II
Analysis
A
The Defendants Cross-Appeal-Excusable Neglect
Due to the fact that the cross-appeal raises a threshold issue as to whether or not Family Dollar filed a timely notice of appeal, we will begin our analysis by addressing the cross-appeal.
1. Standard of Review
As we have previously stated, we will review the Superior Courts excusable-neglect determination for abuse of discretion. UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio , 987 A.2d 873, 878 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Friedman v. Lee Pare & Associates, Inc. , 593 A.2d 1354, 1356 (R.I. 1991) ); see also Boranian v. Richer , 983 A.2d 834, 837 (R.I. 2009) (Motions to enlarge time are confided to the sound discretion of the trial justice[;] * * * [t]herefore, this Court reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion or error of law.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Discussion
On appeal, defendants contend that Family Dollars lack of knowledge of the Superior Courts rules and process relative to the entry and notice of Orders and Judgments cannot constitute excusable neglect as a matter of law. They point out that this Court has stated that ignorance of court rules and court procedures is not a defense. They further aver that, pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Family Dollar should have known of its responsibility to routinely check the docket for a notation of Order and Judgment entering. It is their contention that Family Dollars acts or omissions are outside the course of conduct a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances * * *. Finally, they posit that the equities did not favor granting Family Dollars motion for extension because Family Dollar would not suffer prejudice by a denial of the same, especially given the fact that its Superior Court action was dismissed without prejudice.
Pursuant to Article I, Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from * * *. We have likewise stated that the twenty-day appeal time commence[s] to run from the first day following the day when the first valid appealable order was entered. Blais v. Beacon Mutual Insurance Co. , 812 A.2d 838, 839 (R.I. 2002) (mem.) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is clear in this case that the judgment from which Family Dollar is appealing was entered on September 20, 2016. It is undisputed that Family Dollar did not file its notice of appeal within the prescribed twenty-day window. However, Rule 4(a) also provides that a trial court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a period of up to thirty days [u]pon a showing of excusable neglect[.] See Boranian , 983 A.2d at 838 (Relief from a counsels failure to comply with procedural requirements will not be granted unless it is first factually established that his [or her] neglect was occasioned by some extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance to render it excusable.) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, with respect to the cross-appeal in this case, we are tasked with reviewing, under the abuse of discretion standard, the hearing justices ruling that Family Dollars failure to file its notice of appeal within the twenty-day window was due to excusable neglect.
This Court has defined excusable neglect as follows:
[a] failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the partys own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party. Duffy v. Estate of Scire , 111 A.3d 358, 366 (R.I. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have further opined that [e]xcusable neglect that would qualify for relief from judgment is generally that course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances. Boranian , 983 A.2d at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted). What is more, [e]xcusable neglect should be interpreted flexibly, because [t]he determination of excusable neglect is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances * * *. Duffy , 111 A.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of those circumstances include: the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. Boranian , 983 A.2d at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also UAG West Bay AM, LLC , 987 A.2d at 880.
Turning to the facts of the instant case, after a thorough review of the record and consideration of the parties contentions on appeal, we are not inclined to second-guess the hearing justice with respect to his conclusion that it appears that the underlying cause of the delay was counsels lack of familiarity with the electronic filing system and not with the rules. Accordingly, under the circumstances of the instant case and bearing in mind that the electronic filing system was of recent vintage at the time in question, we cannot say that the hearing justice abused his discretion in holding that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was the result of excusable neglect.
Rule 77(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [i]mmediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall make a note in the docket. Such notation is sufficient notice for all purposes for which notice of the entry of an order is required by these rules * * *. Pursuant to that rule, the judgment at issue in this case was entered into the docket on the electronic filing system on September 20, 2016; no additional notice was provided (electronically or otherwise) to the parties of that entry. However, Family Dollars counsel represented that he had received thirty-eight notifications in this case alone from the Superior Courts relatively new electronic filing system and that, accordingly, he had relied on that course of conduct as the basis for his belief that the electronic filing system would similarly notify him when the judgment and the order entered. As such, the record reflects that the delay in filing the notice of appeal in this case was caused by a lack of understanding of what notice is and is not provided under the electronic filing system, not a lack of understanding of the court rules.
