JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Circuit Judge:
This is an interlocutory appeal of the grant of a motion to suppress. Defendant-Appellee Jeffrey Louis Freeman (Freeman) was stopped twice over the course of several months while driving his truck along Farm-to-Market Road 2050 (FM 2050) near the Texas-Mexico border, once by a county deputy and once by U.S. Border Patrol Agent Carlos Perez. Freeman was charged with conspiracy to transport an illegal alien within the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(I), and transportation of an alien within the United States for financial gain, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II). Freeman filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from both stops. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and recommended the district court grant Freemans motion as to the first stop but deny his motion as to the second stop. The district court adopted the magistrate judges recommendation as to the first stop, but not as to the second stop, granting Freemans motion to suppress as to both stops. The Appellant-Government appeals the district courts ruling as to the second stop only. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background of the Area and of Agent Perez
Agent Perezs testimony made up a significant portion of the suppression hearing before the magistrate judge. He testified that he had been a Border Patrol agent at the Freer, Texas immigration checkpoint for over eight years. His duties at the checkpoint consisted of working the inspection lanes and conducting immigration inspections on vehicles that approach the checkpoint. Agent Perez testified that the Freer checkpoint is about 50 miles from the border of the United States and Mexico and approximately 43 miles from Laredo, Texas. It sits on U.S. Highway 59, just north of where FM 2050 dead-ends into Highway 59. If a motorist traveling north on Highway 59 turned right (south) onto FM 2050, he would avoid the Freer checkpoint. Agent Perez testified that turning right onto FM 2050 from Highway 59 will add about an hour onto a trip from Laredo to Houston. It is undisputed that FM 2050 is known for alien and contraband smuggling.
Nevertheless, there are legitimate reasons to be on FM 2050. Agent Perez testified that there are homes, ranches, and businesses along the road. When pressed by the magistrate judge, he guessed there were perhaps a dozen homes, in addition to a wind farm, oil and gas concerns, and other ranches. Agent Perez testified he was familiar with some of the vehicles belonging to homeowners and people who worked on the road, but he was not familiar with all the vehicles. Over the eight years that he worked at the Freer checkpoint, Agent Perez had driven on FM 2050 numerous times, sometimes on a daily basis.
Agent Perez confirmed that no vehicle is stopped prior to turning down FM 2050, but once a vehicle makes the turn, Border Patrol attempt to chase down the vehicle and conduct a roving stop to see if there are any immigration violations occurring. When asked by the Government if the agents were actually stopping every single vehicle, Agent Perez answered, Yes, sir. Agent Perez explained these stops generally transpired as follows: an agent on the primary inspection lane, upon seeing a vehicle turn south on FM 2050, alerts an agent inside the checkpoint who comes out and attempts to chase down the vehicle. Once the pursuing agent finds the vehicle matching the description of the vehicle the primary agent called out, he attempts to run a registration check to determine where the vehicle is from, as it is uncommon for vehicles from out of the area to be traveling down FM 2050. While following the vehicle, the agent will observe the vehicle speed, the driving of the vehicle, and how the driver is reacting to being pursued.
Agent Perez estimated the Border Patrol made approximately ten to twenty roving stops per week on FM 2050. He estimated that he had only conducted approximately twenty to thirty stops throughout his eight years there, and only two or three of those stops resulted in seizures.
B. The February 13, 2017 (Second) Stop
On February 13, 2017, Agent Perez was working inside the Freer checkpoint rather than on the inspection lanes. Around 4:10 p.m., an agent called out that a white Chevy pickup truck turned onto FM 2050 and Agent Perez and his partner got into the pursuit vehicle and attempted to chase down the truck. Agent Perez estimated it took him and his partner about twenty seconds to walk to their vehicle, and another ten seconds to turn onto FM 2050. Agent Perez thought it took him [p]erhaps five minutes to catch up to the truck and that he traveled about over 100 miles an hour to reach it, although he had slowed down to [p]erhaps 70 miles per hour when he caught up to the truck. While Agent Perez testified that he checked his odometer frequently, he also stated twice that he was not sure if the truck was speeding.
