DOOLEY, J.
¶ 1. Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that: (1) the States principal witness testified on a matter that violated the trial courts pretrial ruling granting defendants motion in limine; (2) the court erred in overruling defendants objection to the prosecutor eliciting testimony from the States principal witness that defendant never reported to police that he was not driving his vehicle on the night in question; (3) the prosecutor made several impermissible statements during his opening statement and closing argument regarding defendants failure to inform police that he was not the driver; and (4) in attempting to define the term reasonable doubt, the court diminished the constitutional burden of proof imposed on the State, thereby committing structural error that requires reversal of defendants conviction. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶ 2. With some notable exceptions, the facts are largely undisputed. At approximately 11:05 p.m. on January 27, 2014, Officer Richard Weinisch was dispatched to a residence in Burlington to investigate a report of a hit-and-run accident. A woman at the residence reported hearing a crash and seeing a late 1990s silver-colored Honda with loud exhaust backing away from a Subaru wagon that had been damaged. After looking for the Honda, Officer Weinisch returned to the scene of the accident and observed a silver Honda parked nearby. The witness to the accident identified the vehicle as the one involved in the accident. Officer Weinisch ran the license plate number through dispatch, identified defendant as the registered owner, and proceeded to defendants listed address.
¶ 3. When Officer Weinisch arrived at that residence, he spoke to defendants mother, who informed him that defendant was not home. Officer Weinisch left the residence, but as he was entering his patrol car parked across the street, he observed the same silver Honda turn into the driveway of the residence. Officer Weinisch proceeded up the driveway on foot as the car pulled into a parking space at the end of the driveway to the left, close to the rear of the residence. According to Officer Weinischs trial testimony, the first question he asked defendant, in investigating the hit-and-run accident, was whether anybody else had driven his car that night, to which defendant replied, no. Officer Weinisch did not notice any visible damage to the car, and defendant denied any knowledge of the accident.
¶ 4. During the conversation, Officer Weinisch observed that defendants eyes were bloodshot and watery and that there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath. Upon inquiry, defendant advised the officer that he had consumed three alcoholic drinks earlier in the evening. Suspecting that defendant was impaired, Officer Weinisch asked him to perform field dexterity exercises, to which defendant agreed. Based on his experience and training, the officer concluded that defendant did not successfully perform the exercises. Defendant then agreed to submit a preliminary breath test (PBT), which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of .150, nearly double the legal limit. At that point, Officer Weinisch arrested defendant and brought him to the police station for DUI processing, where at 12:45 a.m. defendant produced a breath sample indicating a BAC of .122.
¶ 5. During the processing interview, defendant stated that he drove his vehicle from the site of the hit-and-run accident into the driveway of his mothers residence, where he was confronted by Officer Weinisch. Defendant signed a form acknowledging that he made those statements to the interviewing officer.
¶ 6. On February 11, 2014, defendant was charged with DUI, first offense. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming that there was no legal basis for the stop that resulted in his arrest for DUI. Following an April 16, 2014 hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A jury trial was held on May 21, 2014. At the trial, defendant, his mother, and his cousin all testified that defendants cousin, and not defendant, was driving defendants car on the night in question. Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found defendant guilty. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that two questions the jury posed to the trial court after it retired to deliberate indicated that it had switched the burden of proof from the State to defendant. The court denied the motion and later sentenced defendant to six-to-twelve months incarceration, all suspended, with a probationary term under special conditions.
II. Testimony Concerning the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test
¶ 7. Defendant first argues that the States principal witness, Officer Weinisch, testified about a matter in violation of the trial courts grant of defendants pretrial motion in limine, and that the testimony prejudiced him. We conclude that any error in admission of the testimony was harmless.
¶ 8. On the morning of the trial, defense counsel stated that she had some motions in limine, the first of which was to preclude Officer Weinisch from testifying about the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test that he had given defendant because hes not qualified as an expert to do so. The State responded, Thats fine, and the court stated, Okay. Later, during the direct examination of Officer Weinisch, the prosecutor asked the officer what he did after he observed that defendant exhibited indicia of intoxication, to which the officer replied: The first thing I did was the horizontal gaze nystagmus test in the driveway. The prosecutor immediately asked the officer what other tests he had defendant perform, at which point the testimony focused on the other two field dexterity exercises and defendants poor performance of those exercises. The prosecutor later asked Officer Weinisch if he formed an opinion as to defendants level of intoxication based on his observations of defendant and defendants performance of the exercises. The officer stated that he believed defendant to be over the legal limit to operate a vehicle, but that, to elaborate further ... Id have to refer to the HGN, which I believe were not doing.
