KING, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 35. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in its Batson analysis for Juror -7. However, because I believe that there are serious concerns as to the pretextual nature of both of Hemp-hill’s proffered explanations, I dissent from the majority’s finding that the trial court may not consider Hemphill’s explanation for striking Juror 13 on remand.
¶36. The purpose of Batson was to “eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The United States Supreme Court described its efforts as “unceasing’ on this issue. Id. Indeed, the Court found that “racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause,” because a party has “the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.” Id. at 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712. This concept advances the policy of the United States, that “all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2015) (emphasis added). Yet, despite the Supreme Court’s unceasing efforts, discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges remains to this day. The majority and concurring opinions do little to diminish this problem and, I fear, may even widen the gap that our Supreme Court has worked so hard to close.
¶ 37. The United States Supreme Court previously has emphasized that, when analyzing a Batson objection, “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). When there are doubts as to the outcome of a Batson challenge, a court is “required to consider the strike of [one juror] for the bearing it might have upon the,.strike of [a second juror].” Id. Hemphill ’used its first peremptory strike against the first African-American potential juror, Juror 7, stating .when questioned that it did not want an older jury panel. Yet, Hemphill had accepted Juror 2, who was Caucasian and sixty-eight years old, (five years older than Taylor’s sixty-three years), as well as Juror 5, a sixty-two-year-old, who also was Caucasian. Hemphill gave no explanation for its disparate treatment of African-American and Caucasian jurors in using its first peremptory strike. Thus, under the Snyder precedent, Hemphill’s explanation forstriking Juror 7 also throws Hemphill’s reason for striking Juror 13 into question. In order to conduct a proper Batson analysis on remand, the trial court must be required to consider Hemphill’s use of its peremptory strikes in toto.
¶ 38. Moreover, I believe that the trial court did in fact err in its Batson analysis for Juror 13. The majority contends that Juror 13 presents a different story. But the trial court’s analysis for Juror 13 is strikingly similar to its analysis for Juror 7. As with Juror 7, when HAS objected to Hemphill’s second use of a peremptory strike against an African-American potential juror, the trial court again stated that it did not believe that a pattern had been established and summarily accepted Hemphill’s proffered explanation without further analysis. When asked to provide a reason for striking Juror 13, Hemphill offered a vague and nonspecific explanation that lacked substance. Without considering the indicators which suggested the proffered reasons were a pretext for racial discrimination, the trial court summarily accepted Hemphill’s explanation and stated: "All right. I do. I’m going to uphold the strike on that.” Clearly the trial court failed to address any of the factors to be considered when, determining whether the proffered explanations were merely a pretext for intentional discrimination, in both Juror 7’s case and in Juror 13’s case.
¶ 39. The majority writes that “the burden remains on the strikers opponent to show the given race-neutral explanation is pretext for discrimination” in the third step of Batson. The majority fails to address the fact that the opponent of the strike must be given a fair opportunity to rebut the proponent’s proffered reasons. Here, after HAS objected to Hemphill’s second use of peremptory strikes to exclude an African-American juror, the trial court again stated that he did not believe that a pattern had been established but asked for a race neutral reason. Hemphill responded that he might have a -possible bias toward the plaintiff because of his employment by Labor Ready. HAS then stated that it would not accept that as a race neutral reason. The trial court did not allow any further analysis and merely stated, “All right. I do.” Thus, HAS had no opportunity to explain why it believed that Hemphill’s stated reason was pretex-tual. Not only was HAS deprived of ,a fair opportunity to respond, but I believe any response would have been moot. The trial court summarily accepted Hemphill’s explanations without analysis or concern. That .summary acceptance of Hemphill’s explanations for both Jurors 7 and 13 is precisely why, on remand, the trial court must revisit both of Hemphill’s questionable strikes.
¶40. Additionally, this Court has held that a trial court should consider “the extent and nature of voir dire on the grounds upon which the strike is being exercised.” Hardison v. State, 94 So.3d 1092, 1100 (Miss.2012). “If the State asserts that it was concerned about a particular characteristic but did not engage in meaningful voir dire examination on that subject, then the State’s failure to question the juror on that topic is some evidence that the asserted. reason was a pretext for discrimination.” Reed, 555 F.3d at 376. The trial court conducted no analysis into whether there was a possibility of actual bias of not. When the trial court asked Hemphill to give a race-neutral reason for striking Juror 13, Hemphill stated that it had struck Calhoun because he had listed his place of employment as Labor Ready on his jury card and because the case contained a number of issues about part-time and temporary employees. Yet neither party in voir dire asked the potential jury members whether they were temporarily employed or whether they worked part-time. In fact, no questions were asked of either Taylor or Calhoun during voir dire. The trial court failed to take any of the Batson factors into consideration. It merely stated that it accepted Hemphill’s reason and moved on.