Agent Perez noted the road was windy and hilly, but that it appeared to him the truck was swaying side to side within the lane and creating dust clouds from driving on the soft shoulder of the road. While Agent Perez testified he couldnt remember any construction signs on the road at the time of the stop, the Government stipulated before the hearing began that the road was under construction.
Prior to conducting the stop, Agent Perez testified his partner contacted radio dispatch to run a check on the trucks paper license plate. He initially testified that the paper plate made no difference to him, although after considerable prompting by the magistrate judge, Agent Perez stated that paper license plates are often used by smugglers to avoid suspicion or inspection. What did make a difference to Agent Perez was the fact that the vehicle was registered to an individual (Freeman, it turned out) out of Houston, Texas. Agent Perez noted it is uncommon to see vehicles based out of Houston on FM 2050 because it is not a direct route to Houston. However, nothing else stood out to Agent Perez about the truck; it was the type of vehicle commonly used by oil and gas companies on FM 2050.
While in pursuit of Freeman, Agent Perez could not see into the back of the truck but was able to see Freemans face in the side view mirror. He thought Freeman appeared to be nervous because he seemed to be glancing into the side mirror several times. Agent Perez activated his emergency lights and conducted a patrol stop. Agent Perez testified the stop occurred approximately nine miles from the checkpoint, but during the hearing defense counsel presented Agent Perez with maps indicating the stop was closer to 7.6 miles from the checkpoint. The stop occurred approximately nine and a half minutes after Freemans truck was called out. After Agent Perez stopped Freeman, Agent Perezs partner discovered there was a passenger in Freemans truck, Ms. Miriam Edith Rivera-Quintero. Ms. Rivera-Quintero did not have any legal status to be in the United States.
Ms. Rivera-Quintero testified at the suppression hearing that Freeman appeared to be driving at a normal rate of speed and that he only veered off the road when he was stopped by the agents. She also believed his behavior to be normal and that everything seemed to be fine prior to the car being stopped and the policemen coming up to the truck. However, Ms. Rivera-Quintero testified that she looked at pictures on her phone for much of the trip in an effort to calm herself.
C. The Magistrate Judges Report and Recommendation and the District Courts Order
The magistrate judge issued a written report and recommendation, recommending the district court, after an independent review of the record, grant in part Freemans motion to suppress as it related to the first stop, but deny in part his motion as it related to the February 13, 2017 stop. Freeman filed timely objections, and the district court reviewed the entire record de novo . The district court agreed with the recommendation as to the first stop, but disagreed with the recommendation as to the February 13th stop, finding the analysis in Freemans objections to be persuasive. While the district court noted that Agent Perez admitted to conducting roving patrol stops of all vehicles turning onto FM 2050 from Highway 59, the court said its decision did not hinge solely on that admission and was merely one aspect taken into consideration. At a later hearing regarding the detention of a material witness pending the instant appeal, the district court stated it found Ms. Rivera-Quinteros testimony about Freemans driving to be truthful. The district court also found that the math did not add up with respect to Freemans speed, and that the agents never actually witnessed Freeman speeding. The district court found there to be nothing evasive about the way that he was driving, and that the dust being kicked into the air was as good as it got. The district court characterized the stop as a fishing expedition and commented that had the agents been a little more patient and stayed behind the vehicle longer, they could probably have developed reasonable suspicion.