¶ 9. Defendant argues that this testimony, particularly this last response by Officer Weinisch, constituted reversible error because a BAC above .08 creates only a permissible inference of impairment, see 23 V.S.A. § 1204(a)(2), and does not preclude a jury from relying on other evidence to find impairment, id. § 1204(b). We find no reversible error. State v. Kinney, 2011 VT 74, ¶ 6, 190 Vt. 195, 27 A.3d 348 ([E]rror in the admission of evidence does not compel reversal of a criminal conviction where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless, considered in light of the strength of the States case apart from the offending evidence and the strength of the offending evidence itself.).
¶ 10. In this case, the offending evidence had virtually no strength at all, while the States evidence of defendants impairment was very strong. Although it was the States burden to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant did not challenge the notion that he was impaired, instead focusing exclusively on his claim that he was not driving his car. For its part, the State presented substantial, unchallenged evidence as to defendants impairment. Officer Weinisch testified that defendants eyes were bloodshot and watery and that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from his breath. The officer also testified, without objection, as to defendants failure to successfully perform two field dexterity exercises. Moreover, defendants evidentiary breath sample was well over the legal limit. Given this evidence of impairment, Officer Weinischs brief referral to the HGN test, even given the suggestion that the results of the test indicated impairment, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Testimony Concerning Defendants Silence Before Trial
¶ 11. Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutors final question on redirect examination of Officer Weinisch, which elicited a response that defendant never contacted police regarding his claim that he was not the driver on the night in question. Again, we conclude that any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless, if error at all.
¶ 12. The exchange at issue was as follows:
PROSECUTOR: And one final question, Officer. In the three months following this investigation, did the defendant or any of the defendants friends or relatives, ever call you or the Burlington Police Department, to your knowledge, to indicate that somebody else was driving that night?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, Im going to object with this question as it respects [defendant], as I believe it suggests to the jury that he had some obligation, which-
THE COURT: No-
DEFENSE COUNSEL: -under the Fifth Amendment, he does not have.
THE COURT: No, the objection is overruled.
PROSECUTOR: Can you answer the question?
OFFICER WEINISCH: So at no point in time from the beginning of my investigation that night through today, did anybody including defendant ever tell me that he was not driving that vehicle.
¶ 13. In a one-paragraph argument, defendant asserts that admission of evidence of his silence was error, citing the U.S. Supreme Courts decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and this Courts reliance on that decision in State v. Mosher, 143 Vt. 197, 465 A.2d 261 (1983). This due process claim is made pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and thus federal law, and most particularly U.S. Supreme Court case law, is controlling.
¶ 14. We conclude that defendants reliance upon Doyle and Mosher is misplaced, given the circumstances of the instant case. But before examining the relevant case law, we emphasize two points. First, as we explain in detail in considering defendants third argument challenging statements made by the prosecutor during his opening statement and closing argument, the State was aware that the defense witnesses, including defendant, were going to testify at trial that defendant was not driving his car on the night in question. Second, although the challenged testimony technically came in during the States case in chief, it was admitted on redirect examination, essentially to rehabilitate the principal witness, Officer Weinisch, following defendants cross-examination of the officer. Cf. State v. Chambers, 144 Vt. 377, 380, 477 A.2d 974, 977 (1984) (concluding that where defense counsel cross-examined prosecutions witness about letter witness had written to defendant and used statements in letter to impeach witness, defense opened door for prosecution to rehabilitate its witness through redirect examination); State v. Settle, 141 Vt. 58, 62, 442 A.2d 1314, 1316 (1982) (Whatever effect the cross-examination may have had on the jury in weakening the impact of [the witnesss] initial identification [of the defendants], the State was properly allowed on redirect, in the discretion of the trial judge, to meet what had been developed on cross-examination, to explain away any tendency to discredit [the witness] that may have been accomplished.).
¶ 15. During the course of what amounts to twenty-three pages of transcript, Officer Weinisch testified on direct examination as to what occurred on the night in question, including that: (1) he told defendants mother that defendants car may have been involved in an accident and that defendant needed to call him so he could determine who, if anybody, had been driving defendants car; (2) a few minutes later, as he walked up the driveway behind defendants car, which had just pulled in, he lost sight of the front of the car for two, three seconds; (3) as he approached defendants car, he observed defendant exiting the drivers seat from a seated position and saw no one else get out of the car; (4) the first thing he asked defendant-in connection with the reported accident and before he observed any indicia of intoxication-was if anybody else had been driving his vehicle that night; (5) defendant responded no to that question; (6) during the ensuing discussion, he observed indicia of intoxication, and his suspicion that defendant had been driving while intoxicated was confirmed by results of the field dexterity exercises defendant performed and the preliminary breath test defendant provided; (7) he then arrested defendant and advised him, among other things, that he had a right to remain silent and to speak to a lawyer; (8) defendant waived those rights and decided to speak to him; and (9) in response to questions on the DUI affidavit form defendant signed, defendant indicated that he had driven from the scene of the hit-and-run to his mothers home, where Officer Weinisch confronted him.