The defendants point out that the thirty-eight notifications from the electronic filing system that were received by Family Dollars counsel were notifications of filings by the parties and were not notice of the entry of any order, judgment, or decree of the court. However, even given that fact, we remain of the opinion that the expectation of Family Dollars counsel that he would receive notification from the electronic filing system of the entry of the judgment at issue was understandable under the circumstances. The electronic filing system had only recently been implemented in the Superior Court during the time period at issue in this case; indeed, even the hearing justice frankly admitted that he was not totally familiar and comfortable with the way our electronic filing system deals with the orders and judgments. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, a reasonably prudent person could have likewise relied on receiving notice from the electronic filing system of the entry of the judgment in the case. See Boranian , 983 A.2d at 839.
What is more, we note that Family Dollars counsel represented that he made an effort to contact the court at least twice to inquire about the status of the order and the judgment. He did not behave in a careless or inattentive manner; nor did he willfully disregard the process of the court. See Duffy , 111 A.3d at 366. For that reason, it is evident to this Court that Family Dollars counsel acted in good faith. See Boranian , 983 A.2d at 839. We also note that the length of the delay in the filing of the notice of appeal was only thirty days. See id.
We do acknowledge that, as defendants point out, it is the responsibility of the parties to know the rules and procedures * * *. Coutu ex rel. Coutu v. Porter , 744 A.2d 405, 406 (R.I. 1999) (mem.). What is more, we have certainly stated that [i]t is incumbent upon the party intending to appeal to be watchful for the entry of a valid judgment. Blais , 812 A.2d at 839. However, we would note that we have already concluded that the error committed by counsel for Family Dollar did not stem from a lack of knowledge of the rules, but rather stemmed from his not unreasonable (albeit erroneous) expectations relative to the electronic filing system. Moreover, a determination of excusable neglect is an equitable determination; and, for the above-stated reasons, we can detect no abuse of discretion with respect to the hearing justices weighing of the equities in this case. See Duffy , 111 A.3d at 366.
Accordingly, it is our judgment that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in finding excusable neglect in this case. However, we wish to be absolutely clear: our holding in this case is the result of our careful scrutiny of the specific facts and context of this case.
B
Family Dollars Appeal-Motions to Dismiss
Having determined that Family Dollars appeal is properly before us, we turn to the substance of that appeal-i.e. , the dismissal of Family Dollars case in Superior Court due to the fact that the charge of discrimination at issue was destined for a hearing before the Commission at the time when the complaint for declaratory judgment and breach of contract was filed.
1. Standard of Review
We have stated that, [w]hen we review the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard as the hearing justice. Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rein v. ESS Group, Inc. , 184 A.3d 695, 699 (R.I. 2018). In so doing we confine ourselves to the four corners of the complaint, assume that the allegations set forth are true, and resolve any doubts in favor of the complaining party. Chase , 160 A.3d at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC , 134 A.3d 173, 175 (R.I. 2016). A motion to dismiss may be granted only when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of conceivable facts that could be proven in support of its claim. Chase , 160 A.3d at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe ex rel. His Parents and Natural Guardians v. East Greenwich School Department , 899 A.2d 1258, 1264-65 (R.I. 2006).
We further note that [a] dismissal of a declaratory-judgment action before a hearing on the merits * * * is proper only when the pleadings demonstrate that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the declaration prayed for is an impossibility. Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown , 964 A.2d 1138, 1140 (R.I. 2009) ; see also Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association v. Preservation Society of Newport County , 151 A.3d 1223, 1228 (R.I. 2017) ; Perron v. Treasurer of City of Woonsocket , 121 R.I. 781, 786, 403 A.2d 252, 255 (1979).