¶ 41. And, while it may be arguable whether part-time or temporary employment was enough of an issue to evoke wariness, it is the trial judge’s burden to conduct a proper Batson analysis. Cf. Hardison, 94 So.3d at 1102 (“[T]he trial judge’s failure to conduct a proper Batson analysis constituted clear error.”); Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294, 298 (Miss.1993) (“[W]e today decide it necessaiy that the trial courts make an on-the-record, factual determination, of the merits of the reasons cited by the State for the use of its peremptory challenges against potential jurors.”).
¶ 42. The concurring opinion initially notes that the purpose of Batson is the elimination of unconstitutional discrimination in the jury selection process. However, the concurring opinion then immediately strays from the issue of this case by its extended discussion in footnote nine, of HAS and its motivation in the exercise of jury challenges, and whether that motivation is the basis upon which it questioned Hemphill’s jury strikes. The issue of whether HAS improperly struck jurors was not before the trial court and is not now before this Court. Therefore, any speculation thereof is moot. The effect and perhaps the purpose of such a discussion is to cloud rather than illuminate the issue which this Court is asked to address.
¶ 43. The concurring opinion does then correctly note that the burden is placed upon the trial judge to ensure that there is no unconstitutional discrimination in the jury selection process. This Court has not always been of assistance to the trial courts in that effort. Perhaps the greatest service that this Court could render in that effort would be the complete elimination of peremptory jury challenges, and the requirement that all challenges be based upon cause clearly set out in the record. Hemphill Construction appears to have made no effort in the record before this Court to demonstrate the truth of the reasons given for striking Jurors 7 and 13. Such a requirement would eliminate the often farcical process of offering questionable reasons for striking jurors in an effort to avoid the mandate of Batson.
¶ 44. In conclusion, the concurring opinion states that, upon remand, “the trial judge may consider such evidence and arguments presented by the parties so as to ensure compliance with the third step of Batson .... ” I would disagree. The determination should be made upon the facts as were before the court when the strikes were exercised. While this would include the trial court’s contemporaneous notes, it would not allow for the introduction of new information. Nor should it be read as allowing Hemphill to view the existing record with a high powered microscope to find a new reason to justify its challenge.
¶ 45. The approach taken by the majority and concurring opinion would seem to be designed to limit, rather than fully enforce, the mandate of Batson. The majority’s holding that, notwithstanding the questionable circumstances surrounding the strikes of both Jurors 7 and 13, that each must be considered in a vacuum and that there was no error with respect to Juror 13, at best defies logic. At worst, it appears to be a self-fulfilling prophecy upon which to justify a finding of no discriminatory action. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s finding that the trial court did not err in conducting its Batson analysis for Juror 13 and would require the trial court to consider Hemphill’s use of its peremptory strikes in whole.
KITCHENS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE,
FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1, This case returns after remand to the trial court, which was instructéd to complete a Batson analysis.,. The trial court has provided a certified result of that proceeding. The trial court ruled thát H.A.S. Electrical Contractors, Inc. (HAS) failed to meet its burden- of proving purposeful discrimination.
¶ 2. We have reviewed the entire record of all proceedings and- affirm the trial court judgment. HAS-failed "to prove (1) purposéful discrimination in the jury selection process, or (2) that the trial court’s ruling was clearly erroneous, or (3) that the trial court’s ruling was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. See Booker u State, 5 So.3d 356, 357-58 (Miss. 2008). Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s verdict, the trial court’s denial of HAS’s motion for new trial, and the trial court’s post-judgment award of attorney’s fees to Hemphill.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 3. Hemphill was the general contractor on a project hrWayeland, Mississippi, to rebuild a state park after Hurricane Katrina. Hemphill entered a subcontract with H.A.S, Electrical Contractors, Inc. (HAS) — one of many entered Into between these companies, both before and after the event complained of — to perform the electrical work. According to HAS, Hemphill did not pay HAS all it was owed under the subcontract. HAS sued Hemphill for breach of contract,’ quantum meruit,- and conversion. After Hemphill had paid HAS $2,498,000, HAS claimed an -additional $570,678.71 was due, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and punitive damages. Hemphill countersued for breach of contract,- seek? ing $23,677.04 in damages.
¶4. -After a three-day trial, the jury found in favor of Hemphill on both HAS’s claims and Hemphill’s counterclaim. However, the jury declined to award Hemphill monetary damages. The subcontract entitled the “prevailing party” to reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. Hemphill filed a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees. Hemphill sought $105,506.72 — $101,787.71 of which was expended to defend against HAS’s claims. Hemphill attached detailed spreadsheets listing the time its attorneys spent on the-case and their houriy rates. The trial court entered, judgment for $90,000 in attorney’s fees, an amount the trial court believed, was spent .in defense of HAS’s claim. ■
¶ 5. HAS filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). HAS argued that the trial court erred (1) in allowing Hemphill to use two of its peremptory strikes to exclude two African Americans from the jury, arguing neither pretext nor purposeful discrimination, and (2) in not finding the unilateral attorney’s-fees provision of the contract to be unconscionable. The trial court denied HAS’s motion for new trial and alternative motion for JNOV.
