Wood, Chief Judge.
At the time of David Joness arrest and prosecution in 2005, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 (1982) identified an omnibus date and allowed prosecutors to make substantive amendments to pending charges only up to 30 days before the omnibus date. Seven years earlier, in a case called Haak v. State , 695 N.E.2d 944, 951 (Ind. 1998), the Indiana Supreme Court had confirmed the strict nature of this deadline. Disregarding this rule, in Joness case the state moved nine days after the omnibus date to amend the charging instrument to add a new and highly consequential charge of criminal confinement. Joness attorney did not object to this untimely amendment, and Jones was ultimately convicted of the confinement charge.
According to the state, there is nothing unique about Joness case. It tells us that defense attorneys around Indiana routinely ignored both the clear text of the statute and the Haak decision and allowed prosecutors to make untimely amendments. If that is an accurate account, it is hardly reassuring. For a lawyer to fail to take advantage of a clear avenue of relief for her client is no less concerning because many others made the same error-if anything, it is more so.
We have seen this problem before. See Shaw v. Wilson , 721 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2013). We held in Shaw that following the crowd is no excuse for depriving a criminal defendant of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 917. We accordingly held that Shaw was entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, based on his attorneys failure to object to an untimely amendment to his charges under the same Indiana law now before us. Id. at 910. We conclude that Jones is entitled to the same relief.
I
Jones was convicted of crimes tied to two incidents of domestic violence in 2005. In the first, he attacked his partner and was charged with battery; in the second, he threatened her and was charged (under a separate docket number) with intimidation and being a habitual offender. The trial court set a joint omnibus date for both cases of October 18, 2005. Nine days after that date, the state moved to amend the information in the battery case to add a charge of criminal confinement. (We refer to this as the First Amendment.) As we noted, Joness attorney let this pass without objection, and the court granted the states motion without a hearing. Then in January 2006, the state moved to amend the charge in the intimidation case to add the language or engage in conduct against her will. (This is the Second Amendment.) A few months later Joness new attorney filed a motion to dismiss the amended information in the intimidation case, but the trial court denied the motion.
The cases were consolidated for trial, by which time Jones had yet another attorney. On the first day of trial, the state moved to amend the information for the criminal-confinement charge (i.e. the battery case) again, this time to add the language and/or extreme pain. Joness attorney objected, but the court overruled him and allowed the amendment. (This was the Third Amendment.) The jury found Jones guilty of all three charges (battery, criminal confinement, and intimidation). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years for criminal confinement, enhanced by 25 years for being a habitual offender; eight years for battery resulting in serious bodily injury; and three years for intimidation. Later the trial court on its own motion reduced the battery conviction to a class B misdemeanor and reduced that sentence to six months because of double-jeopardy concerns.
On direct review, Jones argued that the trial court erred when it allowed the First Amendment in violation of Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected that argument on waiver grounds, because of counsels failure to object.
Jones v. State , 876 N.E.2d 389, 2007 WL 3287457, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished table decision) ( Jones I ), transfer denied, 891 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 2008). His state-court petition for post-conviction relief was also unsuccessful. Jones v. State , 46 N.E.3d 501, 2016 WL 359276, at *2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ( Jones II ) (unpublished table decision), transfer denied, 49 N.E.3d 107 (Ind. 2016).
After exhausting his state-court remedies, Jones filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In it, he argues that his first lawyers failure to object to the untimely First Amendment amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the failure of the state courts to grant him relief on that ground involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We review the district courts decision to deny a petition under section 2254de novo , but the standard we apply is one under which relief is possible only if the state courts determination was objectively unreasonable. Virginia v. LeBlanc , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 198 L.Ed.2d 186 (2017) (great deference is due to state-court determination, and standard for granting relief under section 2254 is meant to be a difficult one); McNary v. Lemke , 708 F.3d 905, 914 (7th Cir. 2013).
The district court denied Joness petition and dismissed his case with prejudice. It also denied a certificate of appealability, but we issued one based on Shaw . Before this court (now represented by recruited counsel, whom we thank), Jones argues only that his attorneys failure to object to the First Amendment, which added the criminal-confinement charge that accounts for the lions share of his sentence, violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
II
The version of Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 in effect during Joness prosecution forbade amendments of substance after 30 days before the omnibus date. In Haak , Indianas highest court held that untimely amendments were impermissible if they were amendments of substance, and that the other procedures in Indiana law allowing prosecutors to make post-omnibus amendments applied only to amendments of form. Id. Shortly after Joness conviction, another defendant who did object to an untimely amendment had his conviction reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court in Fajardo v. State , 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1202 (Ind. 2007). Jones argues, in essence, that his case should have been Fajardo , and would have been if counsel had lodged a timely objection. Counsels failure to do so, he contends, was both defective performance and highly prejudicial.
A Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness of counsel can be predicated on an attorneys failure to raise a state-law issue in a state-court proceeding. McNary , 708 F.3d at 920. We look to state law in our evaluation of such a claim. George v. Smith , 586 F.3d 479, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2009). This focus on state law does not prevent us from considering the attorneys failure to raise an obvious argument.
McNary , 708 F.3d at 920. That is because we are assessing counsels performance, and that assessment proceeds against the backdrop of whatever the state says its law is. We then apply the standards of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to determine whether counsels assistance met constitutional standards. That requires us to determine whether counsels actions fell below the constitutional minimum and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels errors, the outcome would have been different. Id . at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Shaw presented almost the identical situation for our review. 721 F.3d at 910. At the time of Shaws conviction, the same Indiana law was in effect, and the state similarly amended the information to add a more serious charge against Shaw after his omnibus date had passed. Shaws trial counsel objected to the amendment, but the trial court ruled against him. Shaws appellate attorney declined to pursue this point on appeal, choosing instead to make a near-frivolous argument about the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 912.