2. Discussion
Family Dollar urges this Court on appeal to reverse the trial courts decision to dismiss Family Dollars declaratory judgment action * * * [and] conclude [that] the settlement agreement * * * entered into between Family Dollar and Appellee Justin B. Araujo * * * preclude[d] him from proceeding with the Charge of Discrimination * * * currently pending before the [Commission]. Family Dollar contends that it was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because the question before the Superior Court was a pure question of law, which should be decided by the courts. It notes that Family Dollars right[s] under the Release are separate and distinct from the statutory rights the Commission is empowered to enforce.
After a thorough review of the record in this case and after careful consideration of the parties arguments, we conclude that the hearing justice erred in dismissing Family Dollars action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9.
We have indicated that [a] release is a contractual agreement, and the various principles of the law of contracts govern the judicial approach to a controversy concerning the meaning of a particular release. Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc. , 973 A.2d 553, 558 (R.I. 2009). Moreover, we have specifically stated that [c]ontract interpretation is a question of law; it is only when the contract terms are ambiguous that construction of terms becomes a question of fact. Dubis v. East Greenwich Fire District , 754 A.2d 98, 100 (R.I. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In deciding whether or not to issue a declaratory judgment with respect to whether the release at issue serves as a bar to Mr. Araujos recovery in this case, the Superior Court was originally and will be hereafter presented with the very limited task of interpreting a contract between the parties. To reiterate, the only issue in the case before the Superior Court with respect to the declaratory judgment count was the validity and effectiveness of the release contained in the settlement agreement between Family Dollar and Mr. Araujo-an issue well within the Superior Courts jurisdiction and competence and one with which the justices of the Superior Court must deal frequently. What is more, a declaratory judgment action is a statutory remedy available to Family Dollar which is quite separate and distinct from the proceedings before the Commission. See G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9. Indeed, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act clearly allows the holder of a release document such as the one at issue in this case to seek from the Superior Court a declaration as to the validity and enforceability of the release. See § 9-30-2. Prompt and definitive resolution of release-related issues is one of the many salutary efficiencies made possible by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Accordingly, it is entirely clear to this Court that Family Dollars complaint with respect to the validity and enforceability of the release may proceed in Superior Court.
This Courts jurisprudence with respect to the election of remedies doctrine similarly leads us to conclude that the hearing justice erred in the instant case. As we have previously stated, [t]he doctrine of election of remedies is one that is grounded in equity and is designed to mitigate unfairness to both parties by preventing double redress for a single wrong. Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC , 85 A.3d 1147, 1154 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State Department of Environmental Management v. State Labor Relations Board , 799 A.2d 274, 278 (R.I. 2002). The doctrine applies only in cases where the parties have two or more inconsistent remedies and where asserting one necessarily negates or repudiates the other. Silva v. Silva , 122 R.I. 178, 184, 404 A.2d 829, 832 (1979) ; see also Coderre v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket , 105 R.I. 266, 274, 251 A.2d 397, 402 (1969). There is of course no bar to the use of concurrent and consistent remedies. Silva , 122 R.I. at 184, 404 A.2d at 832 ; see also Coderre , 105 R.I. at 274, 251 A.2d at 402.
In applying that precedent to the instant case, we do not hesitate to conclude that there is no viable election of remedies issue in this case. In the judgment of this Court, and contrary to the assertion of defendants, it matters not that Family Dollar opted not to have the case removed to Superior Court pursuant to § 28-5-24.1(c) because we are confronted with the plain blunt fact that Family Dollar did not commence this litigation before the Commission and thus did not affirmatively elect any remedy. See, e.g. , Rhode Island Employment Security Alliance, Local 401, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO v. State Department of Employment and Training , 788 A.2d 465, 468 (R.I. 2002) (stating that the plaintiffs, having elected their remedies, are now barred from pursuing the matter in court until the remedy they initiated has been exhausted) (emphasis added); Cipolla v. Rhode Island College, Board of Governors for Higher Education , 742 A.2d 277, 282 (R.I. 1999) (stating that [o]nce the plaintiff entered the grievance procedure, he had selected the remedy to adjudicate his claim, and he should have pursued that remedy to its conclusion) (emphasis added). Consequently, Family Dollar is entitled to have the question of the validity and enforceability of the contractual settlement agreement passed upon by the courts at this juncture. It is our opinion that the election of remedies doctrine is inapplicable to the case before us.