¶ 6. In its briefs, HAS complains of the attorney’s-fees award and argues that the trial court mishandled the Batson hearing when HAS challenged Hemphill’s use of peremptory strikes on Juror 7 and Juror 13, both African-American males. ■
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. Dual standards of review apply in today’s case. In reviewing a claim for a Batson violation, we follow the standard .set by the United States Supreme Court, which states that “[o]n appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (citations omitted). We will not overrule a trial court on a Batson ruling unless the record indicates that the ruling was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Booker, 5 So.3d at 357-58. We “afford [] great deference to the trial court’s finding of whether a peremptory challange was race neutral ... because finding that a striking party engaged in discrimination is largely a factual finding.” H.A.S. I, 232 So.3d at 123, 2016 WL 3091754, at *3. A trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees is subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Wyssbrod v. Wittjen, 798 So.2d 352, 357 (Miss. 2001); Terex Corp. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 671 So.2d 1316, 1324 (Miss. 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. Batson
¶ 8. Batson requires a three-step analysis. See H.A.S. I, 232 So.3d at 133-34, 2016 WL 3091754, at *3. This three-step process is to prevent peremptory strikes from being used in a racially discriminatory manner. Pitchford v. State, 45 So.3d 216, 224 (Miss. 2010) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712).
First, the party objecting to the peremptory strike of a potential juror must make a prima facie showing that race was the criterion for the strike. Second, upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding that particular juror. Finally, after a race-neutral expiar nation has been offered by the prosecution, the trial court must, determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory strike, i.e., that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination.
Pitchford, 45 So.3d at 224. This Court consistently has held that:
[t]he Batson doctrine is -not concerned with racial, gender, or ethnic balance on petit juries, and it does not hold that a party is entitled to a jury composed of or including members of [a] cognizable group. Rather, it is concerned exclusively with discriminatory intent on the part of the lawyer against whose use of his peremptory strikes the objection is interposed.
Strickland v. State, 980 So.2d 908, 915 (Miss. 2008) (quoting Ryals v. State, 794 So.2d 161, 164 (Miss. 2001)) (emphasis added).
¶9. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the ... explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Randall v. State, 716 So.2d 584, 588 (Miss. 1998)., This process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible — “any reason which is not facially violative of equal protection will suffice.” Id. “[R]ace neutral explanations must be vie\yed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings.” Walker v. State, 815 So.2d 1209, 1215 (Miss. 2002). It is well-established for Bat-son determinations that:
[a] reversal will only occur if the factual findings of the trial judge appear to be “clearly erroneous or ágainst the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Tanner [v. State], 764 So.2d 385, 393 (Miss. 2000).... “On appellate review, the trial court’s déterminations under Batson ... are accorded great deference because they are based, in a large part, on credibility.” Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 785 (Miss. 1997),.... The term “great deference” has been defined in the Bat-son context as meaning an insulation from appellate reversal any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d [1346,] 1349 (Miss. 1987).
Booker v. State, 5 So.3d 356, 357-58 (Miss. 2008) (quoting Smith v. State, 835 So.2d 927, 940 (Miss. 2002)). This standard conforms to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, which held that “[o]n appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.” See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985)) (“[d]eference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular. sense in this context because evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ”). In Hernandez, the United States Supreme Court added that “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial court].” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 366, 111 S.Ct. 1859.
¶ 10. At the beginning of voir dire, the trial court introduced HAS’s client, Harry Schepens, to the venire. Well before the Batson issue arose, Hemphill’s attorney asked the venire:
Mr. Schepens (HAS’s founder and star-witness) has had some medical issues. I don’t know if they’re going to impact this trial, but I am concerned about sympathy. ... I want to know that you can just listen to the testimony and not let any medical issues cloud your judgment. I want to know that you can be fair and impartial and listen just to that testimony.
One sixty-seven-year-old prospective juror (Juror No. 28) conceded that Schepens’s condition would cause her not to be fair and impartial. Additionally, the panel was informed that this was a construction case involving “a subcontractor-contractor dispute.”
¶ 11. A review of the first hearing transcript revealed to Judge Emfinger that he “got ... off kilter” by Davis’s (HAS’s attorney’s) asking for an immediate race-neutral reason, contrary to the trial court’s customary practice. In the remand analysis, the trial court clarified his own words. The trial court recognized that, not only had it failed to follow its normal, procedural analysis of Batson pursuant to Rule 4.05 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and Chancery Court Practice, but it had mistakenly said a “pattern” had not been proven, rather than stating HAS had failed to show a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Although, a pattern is not an essential element to establish a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, it is an element which can be used.