¶ 16. At no time during this direct examination of Officer Weinisch-the States only witness other than a state chemist who testified about the breath test result-did the prosecutor question the officer as to whether defendant had ever informed police after his arrest and DUI processing of his claim that his cousin had actually been the driver of the car.
¶ 17. On cross-examination, defense counsel immediately attacked Officer Weinischs reliability and credibility as to who was driving defendants car that night. Defense counsel got Officer Weinisch to acknowledge that he could not see who was driving the car while it was moving up the driveway toward the parking area behind the house. The following exchange then occurred:
Q: Okay. And you did lose sight of the vehicle, I believe you said for a matter of two or three seconds?
A: I did.
Q: Okay.
A: Just the passenger compartment of the vehicle. I could still see the ... trunk area of the vehicle. But ... I could not see the doors of the vehicle.
Q: So you dont really know whether [defendant] was the only person in the car.
A: No. I do.
Q: Well, you said that you couldnt see the whole vehicle and you lost sight of most of the vehicle for two to three seconds.
A: Two or three seconds, while the vehicle was pulling into a parking spot.
Q: So you dont know what happened during those two or three seconds, do you?
A: The vehicle parked.
Q: But you couldnt see it?
A: I could see the vehicle moving into a parking spot, so-Q: You could not see the entirety of the vehicle. Is that what you testified before?
A: Yes.
¶ 18. In response to this line of questioning attacking Officer Weinischs reliability and credibility as to who was driving defendants car, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the officers prior direct testimony by asking him two questions on redirect examination: (1) whether he saw anybody else around defendants car after he made contact with defendant; and (2) whether, to his knowledge, in the three months since that night, either defendant or his relatives called police to indicate that someone other than defendant had been driving defendants car that night. It is the latter question, and defendants response to that question, to which defendant objects.
¶ 19. As noted, defendant relies primarily on Doyle to support his claim of error. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendants exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. 426 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (footnote omitted). The Court held that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (emphasis added). The Court explained that because Miranda warnings contain an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty, in such circumstances [where warnings are given], it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested persons silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240.
¶ 20. The Court explicitly noted, however, that it was not considering if the prosecutions cross-examination of a defendant on his or her general pretrial silence regarding an exculpatory story presented at trial amounts to constitutional error, stating that such averments of error present different considerations from those implicated by cross-examining ... defendants as to their silence after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. Id. at 616 n.6, 96 S.Ct. 2240 ; see United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1304 (5th Cir. 1993) (However, Doyle did not decide whether comments on a defendants failure to give an alibi anytime prior to trial is unconstitutional.). Thus, Doyle is plainly distinguishable from, and does not control, this case, where defendant is challenging the States elicitation of testimony regarding defendants general silence following an investigation in which he explicitly waived his Miranda rights and spoke to police about the same facts that defendant now asserts he had a right to silence.
¶ 21. Over the ensuing years, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified, and in some respects narrowed, the scope of the holding in Doyle. On multiple occasions, the Court has reiterated that the Doyle holding rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) ); see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (same); see also Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, ---- n.3, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2182 n.3, 186 L.Ed.2d 376 (2013) (citing Doyle for principle that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he [or she] heard Miranda warnings (emphasis added)); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (per curiam) (In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.); United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1464 (5th Cir. 1992) (Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have clarified that the Doyle protection derives primarily from the implicit assurance of the Miranda warnings and thus is strongest in the context of immediate post- Miranda-warning interrogation.). Thus, the holding in Doyle does not bar cross-examination as to prior inconsistent statements made by the defendant because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980).
¶ 22. As noted, in the instant case, defendant was given Miranda rights, but elected to waive them and speak to police. After doing so, he informed the officer during DUI processing that he had driven his car from the scene of the hit-and-run accident into [the] driveway of his mothers residence, where Officer Weinisch confronted him. At trial, however, he testified that he told Officer Weinisch at the time the officer confronted him in his driveway that he had not been driving his car-which is directly inconsistent not only with Officer Weinischs testimony, but also with his statement to Officer Weinisch during DUI processing after waiving his Miranda rights, as reflected on a DUI statement form that defendant signed.
