IN THE MATTER OF MARK FRANTZ

Supreme Court of Georgia1999-09-13No. S99Y1453

271 Ga. 529520 S.E.2d 686

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the special master's recommendation and the review panel's decision, holding that termination of appeal under Bar Rule 4-106(f)(1) includes only first-level federal appeals and does not extend to collateral habeas corpus petitions, and therefore Frantz's appeal had terminated, warranting disbarment rather than suspension. Frantz is disbarred.

Mark Frantz was convicted of federal bribery, a felony involving moral turpitude. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected his petition for further review in 1997. A special master held a hearing to determine whether his appeal had terminated under Georgia Bar Rule 4-106, and concluded that it had. The court agreed that a motion under federal habeas corpus law does not extend the appeal process and therefore does not delay disciplinary proceedings.

The court found that Frantz's appeal had ended for purposes of bar discipline, making him subject to immediate sanctions rather than suspension pending appeal resolution. The court identified aggravating factors, including his failure to acknowledge wrongdoing and his substantial experience as a lawyer since 1984. Prior cases involving similar felony convictions resulted in disbarment or voluntary surrender of licenses. Accordingly, the court disbarred Frantz from practicing law in Georgia.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a pending federal habeas corpus motion extends the 'termination of appeal' period under bar disciplinary rules
Whether disbarment is the appropriate sanction for a felony conviction involving moral turpitude
Scope of 'post-conviction proceedings' in the context of attorney discipline

Procedural posture

The State Bar petitioned a special master to determine whether the respondent's appeal had terminated following affirmance of his conviction and Supreme Court denial of certiorari, leading to a disciplinary hearing and recommendation for disbarment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per curiam.

Respondent Mark Frantz was suspended under State Bar Rule 4-106 pending the termination of his appeal of a conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia of bribery, a felony violation of 18 USC § 666 (a) (2). See In the Matter of Frantz, 267 Ga. 43 (475 SE2d 913) (1996). Frantz’ conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on December 15, 1997. The State Bar, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106 (f) (1), subsequently petitioned the special master to convene a hearing to determine the circumstances of the termination of Frantz’ appeal and to recommend further disposition of the disciplinary matter. After the hearing, at which the State Bar and Frantz appeared, the special master filed a final report in which he concluded that Frantz’ appeal had terminated within the meaning of Georgia law. The review panel accepted and approved the findings of fact and the recommendation of the special master of disbarment as an appropriate sanction for Frantz’ violation of Standard 66 (conviction of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d). We agree.

Although Frantz argues that his appeal has not terminated due to his pending “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct a Sentence Pursuant to Title 28 USC 2255,” the term “termination of appeal” as stated in Bar Rule 4-106 (f) (1) includes only first level appeals through the United States Supreme Court and does not apply to habeas corpus and similar collateral procedures that are neither continuation of appeals nor second appeals. See In the Matter of Nave, 254 Ga. 107 (2) (326 SE2d 769) (1985); In the Matter of Stoner, 252 Ga. 397 (314 SE2d 214) (1984). We also find that this Court’s previous statements that it is better to suspend, rather than disbar, an attorney who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude during the pendency of “any post-conviction proceedings” refer to “termination of appeal” as used in Bar Rule 4-106 (í) (1). See In the Matter ofMcLarty, 269 Ga. 749 (506 SE2d 850) (1998); In the Matter of Rehberger, 269 Ga. 576 (502 SE2d 222) (1998). Frantz’ written exceptions to the Review Panel’s findings were untimely under Bar Rule 4-219 (a), and have not been considered by this Court.

We note as aggravating factors Frantz’ failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and his substantial experience in the practice of law, having been admitted to practice in 1984. Furthermore, in several previous cases in which attorneys have violated Standard 66 based on convictions for offenses similar to those of Frantz, the attorneys were either disbarred or voluntarily surrendered their licenses to practice. See In the Matter of Bernard, 265 Ga. 767 (462 SE2d 376) (1995); In the Matter of Nave, supra; In the Matter of Matthews, 249 Ga. 586 (293 SE2d 716) (1982).

Decided September 13, 1999

Reconsideration denied October 15, 1999.

William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, E. Duane Cooper, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

Accordingly, Frantz is disbarred from the practice of law in Georgia. He is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred.

All the Justices concur.