dissenting, 43 USLW 2175 (October 8, 1974). It involves claims of kidnapping, extended torture and electronic surveillance by or at the direction of United States officials in a foreign country with the consent and knowledge of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. Aside from the wide variance between facts of this case and the claims asserted in Toscanino, we are bound on the basic proposition by the Ker and Frisbie decisions of the Supreme Court and our decisions cited supra. We find no merit in this assignment of error.

We also find no merit in the claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Appellant in a pro se brief filed some months before the brief filed by his counsel makes the additional contentions that taking his good time because of the escape violated the double jeopardy clause, and that the district court abused its discretion in the length of the sentence imposed, a sentence within statutory limits. We likewise reject these assignments of error.

Affirmed.

. Appellant is represented on this appeal by counsel employed for the appeal. In their appellate brief, they allege facts which read on the claims made by Toscanino. There is no record basis whatever for the claims and counsel so conceded on oral argument. They excuse their unusual conduct on the basis that they recited what they were told post-trial by appellant.