¶ 23. In Wainwright, in contrast to the instant case, the defendant exercised his right to remain silent after being read his Miranda rights. 474 U.S. at 286, 106 S.Ct. 634. The Court noted that the prosecutions use of a defendants silence as affirmative proof of guilt in its case in chief might thus be especially egregious because, unlike Doyle, there was no risk that exclusion of the evidence [would] merely provide a shield for perjury. Id. at 292 n.8, 106 S.Ct. 634 (quotation omitted). The same cannot be said of the instant case, where the State was responding to defendants eleventh-hour denial at trial that he was driving his car that night, which was wholly inconsistent with statements defendant made after being given his Miranda rights on the night of his arrest. As we stated in State v. Hunt, [o]nce a defendant decides to speak, [the defendants] failure to speak in exculpation cannot be explained away as a response to Miranda warnings. 150 Vt. 483, 500, 555 A.2d 369, 380 (1988) (quotation omitted). Every defendant has the right to take the stand, but having voluntarily done so, a defendant is under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution may utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).
¶ 24. For similar reasons, we find unavailing defendants reliance on State v. Mosher, which in turn relied upon Doyle. In Mosher, we found reversible error in the prosecutions use in its case in chief of the defendants silence after being confronted with inculpatory evidence during a police interview. In that case, however, we concluded that the prosecution was foreclosed from presenting substantive evidence of the defendants conduct at the end of the interview because the eighteen-year-old defendant effectively reasserted his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent, by walking out of the interview. See Mosher, 143 Vt. at 203-06, 465 A.2d at 264-66. That situation is plainly distinguishable from this case, where defendant waived his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent, before making statements inconsistent with his later trial testimony.
¶ 25. To be sure, in Mosher we found no authority for the proposition that it is not error for the State to use defendants silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 143 Vt. at 205, 465 A.2d at 266. But, as noted above, in Mosher we concluded that the youthful defendant had asserted his right to remain silent after being read his Miranda rights. Moreover, none of the cases cited by Mosher in support of its statement that ample authority exists for the opposite proposition involved a situation such as the instant one, in which defendant waived his Miranda rights, spoke to police, and then later asserted a defense at trial inconsistent with the statements made to police. Mosher, 143 Vt. at 205-06, 465 A.2d at 266 ; see United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (While a defendant who chooses to volunteer an unsolicited admission or statement to police before questioning may be held to have waived the protection of that right, the defendant who stands silent must be treated as having asserted it.); United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding plain but harmless error where prosecutor improperly commented on defendants failure to explain that shooting was accident); Egger v. United States, 509 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding harmless error where States witness was allowed to testify that defendant refused to comment on whether he had knowledge of stolen bank money); United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969) (finding error in allowing testimony regarding defendants failure to deny accusations because the question whether his silence has any incriminating effect depends upon whether he was under any duty or any natural impulse to speak); United States v. Brierly, 384 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir. 1967) (concluding that eliciting testimony that defendant clenched his lips and shook his head upon hearing accusations against him was fundamentally unfair); cf. Hunt, 150 Vt. at 500, 555 A.2d at 380 (distinguishing Mosher and stating that where defendant has chosen not to remain silent, the prosecutor may comment to the jury, and use for impeachment, inferences from the statements which he made of his own volition).
¶ 26. In short, neither Doyle nor Mosher are controlling, given the circumstances of this case. In fact, no U.S. Supreme Court decision supports the proposition, as argued by defendant, that the prosecution cannot reference in its case in chief defendants silence regarding an exculpatory defense leading up to trial where the defendant had waived his Miranda rights at the time of the arrest and made inculpatory statements inconsistent with that defense. Nor does any decision support the proposition that the prosecution cannot present rehabilitative testimony regarding such silence on redirect examination following defense counsels attack during cross-examination on the reliability and credibility of the prosecutions principal witness concerning the inconsistent exculpatory defense. Indeed, neither proposition is supported by the rationale of Doyle and its progeny.
¶ 27. The dissent contends that our affirmance of defendants conviction violates clear and plain precedent prohibiting the prosecution from commenting on silence, as opposed to prior inconsistent statements. Post,¶¶ 51, 61. In fact, there is no such clear and plain precedent. Indeed, the case law cited by the dissent in support of this proposition demonstrates that the right on which the dissent relies is far more conditional and limited than the dissent recognizes.