Additionally, we do not believe that the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable to this case since we are not confronted with a situation where Family Dollar is aggrieved by a decision of an agency and must exhaust all avenues of review within that agency before proceeding to court; rather, this is a purely contractual issue. See Almeida v. Plasters and Cement Masons Local 40 Pension Fund , 722 A.2d 257, 259 (R.I. 1998) (The general rule is that a plaintiff first must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an administrative decision.). The validity and applicability of the release is a legal question, unquestionably within the jurisdiction and purview of the Superior Court. See Burns v. Sundlun , 617 A.2d 114, 117 (R.I. 1992) (noting, in holding that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply in that case, that the question was a pure question of law). As such, in our judgment, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable to the instant case.
In conclusion, we hold that the hearing justice erred in dismissing Family Dollars declaratory judgment action. It certainly has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Family Dollar would not be entitled to relief under any set of conceivable facts on either its declaratory judgment or breach of contract claims. See Chase , 160 A.3d at 973. What is more, it is certainly clear that defendants have not borne their burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the declaration requested in the declaratory judgment count in the complaint is an impossibility. See Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC , 964 A.2d at 1140.
Accordingly, Family Dollars declaratory judgment action may proceed in Superior Court on remand.
III
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the November 9, 2016 order of the Superior Court is affirmed. The September 20, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court is vacated. The record may be returned to that tribunal.
Chief Justice Suttell, with whom Justice Indeglia joins, dissenting.
Although I am not unsympathetic to the plight of the plaintiffs counsel in navigating the intricacies of the courts relatively new electronic filing system, I would point out that Rule 77(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure is neither new nor confusing. Because I do not believe that the plaintiff has met the high standard that this Court has set for a finding of excusable neglect, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority explains, the defendants cross-appeal is grounded in two procedural rules and this Courts previous interpretation and application of those rules. Rule 77(d) provides: Immediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall make a note in the docket. Such notation is sufficient notice for all purposes for which notice of the entry of an order is required by these rules * * *. Article I, Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal be filed within twenty days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from[,] but, [u]pon a showing of excusable neglect, the trial court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original time prescribed by this [rule].
We have previously described excusable neglect as
a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the partys own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party. Boranian v. Richer , 983 A.2d 834, 838 (R.I. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting Pleasant Management, LLC v. Carrasco , 960 A.2d 216, 224-25 (R.I. 2008) ).
Relief from the repercussions of failure to comply with procedural requirements will not be granted unless it is first factually established that counsels neglect was occasioned by some extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance to render it excusable. UAG West Bay AM, LLC v. Cambio , 987 A.2d 873, 880 (R.I. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting King v. Brown , 103 R.I. 154, 157, 235 A.2d 874, 875 (1967) ). We have characterized such circumstances as those that are out of that party or counsels control. Id. (quoting Boranian , 983 A.2d at 840 ). This Court has declined to grant relief from a counsels failure to timely file a notice of appeal when the failure to file was fully within his or her control, and his or her failure to do so derived from his or her own conduct. Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Astors Beechwood v. People Coal Company, Inc. , 659 A.2d 1109, 1116 (R.I. 1995) ).
This Court has also stated that, [w]hen determining whether or not the evidence in a particular case indicates that the conduct at issue amounts to excusable neglect, this Court asks whether what transpired was a course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances. Duffy v. Estate of Scire , 111 A.3d 358, 366 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Boranian , 983 A.2d at 839 ). [T]he determination of excusable neglect is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the partys omission. Boranian , 983 A.2d at 839 (quoting Pleasant Management, LLC , 960 A.2d at 225 ).
