FISHER, P.J.A.D.
We previously dismissed defendant Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.s cross-appeal, which sought reversal of the denial of summary judgment, because of Heartlands failure to comply with Rule 2:6-1(a)(1). Noren v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. , 448 N.J. Super. 446, 500, 154 A. 3d 178 (App. Div. 2017). Specifically, we dismissed the cross-appeal because Heartland failed to submit the items that had been submitted to the trial court on the summary judgment motion or even a statement of the items submitted. Id. at 500, 154 A. 3d 178
Heartland now moves for reconsideration, arguing we mistakenly employed Rule 2:6-1(a)(1). In Heartlands view, the obligation to include in the appendix all items submitted to the court on the summary judgment motion and a statement of all items applies only-in the words of the Rule -to an appeal from a summary judgment, and there can only be a summary judgment upon the grant of a summary judgment motion. Heartland argues that it only cross-appealed from a denial of summary judgment, not from a summary judgment. Hence, Heartland contends we should reconsider our rule-based disposition and review the cross-appeal on its merits.
To be sure, Heartlands argument has color because of the Rule s particular wording. We nevertheless find the argument lacking in merit. As Judge Learned Hand famously said, [t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally. Guiseppi v. Walling , 144 F. 2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (concurring opinion), affd sub nom. , Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling , 324 U.S. 244, 65 S.Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921 (1945) ; see also McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commn , 177 N.J. 364, 374, 828 A .2d 840 (2003). Despite the superficial appeal of Heartlands literal construction of the phrase from a summary judgment, the Rule was obviously intended to precisely identify for the reviewing court that which was presented to the trial court on the motion for summary judgment, regardless of how the motion was decided. Whether a summary judgment motion is granted, denied, or granted in part and denied in part, an appellate court is limited to an examination of the original summary judgment record. Lombardi v. Masso , 207 N.J. 517, 542, 25 A .3d 1080 (2011) ; see also Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp. , 39 N.J. 184, 188, 188 A .2d 24 (1963) (in reviewing the disposition of a summary judgment motion, a court is limited to a consideration of the case only as it unfolded to that point). A partys compliance with the Rule clarifies for the reviewing court the parameters of the original summary judgment record; if it didnt apply in all the ways in which a trial judge might dispose of a summary judgment motion, an appellate court could easily stray from its proper function by affirming or reversing in light of material never presented when the trial judge considered the motion. We reject Heartlands invitation to read the Rule literally, and we conclude that the phrase from a summary judgment should be understood as including appeals taken from the disposition of a summary judgment motion.
The motion for reconsideration is denied.
Heartland cites Rios v. Szivos, 354 N.J.Super. 578, 581 n.1, 808 A.2d 868 (App. Div. 2002) (in an appeal of a denial of summary judgment, the panel observed the lack of certainty about what was put before the motion judge and then provided a but see citation to Rule 2:6-1(a)(1), with a comment that the Rule regard[s] appendices on appeal from the grant of summary judgment), as support for its position. We do not read the Rios s footnote as does Heartland; in any case, we disagree to the extent that footnote may be interpreted as holding the Rule does not apply to the denial of summary judgment.