¶ 12. Upon receipt of the remand order, Judge Emfinger reviewed the transcript of the first hearing and, without objection, attached a copy of the jury list with his notes and jury information cards as exhibits to this record.,
¶ 13. On remand, Judge Emfinger readily recognized his mistake, recounting his reaction to HAS’s attorney’s statement:
... Mr. Davis responded, “Judge, we’ll just point out that that’s the first black we’ve reached on the panel.
Now, at that point in time none of these attorneys in this case, I’ve never been in a jury trial with any of these attorneys, I did not know — so they didn’t know what process the court may use in considering Batson challenges and what process may be in place to designate who’s white, who’s black, who’s male, who’s female. So when Mr. Davis said that, I assumed that he was making a record that this was a black juror that had been stricken.
But that’s why when he made that statement, “Judge, we’ll just point out that that is the first black we’ve reached on the panel,” when I said “anything further,” I really didn’t expect there to be anything further. That’s just what I always say when something comes up.
But, in any event, Mr. Davis at that point said, “Judge, we — I guess we would go ahead and ask for a race neutral reason because it’s the first black we’ve reached on the panel at this time of the venire.”
Now, at that point, I think I made my first mistake. Under the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, Rule 4.05, Jury Selection Process, 4.05(b) says that “constitutional challenges to the use of preemptory challenges shall be made at the time each panel is tendered.”
Now I’ve always done that and that’s the way that it’s always been done in my presence when I was both a practicing attorney and since I’ve been on the bench and I don’t know why at this point I allowed Mr. Davis to go forward with his Batson challenge.
You can look on down to — on page 53, and lines 19 through 24, when Mr. Davis again wanted to raise a Batson challenge. On line 23, I said, “I’m going to let you make that objection at the end,” meaning when whole panel had been tendered again.
I consider that when Mr. Davis had tendered 12 people to the defense that that was the proper time for the defense to raise any Batson or reverse Batson challenges that it might wish to use. After the defense then had gone through all 12 of the panel of the jurors that were tendered to them, then that would have been the appropriate time for Mr. Davis to have raised any Batson challenges. However, I allowed him to go forward here so I think that’s part of what got us off kilter there was I allowed that challenge to proceed prior to the time it really should have at the conclusion or after the defense had considered all 12 jurors that had been tendered to them.
Now next I say, ‘Well, I don’t see how in the world you can have a pattern after one strike, but I will, as I believe the cases say, I should ask you for a race neutral reason for Number 7, Taylor.” Now my thought process is, at that point in time, I was finding that Mr. Davis had not made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
I used the word pattern. I used the word pattern because in all the cases I’ve ever dealt with and I’ve ever seen, prima facie cases have been based upon there being a pattern in the number of strikes, all the strikes being used against black jurors or a disproportionate number being made against black jurors as opposed to white jurors.
But there was nothing in this case as it existed, nothing during the voir dire or nothing that was said that existed outside of the fact that this was the first black juror that was presented and it was the first black juror that was stricken by the defense as Dl. But while I used the word pattern, I was finding that there was not — that the defense— excuse me, that Mr. Davis had not made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
Now what happened next was the process that I believe I was required by a prior Mississippi Supreme Court rulings to make. I had always, both as a practicing attorney and since I’ve been on the bench, the practice has been that even if you found that there was not a race — a prima facie showing of racial discrimination the court would always go forward and make a record for appellate purposes and require or ask that a race neutral reason be given. That’s how we’ve always done it in this district and how I’ve always seen it done; so that if I was incorrect in finding that the plaintiff had not made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, that the record would be complete for the Supreme Court to consider. ...
¶ 14. When Davis raised Batson regarding Juror 7, Judge Emfinger states that he assumed Davis was merely noting for purposes of the record that Juror 7 was an African American.. Although Judge Em-finger stated “Anything further?” he did not expect a reply. At that point, Davis made a premature demand for a race-neutral reason. Judge Emfinger accommodated Davis’s request, which HAS claims was error. Judge Emfinger offers that this accommodation was contrary to his practice as an attorney and as a trial judge. Judge Emfinger acknowledged that he failed to follow Rule 4.05 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, which reads that “[c]onstitutional challenges to the use of préemptory challenges shall be made at the time each panel is tendered.” URCCC 4.05. The proper time to consider Batson challenges was after Drake had tendereda panel to Davis.