¶ 28. Several of the cases the dissent cites are distinguishable from the instant case because they involved situations in which the prosecution commented on silence when there were no prior inconsistent statements and/or no waiver of Miranda rights. For example, the dissent cites multiple times to United States v. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1993), a case in which the defendant raised an entrapment defense at trial with respect to the charge of unlawfully possessing an unregistered firearm. The prosecutor cross-examined the defendant extensively as to why he did not inform police at the time he was arrested that he had been set up. The court found a Doyle violation because the defendants partial silence after receiving Miranda warnings did not preclude him from claiming a violation of his due process rights under Doyle and because the few statements he made were not inconsistent with his entrapment defense. Id. at 486 ; see also Laury, 985 F.2d at 1303 (finding Doyle violation where, although defendant made post-arrest statements to police, he did not say anything that was inconsistent with his alibi defense first raised at trial).
¶ 29. Another case cited by the dissent, Grieco v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1981), reveals some of the limits on the right upon which the dissent relies. In that case, the defendant presented an exculpatory story at trial that was inconsistent with post-arrest statements he had made. The prosecutor vigorously cross-examined the defendant as to why he did not present the story to police at the police station after he was arrested. Rejecting the defendants claim of a Doyle violation, the court noted that Doyledoes not establish a rule which gives rise to constitutional error in every case in which the prosecutor refers to the defendants post-arrest silence. Id. at 1033. As the court stated, once a defendant makes post-arrest statements that may arguably be inconsistent with the trial story, inquiry into what was not said at arrest may be designed not to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 1034 (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 409, 100 S.Ct. 2180 ).
¶ 30. In this case, following his arrest, defendant told police during DUI processing that he had driven to his residence on the night in question. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Charles: Each of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said to involve silence insofar as it omits facts included in the other version. But Doyle does not require any such formalistic understanding of silence.... Charles, 447 U.S. at 409, 100 S.Ct. 2180. Here, the prosecutors challenged question could be viewed as an attempt to elicit an explanation for defendants statements at the time of his arrest that he drove his car, which were entirely inconsistent with his exculpatory story presented to the jury at trial. Id.
¶ 31. In any event, given the unique circumstances of this case, we need not determine if admission of the challenged testimony was error, insofar as we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted, error in the admission of evidence does not compel reversal of a criminal conviction where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless, considered in light of the strength of the States case apart from the offending evidence and the strength of the offending evidence itself.
Kinney, 2011 VT 74, ¶ 6, 190 Vt. 195, 27 A.3d 348 ; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that constitutional error is harmless where it can be prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained). As indicated above, the evidence of defendants impairment was very strong. The only defense to the DUI charge was defendants after-the-fact I was not driving exculpatory story. That story was not reasonably plausible-as suggested by the twelve minutes it took the jury to reach a guilty verdict-given the evidence presented in the case. Cf. State v. Heller, 58 Wash.App. 414, 793 P.2d 461, 466 (1990) (concluding that error in prosecutors questioning of defendant regarding her failure to inform police of her exculpatory story before trial was not harmless error because story was reasonably plausible and not facially unbelievable); Canterbury, 985 F.2d at 487 (finding no harmless error because this is not a case where the defendants theory is transparently frivolous and the evidence of guilt overwhelming (citation omitted)).
¶ 32. Officer Weinisch testified that in walking up the twenty-yard-long driveway behind defendants car as it was pulling into the driveway, he lost sight of all but the rear of the car for only two to three seconds while the car turned into a parking spot behind the house. Moreover, Officer Weinisch testified that he actually observed defendant exiting the drivers seat of the car. The jurors would have had to suspend disbelief to conclude that in those two to three seconds defendant got out of the passenger side of the car, ran around the front of the car, took the car keys from his cousin exiting the drivers seat (who was somehow unseen by the officer as he entered the residence), and then appeared to be getting out of the drivers seat as Officer Weinisch regained a full view of the car.
¶ 33. Officer Weinisch also testified that defendant told him immediately after being confronted at the end of the driveway that no one else was driving his car that night. When Officer Weinisch asked defendant if anyone else had driven his car, the officer was investigating the hit-and-run accident, not a DUI. Defendants response to the officer was consistent with the statements defendant made shortly thereafter during DUI processing after he waived his Miranda rights. Thus, although defendant testified at trial that he told Officer Weinisch he was not the driver, this is not a pure credibility contest. Cf. Kinney, 2011 VT 74, ¶¶ 12-13, 190 Vt. 195, 27 A.3d 348 (finding no plain error in prosecutors comment regarding defendants credibility as to who had been operating his ATV when it was stopped because this was not a pure credibility contest in that the circumstantial evidence that defendant was the operator of the ATV was overwhelming (citation omitted)).