The Government appeals the district courts grant of Freemans motion to suppress as it relates to the February 13th stop.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a district courts ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the district courts findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law, including its determination regarding the presence of reasonable suspicion, de novo . United States v. Cervantes , 797 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Lopez-Moreno , 420 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir.2004) ). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below-here, Freeman. Cervantes , 797 F.3d at 328 ; Lopez-Moreno , 420 F.3d at 429 (citing United States v. Shelton, 337 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir.2003) ). We must defer to the findings of historical fact made by the district court unless left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Payne v. United States, 289 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir.2002). While this court reviews the district courts legal determination that the historical facts provided reasonable suspicion de novo , due weight must be given to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). The district courts ruling should be upheld if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. United States v. Ortiz , 781 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Scroggins , 599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2010) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Reasonable Suspicion for Roving Patrol Stops
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the Government, and its protections extend to roving patrol stops by U.S. Border Patrol agents. United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). To temporarily detain a vehicle for investigatory purposes, a Border Patrol agent on roving patrol must be aware of specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, that warrant a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is involved in illegal activities, such as transporting undocumented immigrants. United States v. Rangel-Portillo , 586 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Chavez-Chavez, 205 F.3d 145, 147 (5th Cir. 2000) ).
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 884-85, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), the Supreme Court outlined several factors to be considered when determining if reasonable suspicion exists. The Brignoni-Ponce factors include:
(1) the areas proximity to the border; (2) characteristics of the area; (3) usual traffic patterns; (4) the agents experience in detecting illegal activity; (5) behavior of the driver; (6) particular aspects or characteristics of the vehicle; (7) information about recent illegal trafficking of aliens or narcotics in the area; and (8) the number of passengers and their appearance and behavior.
Cervantes , 797 F.3d at 329 (quoting United States v. Soto , 649 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2011) ). No single factor is determinative; the totality of the particular circumstances known to the agents are examined when evaluating the reasonableness of a roving border patrol stop. United States v. Hernandez , 477 F.3d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 2007). The primary elements of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause. Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 696-97, 116 S.Ct. 1657.
B. Application of the Brignoni-Ponce Factors to the District Courts Findings of Fact
While the magistrate judge concluded the facts supported reasonable suspicion, in making a de novo determination of the factual findings and legal conclusions, the district came to the opposite conclusion. The district court did not explicitly make any factual findings in its order, but stated it found persuasive Freemans objections to the magistrate judges report, which largely contested the reports conclusions rather than its factual findings. The district court further explained its reasoning at a later hearing. The Government argues the district court clearly erred by not applying the totality of the circumstances test, noting that Freemans objections went through the Brignoni-Ponce factors in isolation rather than as a laminated whole. The Government also complains that the district court inappropriately considered the fact that the agents were stopping every car that turned right onto FM 2050. Freeman maintains the district court correctly examined the Brignoni-Ponce factors in totality and properly weighed the factors.
1. Proximity to the Border
[O]ne of the vital elements in the Brignoni-Ponce reasonable suspicion test is whether the agents had reason to believe that the vehicle in question recently crossed the border. United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez , 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1984). [A] car traveling more than 50 miles from the border is usually viewed as being too far from the border to support an inference that it originated its journey there. United States v. Jacquinot , 258 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Zapata-Ibarra , 212 F.3d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 2000) ). If there is no reason to believe that the vehicle came from the border, the remaining factors must be examined charily. United States v. Olivares-Pacheco , 633 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2011). While this court does not adhere to a bright line test regarding proximity, the proximity element can be satisfied if the defendants car was first observed within 50 miles of the United States/Mexico border, but was stopped more than 50 miles from the border. Jacquinot , 258 F.3d at 428.
The facts here are essentially undisputed-Freemans truck was spotted less than 50 miles from the border and was stopped more than 50 miles from the border. Because the truck was spotted less than 50 miles from the border, the proximity element is satisfied. Nevertheless, this fact alone cannot support reasonable suspicion, otherwise, law enforcement agents would be free to stop any vehicle on virtually any road anywhere near the Texas-Mexico border. Rangel-Portillo , 586 F.3d at 380 (quoting United States v. Diaz, 977 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1992) ). We must determine de novo how much weight to give this factor.