¶ 15. Judge Emfinger further informs us that he misspoke when he used the word “pattern,”
Now what I meant by saying that was that there had not been a prima facie showing, that Mr. Davis had not made a prime facie showing of racial discrimination. “That’s the first person — that’s the first black that’s been presented,. I don’t believe that there’s any possible pattern,” So I was just rehashing at that point that I had found that there had not been a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
Judge Emfinger explained that he made a finding that Davis had not established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, an error acknowledged by Judge Em-finger. Even though Judge Emfinger determined ho prima facie case had been made, he required Hemphill to state a race-neutral reason. That error is of no event for, once Judge Emfinger asked for a race-neutral reason and Drake provided age, the prima facie showing became moot. Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323, 339 (Miss. 1999) (“When the prosecution gives race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes, the sufficiency of the defendant’s prima facie case becomes moot.”).
¶16. Judge Emfinger clarified that, at the time he ruled on the strike, he was deciding whether age was a valid race-neutral reason or an impermissible category.
Now at that point in time, as I Was sitting here, there was several things going through my head: Number one was that when they gave the race neutral reason as age, I was considering whether or not, I knew that race and gender were prohibited or suspect categories under Batson, and I was trying to remember whether or not age was a race neutral reason or whether or not age was a suspect category, I know that age is a suspect category in certain other matters and I was trying to determine or thought in my mind as to whether or not I had an age discrimination problem with that being used, I started to respond and I said, “All right. I believe that there’s not a pattern.”
Now with my next sentence I’m considering the race neutral reason that I was . given by the defense, the older veni-re, “whether there’s one or two or three, I don’t believe that’s a good reason” and all that time I’m considering whether or not age is a problem or whether or not age is a race neutral reason.
At that point, I decided that, in fact, age was a good race neutral reason and that there was nothing, about that that would cause or for me to — nothing about the process there that caused me to believe that the defense was using that strike to discriminate based upon race and I said I’m going to recognize the strike and we went forward.
¶ 17. Because Judge Emfinger determined that no prima facie case had been made, Hemphill should never have been required to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike. However, once Judge Em-finger required a race-neutral reason be given, he was then required to determine if HAS had proffered sufficient rebuttal that Hemphill was purposefully discriminating against Juror 7-becauseof his race. Judge Emfinger was required to weigh the reason given — “Your Honor, we — my reason, race neutral or otherwise, was age. We just thought he was — we would prefer not to have an older jury panel.” — against the rebuttal, if any was offered. No rebuttal was forthcoming. HAS stated only that Hemphill “accepted Number 2, who is 68 years old, and Number 5 that was 62 years old, but they were both white.” The trial court found Hemphill’s age/older-jury-panel reason was race-neutral. We have no factual basis to find otherwise.
¶ 18. The record reveals that no other person over the age of fifty-five was selected by Hemphill after Juror 7 was struck. The record reveals Hemphill achieved an age-balanced jury panel: the panel consisted of one juror in her twenties; three jurors in their thirties;- three jurors in their forties; three jurors in their fifties; and two jurors in their sixties. The record reveals the very next two jurors selected by Hemphill were younger African Americans.
¶ 19. The trial court concluded the remand hearing by making the follow findings:
When I was considering the ruling then and in considering my ruling now, the issue was whether or not they struck him because of age but they struck him because they would prefer not to have an older jury panel. The fact of the matter is they already .had someone 68 on the panel, someone 62, and I believe Mr. Taylor’s 63, and that the objection was or the reason was they did not wish to have an older panel. Now that’s why I was considering one, two, or three.
But at the end of the day, age being a sufficient race neutral reason, the fact that you’ve already got two people above the age of. 60 on the jury venire, -there was nothing about that strike that I believed was purposeful discrimination and I believe that it was not pretextual and I believe that Mr. Taylor was stricken because they did not wish to have so many older persons on the jury that heard this case. The fact that they already had two above 60, I think they struck Mr. " Taylor because he was the third person out of the first seven there that was going to be above the age of 60 and they did not want to have an older jury panel and I believe that is a race neutral reason and I don’t find that to be preitextual. Nothing that was said today really changes my mind from what I saw and heard that day and so that will be the Court’s ruling.
As I go forward now, you’ve looked at other things, you know, and, obviously, I’ve looked at other things. The only other person that was above the age of 60 that was tendered to either side in this case was Juror Number 15. Juror Number 15, Ms. Houston, she was actually stricken by the plaintiff. So unless I’m missing something, the defense did not have another person that was submitted to them during the course of the proceedings that was above the age of 60.
Again, I’m noting that now. That’s not something that I would have considered, because we were only at Juror Number 7, so I wouldn’t have considered that then. But I did consider the fact that age was a race neutral reason and that it wasn’t the age of a particular juror but, actually, the objection or their race neutral reason was we don’t have an older jury panel and to have the third person out of the first six jurors to be above the age of 60,1 can see that as being a race neutral reason. So that’s going to be my ruling.
