Scott W. Dales, United States Bankruptcy Judge
After the court declined to confirm debtor Darcy A. Hagers chapter 13 plan, Ms. Hager retained new counsel, Kerry D. Hettinger, Esq., to assist her in proposing and prosecuting a revised, confirmable plan. Mr. Hettinger took on the Debtors case, assisted her in revising her plan, and persuaded the court to confirm it, over the objections of creditor Lawrence W. Newmeyer, Esq. Mr. Hettinger then filed an Application for Fees and Expenses (the Fee Application, ECF No. 89), seeking an award in the amount of $3,753.00 under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4).
Mr. Newmeyer timely filed Creditor Lawrence W. Newmeyers Objection to Attorney Hettingers Application for Fees and Expenses (the Objection, ECF No.
91), and the court held a hearing on July 25, 2018 in Kalamazoo, Michigan, to consider the Fee Application and the Objection. After listening to argument from Messrs. Hettinger and Newmeyer, the court took the matter under advisement. For the following reasons the court will approve the Fee Application as filed.
As the court noted in rejecting Mr. Newmeyers objection to the fee application of Ms. Hagers original counsel, the courts task when considering fee applications for chapter 13 debtors counsel is governed largely by § 330(a)(4) and the lodestar analysis. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4) ; In re Boddy , 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the lodestar award as product of multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable rate); In re Ulrich , 517 B.R. 77 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). Augmenting the statutory factors listed in § 330(a)(4), the Sixth Circuits Boddy decision also directs the court to consider the following:
(i) the time and labor required; (ii) the novelty and difficulty of the question; (iii) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (iv) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (v) the customary fee; (vi) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (vii) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstance; (viii) the amount of money involved and the results obtained; (ix) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (x) the lack of desirability of the case; (xi) the length and nature of the professional relationship with the client; and (xii) fee awards in similar cases.
Boddy , 950 F.2d at 338.
First with respect to Mr. Hettingers rate-$220 per hour-it falls within the courts presumptively reasonable hourly rate for consumer attorneys who, like Mr. Hettinger, regularly attend continuing legal education programs. See Memorandum Regarding Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses for Court-Appointed Professionals, as amended effective October 1, 2013 (the Fee Memorandum) at ¶ 16. Indeed, during the hearing, Mr. Newmeyer extolled Mr. Hettingers expertise in his field (which supports a higher than average rate), and nothing in the formers argument or Objection raised any issue regarding counsels hourly rate. The court is well-acquainted with Mr. Hettingers work, experience, and training, and finds that his hourly rate is reasonable.
With respect to the hours Mr. Hettinger spent in connection with the case, Mr. Newmeyer stated generally that he regards roughly eighteen hours as too much time to spend on the case under the circumstances, particularly given the fees the court awarded to the Debtors first law firm and the courts road map in the order denying confirmation of the Debtors original proposal. Although Mr. Newmeyer agreed that Mr. Hettinger should be paid something, his Objection did not include a specific reduction, nor did his oral argument suggest any specific reduction. Instead, Mr. Newmeyer appears to take issue with the courts prior fee award in favor of Chase Bylenga Hulst, PLLC, and Congresss decision to subordinate his claim to the claims of debtors counsel in chapter 13 cases. See Objection at ¶¶ 3 & C (suggesting that he contributed as much to the case as any of the Debtors lawyers, and requesting that the court place his claims against the Debtor on the same level as the claims of Debtors attorneys to reflect his contribution to the proper administration of the estate). As the court noted during the hearing, Congress sets the policy concerning whether fees for debtors counsel take priority over other claims; the court is not at liberty to ignore that decision, even under the guise of reducing fees.
As for Mr. Newmeyers supposed contribution to the case, the court does not regard the confirmable chapter 13 plan from the Debtor-even if prompted by Mr. Newmeyers involvement in the case-as the sort of benefit compensable as a cost of administration, and the legal fees that his repeated filings precipitated substantially undermined any such contribution, even if compensable. Moreover, the request for priority treatment, buried in the prayer for relief of the Objection and masked in an argumentative phrase, does not provide sufficient notice to other interested parties. The request is probably more rhetorical than genuine.
The court has carefully reviewed the itemization included within the Fee Application and has considered the arguments of counsel. Under the circumstances, the court finds that Mr. Hettingers hours spent on the case so far fall within the range of reasonableness. Mr. Hettinger supplemented the itemization of his fees by explaining at the hearing that the courts earlier denial of confirmation prompted him to proceed especially cautiously in advocating for a client who fared so poorly before the court with her original plan proposal. These concerns led Mr. Hettinger to proceed with extra diligence by interviewing not only the Debtor, as would be customary, but also the Debtors ex-husband (upon whose financial assistance and cooperation the revised plan would depend). In addition, Mr. Hettinger reports that he took additional steps to satisfy himself that the medical condition of the Debtors adult son justified the Debtors plan to retain a home large enough to accommodate him from time to time, given his medical needs. The court can hardly insist that attorneys comply with their obligations under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, including the obligation to investigate the factual predicates of their positions, and then penalize them by discounting their bills for making the necessary inquiries.
Moreover, several of the hours reflected in the itemization do not relate to the pursuit of confirmation, but instead show time spent addressing Mr. Newmeyers objection to the fees of the Debtors former counsel as well as his motion to reconsider the courts decision to confirm the plan. Mr. Hettinger spent a reasonable amount of time, approximately three hours, on these post-confirmation issues, in response to Mr. Newmeyers filings, for the debtors benefit. Thus, it is not fair to suggest, as Mr. Newmeyer did, that Mr. Hettinger spent eighteen hours making minor changes to the plan. As the court previously noted, Mr. Newmeyers aggressive approach to this proceeding goes a long way to explaining why the fees the court has approved under § 330(a)(4) are higher than it approves in more routine chapter 13 proceedings.
To summarize, after applying the lodestar analysis, and drawing on its experience in this and other matters, the court finds that Mr. Hettingers fees are reasonable and compensable under § 330(a)(4), notwithstanding Mr. Newmeyers arguments to the contrary.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Fee Application (ECF No. 89) is APPROVED and Mr. Hettinger shall have an administrative priority claim in the amount of $3,753.00 payable as provided in the confirmed plan.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9022 and LBR 5005-4 upon Lawrence W. Newmeyer, Esq., Kerry D. Hettinger, Esq., Kurt Steinke, Esq., Ms. Darcy A. Hager, the United States Trustee, and all entities included on the most recent creditor matrix.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Although the itemization suffers from occasional bunching of entries in a manner at odds with the Fee Memorandum, this defect does not seriously impede the courts review of the fees and, moreover, did not form any part of Mr. Newmeyers Objection.
See Memorandum of Decision and Order dated September 5, 2017 (ECF No. 56) at p. 17 (finding more than a tincture of bad faith).