Freeman argues that because his truck was seen and stopped so close to the 50-mile benchmark, Agent Perez should have had additional independent indicia that Freeman had recently crossed the border and therefore this factor should receive little weight. While there are not many towns between Laredo and Freer along Highway 59, we hesitate to conclude that driving on a road coming from a densely populated city such as Laredo, even if situated along the border, can weigh heavily in favor of reasonable suspicion. See Melendez-Gonzalez , 727 F.2d at 411 (If a vehicle is already past towns in this country, the mere fact that it is proceeding on a public highway leading from the border is not sufficient cause to believe the vehicle came from the border.); see also Rangel-Portillo , 586 F.3d at 380-81 (stop within 500 yards of border was not supported by reasonable suspicion even where stop was conducted in area known for illegal alien smuggling). Accordingly, while we conclude that the stop occurred within proximity to the border, proximity here carries its weight only where there are other factors present which suggest illegal activity. As we shall explore below, that is not the case here.
2. Usual Traffic Patterns, Recent Illegal Activity, and Passengers
Agent Perez testified that the traffic patterns on February 13, 2017 were not unusual for the area. It is also undisputed that there was no recent information about illegal trafficking in the area prior to the agents pursuing Freeman. Further, Agent Perez and his partner did not see any passengers in the truck prior to stopping Freeman. Consequently, none of these factors weigh in favor of reasonable suspicion.
3. Freemans Behavior
i. Speeding
The district court found that Agent Perezs math did not add up and that he never saw Freeman speeding. This is a factual finding accorded deference, especially where Agent Perez specifically testified he was unsure whether Freeman was speeding. Further, while Agent Perez noticed that Freemans truck kicked up dust clouds, Freemans objections noted that, at least as of October 2016, FM 2050 was under construction and the new pavement had not been completed. Further, Freemans truck had kicked up dust prior to his first stop, where it was shown he was traveling under 60 miles per hour, and the Government at the suppression hearing stipulated that the road was under construction at the time of both stops. Taking these facts in the light most favorable to Freeman, we find no error in the district courts factual determination that Freeman was not speeding and it was therefore objectively unreasonable for Agent Perez to have concluded he was.
ii. Looking Nervous and Erratic Driving
The district court credited Ms. Rivera-Quinteros testimony that Freeman did not seem nervous and did not appear to be swerving, and could have reasonably inferred that even if Freeman was glancing in his side mirror, this was a response to being pursued by Agent Perez, especially where Agent Perez testified that part of the purpose of pursuing vehicles that turn right onto FM 2050 is to see how the driver reacts to such pursuit. United States v. Jones , 149 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1998) ([W]hen the officers actions are such that any driver, whether innocent or guilty, would be preoccupied with his presence, then any inference that might be drawn from the drivers behavior is destroyed.). It is therefore not clearly erroneous for the district court to have found Freeman was not driving erratically.
4. Characteristics of the Area
The characteristics of the area weigh in favor of reasonable suspicion. It is essentially undisputed that FM 2050 is a known smuggling route, which weighs in favor of reasonable suspicion. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d at 881-82 (quoting United States v. Aldaco , 168 F.3d 148, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1999) (It is well established that a roads reputation as a smuggling route adds to the reasonableness of the agents suspicion.) ); but see Rangel-Portillo , 586 F.3d at 380 (5th Cir. 2009) (Absent some other contributing factor, merely driving in an area notorious for alien smuggling, alone, does not constitute reasonable suspicion.).
5. Particular Aspects of the Vehicle
As for the particular aspects of the vehicle, the truck was of the type normally found on FM 2050. Nevertheless, the truck had paper license plates and was registered to an individual out of Houston. Based on Agent Perezs testimony, at the time of the stop Agent Perez did not find the temporary plates to be suspicious. However, after being pressed by the magistrate judge he stated paper plates could indicate someone attempting to avoid detection. What Agent Perez did find unusual was the fact that the vehicle was registered to an individual rather than a company, as well as the fact that the truck was from Houston and FM 2050 was not the most direct route to Houston. Freeman argues the district court properly accorded little to no weight to these factors. While the weight given these factors is reviewed de novo , the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to Freeman.