The trial court found Hemphill’s stated reason during voir dire—“preferring] not to have an older jury panel”—as permissible, credible, and not pretextual.
¶ 20. Based on the record before us, there is no evidence of purposeful discrimination of African-American jurors, despite the dissent’s protestations otherwise. This case was remanded to the trial court for a Batson examination as to Juror 7, offering a full opportunity for HAS to rebut Hemphill’s reason. The trial court acknowledged that he acted upon the premature insistence of HAS in requesting an immediate ruling on its Batson challenge. Judge Emfinger acknowledged he did not follow his customary practice of conducting a hearing at the time the jury panel had been tendered.
¶21. We find no error in the trial court’s acceptance of Hemphill’s race-neutral reason. HAS’s rebuttal was lacking and nonconvincing to Judge Emfinger. It is unavailing to this Court as well. Judge Emfinger determined that Hemphill had previously accepted jurors who were sixty-eight years old and sixty-two years old. However, ho juror over the age of fifty-five was selected for service after Hemp-hill’s first strike. Only HAS struck a juror over that age, when it struck a sixty-seven-year-old, white female.
1Í 22. Upon reconsideration, Judge Emfinger found HAS developed no racial animus, no pretext evidence, or purposeful discrimination, and conclusively no Batson violation. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion otherwise, HAS was given the opportunity when the panel was seated and again when this case was remanded to offer rebuttal to meet its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. It failed to do so before the trial court. The trial court’s ruling was neither clearly erroneous nor against the overwhelming weight of the evidence." ‘[The best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge,’ making the trial court’s firsthand observations of even greater importance.” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203.
¶ 23. We reject the dissent’s baseless assertion that Hemphill’s counsel’s reason for striking Juror 7 and Judge Em-finger’s and the Majority’s findings are absurd. Such a charge fails to account for age being a valid race-neutral reason for striking a venire member. Age is a well-supported, race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 558 (Miss. 1995) (citing Harper v. State, 635 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1994); Simon v. State, 633 So.2d 407, 411 (Miss. 1993); Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1351)). Thus, we find that Hemphill’s reason for striking Juror 7—not wanting to seat an older jury panel—was not pretext for purposeful discrimination.
¶24. Hemphill, as the striking party, met its burden under step two of Batson to demonstrate a race-neutral explanation for the strike. See Pitchford, 45 So.3d 216, 224 (Miss. 2010) (describing three-step process of Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Under step three, the burden shifted back to HAS to prove the stated reason for the strike was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
¶ 25. HAS argues “disparate treatment”—i.e., “the presence of unchallenged jurors of the opposite race who share the characteristic given as the basis for the challenge” Lynch v. State, 877 So.2d 1254, 1272 (Miss. 2004). Because Hemphill accepted two white female jurors aged sixty-three and sixty-eight, HAS argues the strike of a black male juror in his sixties based on his age is per se pretextual. But this Court has held disparate treatment “is not necessarily dispositive of discriminatory treatment.” Berry v. State, 802 So.2d 1033, 1039 (Miss. 2001). Rather, it “is only one factor to be considered by the trial court[.]” Id. Moreover, after considering this factor and no other rebuttal, the trial court reached a different conclusion. Instead of proving pretext, the trial court found that two jurors in their sixties already accepted actually led credence to Hemphill’s contention that it “would prefer not to have an older jury.” In other words, the trial court concluded this factor made Hemphill’s race-neutral reason more credible, not less so, a point not addressed by the dissent.
¶ 26. The rule of law requires this Court to defer to the credibility finding of the trial court, unless plainly contradicted by the record before us. The record shows Hemphill accepted the very next two jurors, both younger African Americans. And every juror thereafter accepted by Hemphill was younger than Juror 7. The record supports the trial court’s findings.
¶27. We therefore find no merit in HAS’s claim that it is entitled to a new trial “[a]s the record in the case sub judice does not reveal that the peremptory strikes were used in such a way as to violate the Batson rule.” Berry, 802 So.2d at 1047.
II. Attorney’s Fees
¶28. Following trial, the trial court ordered HAS to pay Hemphill $90,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. For the trial court to award attorney’s fees in a breach-of-contract action, the contract must provide for them or there must be a finding of conduct so outrageous as to support an award of punitive damages. Sentinel Indus. Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp., 743 So.2d 954, 971 (Miss. 1999).