¶ 34. The most probative evidence on driver identity in this case, aside from Officer Weinischs testimony, was defendants own statement during DUI processing after waiving his Miranda rights indicating that he was driving his car on the night in question. Evidence of defendants silence regarding driver identity from that time until trial had little probative value-or potential prejudicial impact-and was merely cumulative with respect to the far more probative evidence of his reaction and statements immediately before and after his arrest and DUI processing. Cf. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (concluding that prosecutions reference to petitioners post- Miranda silence regarding circumstances of shooting were cumulative and thus had no substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining jurys verdict, given prosecutions extensive and permissible reference[ ] to petitioners pre- Miranda silence regarding circumstances of shooting). Indeed, if the jurors had believed defendants testimony that he told Officer Weinisch he was not the driver, evidence of his failure to later inform police of that fact would have had no probative value and no prejudicial impact.
¶ 35. Moreover, defendants Doyle argument is essentially based on the timing of Officer Weinischs challenged trial testimony. Defendant, as well as his mother and cousin, testified at trial that the cousin was driving defendants car on the night in question-and defense counsel cross-examined those witnesses on that testimony without objection. The defense presented the testimony of defendants cousin, defendants mother, and then defendant, each of whom repeated on direct examination the same story-in the two to three seconds that the officer could not see the passenger compartment of defendants car as it was pulling into the parking spot behind the house, defendant exited the front passenger seat of his car and went around the front of the car to take his keys from his cousin, who had been driving the car but felt sick and rushed into the house to throw up. Apart from the question of how this could have happened in the two or three seconds that Officer Weinisch lost sight of the front of the car as it was pulling into the parking space, the story is directly inconsistent with Officers Weinischs testimony that he observed defendant exiting the drivers seat of the car. Defendant also testified-contrary to Officer Weinischs testimony-that he told Officer Weinisch that his cousin had been driving the car and not him. But, as noted, that testimony was inconsistent with defendants own statement made shortly after the stop during DUI processing that he was driving the car.
¶ 36. The prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine defendant by impeaching his prior testimony that he told Officer Weinisch he was not the driver that night. See Charles, 447 U.S. at 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180 (stating that cross-examination inquiring into prior inconsistent statements makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent); cf. United States v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 1983) (Clearly, the state can cross-examine and comment when a defendant, prior to his arrest, did not come forward with the exculpatory story of his trial testimony when he had both the opportunity and good reason to do so.). Indeed, defendant did not object to the prosecutors cross-examination of the defense witnesses, including defendant, regarding their version of what occurred that night. Cf. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 237, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) ( Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here [in cross-examining defendant about not reporting his claim of self-defense to police after stabbing] did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. 643 )); Carter, 953 F.2d at 1465 (concluding that prosecutors questioning during cross-examination as to whether defendant had ever told police about his exculpatory story offered at trial was not commenting on defendants refusal to submit to interrogation but rather on the improbability that [the defendant] would languish for two and a half months in jail in possession of information that might, upon investigation, have resulted in his release). Following the close of defendants case, the prosecutor could have offered essentially the same testimony that was objected to in the States case in chief.
¶ 37. Because the only defense in this case was the I was not the driver defense, the jury was going to hear, through cross-examination of the defense witnesses, evidence of defendants inconsistent contemporaneous statement that he was driving, as well as Officer Weinischs rebuttal testimony. This is not a situation, like the one in Mosher, where defendants decision to testify may well have been influenced by Officer Weinischs answer to the one challenged question on redirect. See 143 Vt. at 207, 465 A.2d at 266-67 (It may well be that [the defendants] ultimate decision to testify was influenced by the fact that some of the most potentially damaging evidence against him had already come before the jury.). Furthermore, even if defendant had not testified, the evidence of defendants inconsistent statements would have been admitted to rebut the testimony of defendants mother and cousin. Cf. United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) ([E]ven if we thus assume arguendo that it was error for the Government to introduce evidence of [the defendants] silence when it did, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence could subsequently have been introduced to rebut [the defendants] testimony that he was shocked to see the counterfeit notes found in his suitcase.).
¶ 38. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that any error in allowing the challenged question on redirect examination of Officer Weinisch was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. Opening and Closing Statements
¶ 39. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made a number of impermissible comments during his opening statement and closing argument. Because defendant did not object to any of these comments at trial, we examine them for plain error. State v. Fellows, 2013 VT 45, ¶ 16, 194 Vt. 77, 76 A.3d 608. Comments made by the prosecutor during opening statement or closing argument will not amount to plain error unless they are so manifestly and egregiously improper that there is no room to doubt the prejudicial effect. Id. ¶ 20 (quotation omitted). Defendant has not satisfied that rigorous standard here.