Freeman argues that the reasoning behind paper plates contributing to reasonable suspicion-that a driver might wish to evade detection-does not apply in this case because when Agent Perezs partner ran the license plate, it turned up current information. The Government counters that Freeman is simply considering this fact in isolation and not how an objective officer would view the situation. However, Freemans interpretation appears bolstered by the fact that, at the time of the stop, Agent Perez did not find the paper license plates to be anything unusual. The facts must be taken together (both the paper plates and the current registration) and viewed in the light most favorable to Freeman-meaning paper license plates under these specific circumstances deserve little weight.
Freeman next notes that the assumption that it is suspicious to travel an indirect route to where the car is registered cannot be made. Even if such an assumption were reasonable, it simply is not unusual that the particular route chosen by a driver does not coincide with a route Border Patrol Agents consider more direct or common. This is especially true when the driver is from another part of the state. United States v. Escamilla , 560 F.2d 1229, 1232 (5th Cir. 1977). To the extent that Freemans decision to take an indirect route to Houston affects the reasonable suspicion analysis, it is encompassed within the fact that FM 2050 is a known smuggling route.
The Government mentions several times the fact that Agent Perez did not recognize Freemans truck and argues this weighs in favor of reasonable suspicion. However, the Government significantly overstates how familiar Agent Perez was with the local traffic, as Agent Perez only said he recognized some vehicles, not that he recognized most. Further, Agent Perez did not actually testify that he did not recognize the truck, as it was a common type of vehicle to be in that area and he found nothing suspicious about it until after running the license plate check.
6. Agent Perezs Experience
The remaining factor is Agent Perezs experience, which, after proximity to the border, is likely the most important factor because the facts are to be viewed through the eyes of an objective officer with Agent Perezs experience. See Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. (internal quotation marks omitted) ); United States v. Neufeld-Neufeld , 338 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2003) ([W]e must view all the facts as a collective whole in light of the context and the Agent[s] experience.).
The parties diverge in how they characterize Agent Perezs experience. Freeman contends that the district court correctly concluded that Agent Perez was inexperienced at detecting illegal activity. The Government contends that with over 8 years of experience at the checkpoint and twenty to thirty stops on this specific road, Agent Perez should be considered to have extensive experience. However, it is not simply the agents time on the job that is relevant, but the agents experience in detecting illegal activity . Cervantes , 797 F.3d at 329.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Freeman, Agent Perezs experience as it pertained to detecting illegal activity on roving patrol stops should be viewed in a much more constrained way. It is undisputed Agent Perez drove FM 2050 numerous times, but that he made only two to three successful stops over the course of eight years. When these facts are considered in context with the normal number of stops on FM 2050, it suggests Agent Perez had very little experience detecting illegal activity. Agent Perez testified that agents conducted approximately ten to twenty stops per week. Taking the low range of this estimate, that would mean approximately 4,160 stops were conducted during his tenure at the Freer checkpoint. Even assuming Agent Perez made thirty stops, he participated in only a fraction of the stops along FM 2050, and, out of the few stops he made, he was successful only about 10% of the time. Seen in this light, the district court could reasonably have discounted Agent Perezs experience as it related to forming reasonable suspicion. Likewise, we conclude this factor bears little weight in the analysis.