¶ 29. HAS acknowledges the subcontract entitled Hemphill to recover attorney’s fees if it prevailed in a dispute with HAS. Still, HAS argues the attorney’s-fees provision is unenforceable, as it entitled only Hemphill to recover attorney’s fees. But we have upheld one-sided provisions like this one. E.g., Upchurch Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utils. Comm’n, 964 So.2d 1100, 1114 (Miss. 2007). While HAS cites several cases that found either substantive or procedural un-conscionability due to a one-sided indemnity or arbitration clause, each of those cases involved a clear contract of adhesion. See Caplin Enters., Inc. v. Arrington, 145 So.3d 608, 614 (Miss. 2014) (finding payday-lending agreements containing arbitration clauses were substantively unconscionable contracts of adhesion); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddoch, 14 So.3d 695, 699 (Miss. 2009) (emphasizing “[t]his Court twice before has found the admissions agreement at issue in .this case to be a contract of adhesion”); Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So.2d 1202, 1207 (Miss. 1998) (finding customer-service agreement containing indemnity clause was a contract of adhesion, because Enter-gy was only energy provider in the area and refused to negotiate agreements with its customers).
¶ 30. By contrast, the subcontract between HAS and Hemphill was not a contract of adhesion. Instead, it was a contract between two businesses that Had worked together multiple times on large-scale construction projects. As we. have held, to enforce a contract “without enforcing the clause addressing attorney fees would be contrary to the law.” Theobald v. Nosser, 752 So.2d 1036, 1042 (Miss. 1999). Here, the trial court found the subcontract was enforceable. So the attorney’s-fees provision also was enforceable.
¶31. Alternatively, HASargues the attomey’s-fee provision does not apply based on the facts. Since the jury awarded Hemphill zero money damages, HAS reasons Hemphill was not “the prevailing party.” But the attorney’s-fees provision did not condition Hemphill’s right to attorney’s fees on its recovery of money damages. Hemphill merely had to be “the prevailing party.” And-in HAS’s suit against Hemp-hill for more-than a half-million dollars in damages, Hemphill clearly prevailed. The jury specifically found in favor of Hemphill on all of HAS’s claims. Thus, under the plain language of the subcontract, Hemp-hill was “entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in ... defending .., [HAS’s] claim,” See. also Aspired Custom Homes, LLC v. Melton, 72 So.3d 540, 551 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (enforcing contractual attorney’s-fees provision in favor of successful defendants in breach-of-contract action).
¶32. While a closer question, we find Hemphill also was the “prevailing party” in its counterclaim against HAS—and thus is “entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in pursuing ... [its] claims.” As with HAS’s claims, the jury expressly found in favor of Hemphill on Hemphill’s counterclaim for breach of contract. While the jury awarded .zero damages, as we recently clarified, money damages are not an element of a breach-of-contract claim—rather, they are one type of remedy. Bus. Commc’n Inc. v. Banks, 90 So.3d 1221, 1225 (Miss. 2012), overruling Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So.2d 330, 336 (Miss. 1992). By expressly finding in favor of Hemphill on its counterclaim for breach of contract, the jury necessarily found Hemphill proved by a preponderance that HAS had breached the contract.
¶ 33. With no damages awarded, Hemphill’s victory on its counterclaim admittedly is hollow. But wé agree with the United States Supreme Court that the degree of a plaintiffs success does not alter a party’s eligibility to recover attorney’s fees — instead, it goes to the reasonableness of the award. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 574, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (interpreting “prevailing party” language in a federal civil-rights statute).
¶ 34. To support its contention that the $90,000 award was unreasonable, HAS first reiterates the award was unreasonable because Hemphill was awarded no money damages. But this argument ignores the fact Hemphill had to defend itself against HAS’s claims that Hemphill owed it more than $570,000 under the contract. So, even had Hemphill not asserted a counterclaim for money damages, Hemp-hill still would have accrued significant attorney’s fees and expenses during the course of the litigation. According to Hemphill, of its $105,506.72 in attorney’s fees and expenses, $101,787.71 went toward defending against HAS’s claims. Thus, we find it was reasonable for the trial court to award Hemphill almost all of the attorney’s fees and expenses requested, even with no money judgment.
¶ 35. HAS also claims the attorney’s-fees award was unreasonable because the $90,000 figure was “plucked out of the air,” HAS pulls this phrase from Young v. Huron Smith Oil Co., 564 So.2d 36, 40 (Miss. 1990), in which this Court found a fee award of $7,500 was an abuse of discretion because the attorney testified he spent only twenty-nine hours on the case and typically charged $100 per hour. In other words, the evidence supported accruing $2,900 in fees — less than half the amount awarded. But in contrast to Young, the trial court here actually awarded Hemphill less than it requested,, not more. In its post-trial motion, Hemphill requested $105,506.72 total or, at .a minimum, $101,787.71 in defense-related fees and expenses. And it backed this claim, using the “lodestar” method of calculating fees, multiplying the number of hours its attorneys worked on the case with the attorneys’ average hourly rates. See Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259, 271 (Miss. 1999) (explaining the “lodestar” calculation). So, contrary to HÁS’s assertion, the trial court did not merely pluck a figure from the air. Instead, it reviewed Hemphill’s evidence and determined $90,000 was a reasonable amount.