There is no question here that the final judgment was signed and entered on the docket on September 20, 2016. The plaintiffs counsel asserts that he was caught unaware of the entry of judgment on September 20 because he did not receive a notification from the electronic case management system that the judgment had been entered, and some of his attempts to inquire directly at the Superior Court went unanswered. The plaintiffs counsel submitted an affidavit with plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal in which he attested that he had received thirty-eight electronic notifications about this case from the electronic filing system since he filed the complaint in March 2016, but that he had not received a notification that the order and judgment had been entered on September 20, 2016. There is no indication, however, that he had received notifications in the past when an order in the case was entered on the docket-only that he received a notification when opposing counsel electronically filed the proposed order and proposed judgment as well as many other notifications (the content and context of which were not provided in the written arguments to the Superior Court or to this Court).
The record indicates that plaintiffs counsel received an electronic notification on August 24 that the proposed final judgment had been filed with the electronic filing system. Counsel called the Superior Court clerks office on September 7 to inquire about its status; he was told that the document was pending. Counsel followed up once more by telephone in late-September or early-October, then he emailed the hearing justices deputy clerk on October 19. Not receiving a response, counsel sent another email on October 31, to which the deputy clerk replied that the judgment had been entered on September 20.
In light of the clear wording of Rule 77(d), it was the responsibility of counsel to monitor the docket to determine whether the judgment had been entered electronically or the old-fashioned way. See Cambio , 987 A.2d at 879 ([I]t is incumbent upon the party intending to appeal to be watchful for the entry of a valid judgment.) (quoting Blais v. Beacon Mutual Insurance Company , 812 A.2d 838, 839 (R.I. 2002) (mem.) ). Four contacts with the clerks office in a nearly eight-week period are simply not sufficient.
Taking all of the relevant circumstances into account and considering our high standard for excusable neglect, counsels confusion as to the process of docketing orders and judgments does not rise to the level of excusable neglect because counsel has not established extenuating circumstances that were out of his control. See Cambio , 987 A.2d at 880. Despite the hearing justices acknowledgment that there were many areas of confusion as the Superior Court transitioned to the electronic filing system, the plaintiffs counsels misplaced expectation that he would be notified electronically when the judgment entered was not occasioned by [an] extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance to render it excusable. Id. (quoting King , 103 R.I. at 157, 235 A.2d at 875 ). And, in my opinion, the hearing justice abused his discretion by so concluding. See id. at 878. Accordingly, I would sustain the defendants cross-appeal, vacate the Superior Courts November 9, 2016 order granting the plaintiffs motion for extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal, and dismiss the plaintiffs appeal from the September 20, 2016 judgment in favor of the defendants.
The amendments to the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure which provided for the implementation of the electronic filing system as to civil cases took effect on November 5, 2014. See Super. R. Civ. P. 86. The electronic filing system for criminal cases was implemented at a later date. See Super. R. Crim. P. 59.
We would add that, in view of the plethora of information provided to litigants through the electronic filing system, now may well be the time for revisiting the provisions of Rule 77(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, especially with respect to the giving of notice of the entry of an order or judgment, one of the most significant events in the travel of a case.
In view of the fact that Family Dollars appellate argument focuses solely on the dismissal of its declaratory judgment count and in view of the fact that the breach of contract count was dismissed without prejudice (as was the declaratory judgment count), we need not and shall not pass upon the hearing justices dismissal without prejudice of the breach of contract claim.
We need not pass upon whether or not, in the circumstances of this case, the Commission has authority to pass upon the validity and effectiveness of the release. See Grady v. Narragansett Electric Co. , 962 A.2d 34, 42 n.4 (R.I. 2009) (noting our usual policy of not opining with respect to issues about which we need not opine).