Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Marc J. Whiten, J.), rendered January 4, 2016, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of robbery in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to a term of eight years, unanimously affirmed.
The record sufficiently establishes that defendant’s waiver of indictment and prosecution by superior court information satisfied the requirement that a “criminal court has held the defendant for the action of a grand jury” (CPL 195.10). The record demonstrates that upon defendant’s waiver of the case to the grand jury (see CPL 180.30 [1]), the court, sitting as a hybrid part, transferred the case from its Criminal Court capacity to its Supreme Court capacity, thereby effectively ordering defendant held for grand jury action (see People v Yunga, 122 AD3d 951 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 993 [2015]; People v Davenport, 106 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1073 [2013]).
The court properly exercised its discretion in summarily denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea made pro se while represented by counsel (see People v Frederick, 45 NY2d 520 [1978]). “[T]he nature and extent of the fact-finding procedures on such motions rest largely in the discretion of the court” (People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 544 [1993]). Defendant submitted only a generalized standard form motion without inserting any specific allegations, and there was nothing to cast doubt on the voluntariness of the plea.
Concur— Friedman, J.P., Gische, Mazzarelli, Kern, Singh, JJ.