¶ 36. “It is .well settled in this State that what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee rests within the sound discretion of the trial court[.]” Id. at 269. And here, based on the record, we do not find the $90,000 award to be an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
¶ 37.- Because HAS is not entitled to a new trial based on Hemphill’s use of peremptory strikes, we affirm the judgment in Hemphill’s favor on all claims. And because Hemphill was “the prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees under the subcontract we also affirm the post-trial order that HAS pay Hemphill $90,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. -
¶ 38. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J.
. Not only does the trial court have a duty to evaluate the proffered explanations individually, but also in toto to determine if the reasons given were pretext for discrimination. Flowers v. State, 947 So.2d 910, 937 (Miss. 2007). ‘‘The persuasiveness-of a proffered explanation may be magnified or diminished by the persuasiveness of companion explanations. ...” Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1987); see also Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir.2003) (‘‘After analyzing each of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons, our precedent suggests that the court should then step back and evaluate all of the reasons together,”), Batson’s prohibition against discrimination in jury selection is intended to benefit the parties as well as the potential jurors. The parties as participants in the action have the ability to object to the selection process. That same ability is not true of potential jurors, so it is the trial courts responsibility to protect the rights of the potential jurors. Thus, contrary to footnote 7 of the majority’s opinion, the ultimate responsibility to ensure,fairness in the jury selection process rests with the trial court. The majority’s footnote 7 .seems to suggest that the trial court simply sits like one of the three little monkeys who sees no evil. Such a position is inconsistent with the responsibility placed upon the trial court to prevent unconstitutional discrimination in the jury selection process. While it is true that the opponent of a strike does carry a burden, that does not relieve the trial court of its obligation to consider whether there is pretext in the exercise of a strike.
. The trial court made this ruling despite the fact that, after the jury was picked, when discussing the topic of objections during trial, the trial court itself stated that "[t]he things that will give me the most problems is going to be on relevance and things of that nature since I know nothing about the case.”
. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
. On remand, the trial court should conduct the third step of Batson analysis for Juror 7. HAS should be allowed the opportunity to prove purposeful discrimination — i.e., Hemp-hill’s race-neutral reason for striking Taylor was pretextual. And Hemphill should be permitted to defend its stated reason for striking Taylor — age. But Hemphill is restricted from giving any new, race-neutral reason to justify the strike. Further, to support, their arguments, both parties are limited to using the record as it existed at the time of the original Batson hearing.
H.A.S. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Hemphill Constr. Co., No. 2015-CA-00596-SCT, 232 So.3d 117, 135-36, 2016 WL 3091754, at *5 (Miss. June 2, 2016) (H.A.S. I). In H.A.S. I, this Court specifically held that HAS wholly failed to meet its burden in proving Hemp-hill’s race-neutral reason for striking Juror 13 — his employment — was pretextual. Id. Any argument raising the issue of Juror 13 is barred by res judicata and needs no further discussion. . . > .
. I agree with my fellow justice that peremptory strikes should be viewed as a whole. Dis. Op. at ¶ 50. Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, the trial court was not limited or restricted in performing its Batson analysis on Juror 7. However, Hemphill was restricted from providing any new, race-neutral reason to justify its strike, and any other reason aside from age will not be considered.
. We expressly reserved the attomey’s-fees issue for post-remand.
. In its opening statement, HAS reduced its compensatory claim to approximately $270,000.
. The first time pretext and purposeful dis- crimination were mentioned in the trial-court proceedings was by the trial court on remand, quoting this Court’s order in H.A.S. I.
.In our prior opinion, we found no Batson violation as to Juror 13.
. The record reflects that Mr. Schepens was two months post-stroke and seventy-nine years old.
. This exhibit reveals that no other juror over the age of fifty-five was selected by Hemphill, after striking Taylor, before Juror No. 15, a sixty-seven-year-old, was tendered. That white juror was HAS’s third preemptory strike, all three of whom were white. Nor was this Court aware that Juror 28 was a sixty-seven-year-old white female.
.HAS’s Motion for a New Trial provided only the gender and racial make-up of the first two panels of the venire. However, HAS did not include the age of the panel members.
. Judge Emfinger’s comment in the first hearing was as follows:
Well, I believe that there’s not a pattern. That’s the first person — that’s the first black that’s been presented. I don’t believe that there’s any pattern possible. The older veni-re, whether there’s one or two, or three, I don’t believe that’s a good reason só Im going to — Im going to recognize the strike. This was a source of confusion for the H.A.S. I Court,
. Based on her juror information cards, Juror 8 was twenty-five, and Juror 9 was fifty-five.
. Specifically, paragraph 21 of the subcontract provided:
As the prevailing party in any dispute between the parties arising out of or related to this Subcontract or the breach thereof, Contractor shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in pursuing or defending any claim.