¶ 40. Defendant first points, once again, to comments made by the prosecutor with respect to defendants failure to tell police prior to trial that he was not driving his car on the night in question. To fully explain why we find no plain error as to these comments, we set forth the origin of defendants driver-identity defense and reiterate how it unfolded at trial.
¶ 41. Defendant first raised the I was not the driver defense at a hearing on his motion to suppress held approximately one month before trial. Although his motion was directed at the alleged unreasonableness of the stop, his principal trial defense became clear. Towards the end of defense counsels cross-examination of Officer Weinisch at the motion hearing, the officer explained the length and layout of the driveway and confirmed his previous testimony on direct examination that he saw only defendant exit defendants car and that defendant told him that he was the only person who had driven the car that evening. Defendant then presented the testimony of his mother, who stated, as she later did at trial, that defendants cousin, not defendant, was driving defendants car on the night in question. The prosecutor cross-examined defendants mother as to why she did not tell Officer Weinisch that defendants cousin was driving the car the night of the accident. On rebuttal, Officer Weinisch reiterated that defendant was the only person who exited the car, that defendant told him no one else had driven the car that evening, and that defendant never indicated that his cousin was driving the car. Defendant neither objected to this testimony nor filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony at trial.
¶ 42. Thus, one month later at the trial, the State was aware that defendants three witnesses, including defendant, were going to testify that defendant had not been driving his car at the time of his encounter with Officer Weinisch. In his opening statement, the prosecutor explained to the jurors that he wanted to give them some picture of the evidence they were to hear that day. Toward the end of his statement, the prosecutor told the jury that defense witnesses were going to testify that in the few seconds that Officer Weinisch lost sight of defendants car, notwithstanding that the officer would testify he observed defendant exit the vehicle, somebody else actually jumped out of the drivers seat and ran inside the house before Officer Weinisch made it all the way up the driveway. The prosecutor then stated: The evidence will show that neither on that night, nor in the months that have passed since the arrest, until about one month ago, at no time did the defendant or his mother call the Burlington Police Department to tell them that somebody else was driving. The prosecutor told the jury that it was their job as jurors to assess the credibility of all of the witnesses you see here today.
¶ 43. Rather than objecting to any of these comments, defense counsel reiterated to the jurors in her opening statement that, as the prosecutor had just told them, they would hear inconsistent accounts of what happened on the night in question, and specifically, that they would hear why none of the defense witnesses reported to police that it was actually defendants cousin who was driving that night.
¶ 44. During closing argument following the presentation of evidence, the prosecutor referred to Officer Weinischs testimony that he observed defendant in the process of exiting the drivers seat and that defendant told him he had driven his car from the scene of the hit-and-run accident to his mothers house and that nobody else had driven his car that night. The prosecutor acknowledged the defense witnesses exculpatory story, but stated: You heard Officer Weinisch testify that neither on that night nor in the months following the incident, did the defendant or any of defendants family tell him that anybody besides the defendant was driving the vehicle. The prosecutor further acknowledged defendants testimony that he told Officer Weinisch he was not driving that night, but noted that defendant did not complain to the Burlington Police Department regarding the alleged misconduct of Officer Weinisch.
¶ 45. Again, given the unique circumstances of this case and for the reasons set forth above, we find no plain error in the prosecutors comments. Although a suspect is not required to provide an exculpatory explanation to police, that does not mean that the State is precluded from using a suspects lack of explanation prior to arrest to rebut an explanation offered by the defense at trial. State v. Longley, 2007 VT 101, ¶ 26, 182 Vt. 452, 939 A.2d 1028 ; cf. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000) (acknowledging prior case law prohibiting prosecutors comments suggesting that silence was evidence of guilt, but citing longstanding rule that when a defendant takes the stand, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness (quotation omitted)); State v. Marshall, 50 Kan.App.2d 838, 334 P.3d 866, 871-72 (2014) (stating that when defendant testifies at trial, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and thus finding no Doyle violation where prosecutor commented during closing argument on defendants failure to mention to police, until after DNA testing was done, that he was performing medically necessary procedure on sexual-assault victim (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) )).