7. Examining the Factors as a Laminated Total
At this point, we are left with the following facts to be viewed from Agent Perezs limited experience in detecting illegal activity: Freemans truck, a type commonly found in the area, was seen less than 50 miles from the border, it turned right onto a road known for smuggling, and his truck was registered to an individual. We conclude that these facts, without more, are not enough to support reasonable suspicion, especially when viewed through the eyes of an agent with minimal experience detecting illegal activity. Courts that have found reasonable suspicion, even in cases in close proximity to the border, have generally required more. This case is more closely analogous to Rangel-Portillo , where the court found no reasonable suspicion. Rangel-Portillo , 586 F.3d at 380-81. There, 500 yards from the border in an area known for smuggling, the driver of a Ford Explorer pulled out of a Wal-Mart parking lot, made eye contact with the Border Patrol agent, and his passengers looked straight forward and did not make eye contact with the agent. Id. If the facts of this case constituted reasonable suspicion, virtually anyone who drove a car registered to an individual and turned right onto FM 2050, a public road, would be subject to being stopped by Border Patrol agents. As the district court pointed out, had Agent Perez waited a little longer, he may have been able to develop reasonable suspicion; he did not. The district courts ruling should be upheld if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it, Ortiz , 781 F.3d at 226 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez , 190 F.3d 668, 671 (1999) ). There are ample grounds to support the district courts determination that reasonable suspicion was lacking.
C. The Significance of Whren
The Government argues the district court committed legal error by ignoring the Supreme Courts pronouncement in Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) and considering and crediting Agent Perezs testimony that Border Patrol agents stopped all cars turning right onto FM 2050. In Whren , the Supreme Court noted the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officers action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. Whren , 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Scott v. United States , 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) ). However, the amount of significance the district court attributed to the Border Patrols practice is largely irrelevant where the factors, when viewed together, do not support reasonable suspicion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the district courts conclusion that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the roving patrol stop was supported by the evidence, we AFFIRM the district courts grant of Freemans motion to suppress.
The exchange between the Government and Agent Perez went like this:
Q. When you say that [you chase down the vehicle to conduct a roving stop], are you-are you stopping every vehicle-let me ask you that.
Are you stopping-actually stopping every single vehicle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And so youre doing this to every single vehicle that turns down that road?
A. Thats correct.
The Government filed a Rule 28j letter prior to oral argument where it argued for the first time that the district court improperly disregarded the credibility determinations made by the magistrate judge without holding its own hearing. Whether or not this issue was waived, the district court was well within its right to rely on Agent Perezs testimony that he was unsure Freeman was speeding, especially in light of the totality of the record, including Ms. Rivera-Quinteros testimony, the condition of FM 2050, and the time between the call-out and the stop.
At the end of its opening brief, the Government argues United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) applies. Martinez-Fuerte concerned permanent checkpoints and held that stops and questioning ... may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.428 U.S. at 562, 96 S.Ct. 3074. The Government claims it is undisputed that the Freer checkpoint is reasonably located; however, the Government did not raise this issue in the district court and the reasonableness of the checkpoints location is subject to judicial review. Id. at 559, 96 S.Ct. 3074. This issue is therefore not properly before us, as neither the district court nor Freeman had an opportunity to consider or develop facts or argument on this issue. See Benefit Recovery, Inc. v. Donelon , 521 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (We will not consider arguments or evidence that was not presented to the district court.).
See e.g. , United States v. De Leon-Reyna , 930 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (agent saw welding truck with no welding equipment on known smuggling route; truck had stack of plywood indicating plywood had all been loaded at one time, but no indications of how cargo could have been loaded; driver appeared scared; truck had broken shock absorber suggesting heavy load in rear of truck; license plates were registered to a dump truck); United States v. Canales , 62 F.3d 395, 1995 WL 450255 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (agents were notified by ranch employee that unauthorized vehicle was using private ranch road; private road was often used by smugglers; truck matched description of unauthorized vehicle; trucks license plates were not registered); United States v. Delgado , 99 F. Appx 493 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (Border Patrol sensors were set off on private ranch road at unusual hour of the morning; private road was generally only used by ranchers; truck was registered from out of town; reason to believe defendants truck had come from private ranch road; truck had no visible load but bed of truck appeared lower than expected for unloaded truck; truck was preceded by possible scout vehicle); United States v. Rodriguez , 585 F. Appx 307, 308 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (rented vehicle not of the type usually seen on FM 2050; car traveling in tandem with another vehicle; neither vehicle was registered locally; there had been recent alien smuggling activity in area).