¶ 46. Defendant also cites as impermissible the prosecutors comments suggesting to the jury that defendant did not want to be accountable for his actions and questioning what motivation Officer Weinisch would have for lying under the circumstances. The prosecutors accountability statements were both extremely brief and followed immediately by a summation of the evidence regarding driver identity. As for the motivation comment, the prosecutor cited the evidence and asked the jurors to ask themselves what motive Officer Weinisch would have had for indicating in his report that defendant had acknowledged he was driving if in fact he had told the officer that his cousin was driving. The prosecutor was suggesting that Officer Weinisch should be believed because of the evidence presented at trial-which included defendants contemporary written acknowledgment of being the driver-not because he was a police officer. Immediately before summarizing the evidence, the prosecutor told the jurors that it was their job as jurors to assess the credibility of all the witnesses you see here today. Its in your hands to decide what you believe and what you dont believe. Again, we find no plain error.
¶ 47. The other statements that defendant cites on appeal were the prosecutors suggestions that defendants membership in the Vermont National Guard and the fact that he lived with his mother and paid some of the household expenses may have motivated him and his mother to fabricate the story about the cousin driving. The prosecutor suggested, while acknowledging that he did not know, that defendant might be concerned about how a conviction could affect his status in the Vermont National Guard and that his mother might be concerned that a conviction could affect her sons support for the household.
¶ 48. Although defendant testified on direct examination that he was a member of the Vermont National Guard, and his mother testified that defendant lived with her and paid some household expenses, it was speculative for the prosecutor to suggest that these facts may have motivated them to fabricate the driver-identity story. See State v. Reynolds, 2014 VT 16, ¶ 30, 196 Vt. 113, 95 A.3d 973 (The general rule is that counsel should confine argument to the evidence of the case and inferences that can properly be drawn from it. (quotation omitted)); State v. Billado, 141 Vt. 175, 183-84, 446 A.2d 778, 783 (1982) (stating that it is not prejudicial to argue fabrication as long as the evidence supports the argument). But these qualified comments do not rise to the level of fundamental misconduct required by the plain error standard. Reynolds, 2014 VT 16, ¶ 35, 196 Vt. 113, 95 A.3d 973.
¶ 49. A defendant seeking reversal of a conviction based on an allegedly improper closing argument must show not only that the prosecutors argument was improper, but also that it impaired the defendants right to a fair trial. State v. Hemond, 2005 VT 12, ¶ 11, 178 Vt. 470, 868 A.2d 734 (mem.) (quotations omitted). Defendant has failed to do that here. Cf. State v. Rehkop, 2006 VT 72, ¶ 38, 180 Vt. 228, 908 A.2d 488 (finding plain error, despite rigorous standard, where prosecutor attempted to undermine the credibility of the defense witnesses by purporting to quote from transcripts not in evidence, by stating that the defense witnesses lied under oath, and by representing that he would have considered charging the defense witnesses with perjury).
V. Reasonable Doubt Instruction
¶ 50. Finally, defendant argues that the trial courts attempt to define reasonable doubt by stating in part that the jury must have great certainty-as opposed to utmost certainty-amounted to structural error that requires reversal. We recently rejected the same argument with respect to the same instruction given by the same judge. State v. Levitt, 2016 VT 60, ¶¶ 5-13, 202 Vt. 193, 148 A.3d 204.
Affirmed.
Defendant did not object to either response in which Officer Weinisch mentioned the HGN test. Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. V.R.E. 103(a)(2). But when the trial court makes only a preliminary ruling denying the defendants motion in limine to exclude the testimony, then a defendant must object to the testimony at trial when it is presented. See State v. Brink, 2008 VT 33, ¶ 7, 183 Vt. 603, 949 A.2d 1069 (mem.). We assume, without addressing the question, that the States agreement not to present testimony about the HGN, and the trial courts acknowledgment of that agreement, precluded the need for a later objection when Officer Weinisch testified about the HGN test.
In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself [or herself] ... without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
During the April 16, 2014 motion hearing, the State presented Officer Weinischs unchallenged testimony, which is apparent from exhibit photographs, that the driveway was about twenty yards long, at the end of which there were parking spots just to the left behind the house.
We do not suggest, as the dissent implies, that this standard is the equivalent of determining whether the jury could have rendered a guilty verdict absent the claimed constitutional error. Post, ¶ 63.
The dissent seeks to downplay this evidence, which severely undercut defendants story at trial that he was not driving his car. In response to the officers questions asking defendant where he was driving from and to, defendant answered from Maple Street (the scene of the accident) into his driveway, thereby acknowledging that he was operating his vehicle on the night in question. The dissent states that these answers did not amount to an admission that he was operating his car at the time it was stopped. Even defendant does not make such an argument. Construing defendants responses as not acknowledging he was driving his car would artfully blur[ ] the facts. Post , ¶ 65 n.15.