When Shaw reached this court, the state made the same arguments against a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel that it is making in Joness case. We were not persuaded. We found irrelevant the fact that no Indiana appellate court had previously invalidated an untimely amendment at the time of Shaws conviction-for all we knew, the trial courts were policing this rule on their own. There could be no doubt, we thought, that the combination of the terms of the statute and Haak made this argument available for responsible counsel. Id. at 916. We also rejected the states attempt to portray the facts as unfairly requiring counsel to predict a change in the law, for the simple reason that nothing had changed. Id. at 916-17. And we held that the possibility of additional time to prepare for trial did not alleviate any potential prejudice, since dismissal was a real possibility under existing law. Id. at 918.
Jones, like Shaw, had a strong argument for dismissing one of the charges against him, yet his trial attorney did not pursue it. The state suggests that Haak was widely ignored by defense counsel, but we have no hard data to back up that impression. We are loath to say that an attorneys failure to heed the specific direction of the Indiana Supreme Court and the plain text of Indiana law is excusable. To the contrary, that action falls outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance required by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As in Shaw , this feature of Indiana law created a real opportunity for Joness defense, but counsel let it slip away. Fajardo and its aftermath show that this opportunity did not dissipate until years after Joness trial. We conclude that this was one of those rare cases in which counsels performance fell below the constitutional minimum, and that the Indiana appellate courts conclusion otherwise was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Shaw , 721 F.3d at 915.
That leaves the question of prejudice. The facts here speak for themselves on that point. It is easy to find a reasonable probability that counsels error prejudiced Jones. As we noted in Shaw :
Prejudice exists, however, if counsel bypassed a non-frivolous argument that, if successful, would have resulted in the vacation of Shaws conviction (just as the conviction in Fajardo later was). If one is entitled to a dismissal, a continuance is no comfort. And when evaluating prejudice, unlike when evaluating attorney performance, hindsight is permissible.... This means that the Indiana Supreme Courts ultimate decision in Fajardo is relevant to whether the argument [the lawyer] jettisoned was both nonfrivolous and stronger than the sufficiency argument he presented.
Id. at 918. Hindsight in Joness case tells us that his attorneys silence doomed his appeal. On direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that the First Amendment was made in violation of Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-5(b). Jones I , 2007 WL 3287457, at *3. In other words, what killed the argument in that court was waiver, not lack of merit. As the court put it, [Jones] did not object to the amendment on the same grounds to the trial court ... [and thus] [t]he issue is waived. Id. at *3-4.
Indianas efforts to distinguish Shaw fall flat. Joness case does not require us to resolve any question of state law; it demands only the application of the states statutes, as interpreted by Indianas highest court. When addressing Joness lawyers failure to object to the untimely substantive amendment, we need ask only whether raising the issue had a better than fighting chance at the time. Shaw , 721 F.3d at 916. It did. As we said in Shaw , a competent lawyer in Indiana should have recognized that there was a state statute under which relief for his client was possible and would have pursued that theory. Id. at 914.
III
Adhering to Shaw , we thus VACATE the district courts decision to deny Joness petition for a writ of habeas corpus and REMAND with instructions to issue the writ within 120 days with respect to his conviction for criminal confinement only and to make any necessary adjustments in his sentence on the two unchallenged counts of conviction.
Indiana amended this statute four months after the Indiana Supreme Court applied it in Fajardo v. State , 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007). See Act of May 8, 2007, P.L. 178-2007 § 1, 2007 Ind. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified as amended at Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 (2014) ). The amendment is not retroactive and thus has no effect on Joness case.
The fact that the defendant in Fajardo won the reversal of his conviction on the improperly added charge and resentencing persuades us that this is not simply a matter of paper-shuffling for Jones. The Indiana Supreme Court unanimously disposed of Fajardo as follows: Because the trial courts sentencing determination for Count 1 may have been substantially affected by the sentence determination for Count 2, we remand to the trial court for a new sentencing determination. 859 N.E.2d at 1209. Had Joness attorney rendered adequate assistance, he would have been entitled to the same treatment.
The dissent suggests that we are giving inadequate deference to the state courts decision in Joness own case. We respectfully disagree. Limited though our role in habeas corpus cases may be, it is not meaningless. While the bar for a successful claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is high and issuance of the writ is rare, some cases clear those hurdles, and we are not free to read the statute out of the books. The Supreme Court on a significant number of occasions post-AEPDA has held a state prisoner was entitled to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because the state courts decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (right to effective assistance of counsel as required by Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (right to effective assistance of counsel as required by Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); Rompilla v. Beard , 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (right to effective assistance of counsel as required by Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman , 550 U.S. 233, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007) (right to present mitigation evidence to sentencing jury as required by Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) ); Panetti v. Quarterman , 551 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (right to present arguments showing incompetency to be executed, as required by Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) ); Brewer v. Quarterman , 550 U.S. 286, 127 S.Ct. 1706, 167 L.Ed.2d 622 (2007) (right to present mitigation evidence to sentencing jury as required by Penry , 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934 ); Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 173, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) (right to effective assistance of counsel as required by Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); McWilliams v. Dunn , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1790, 198 L.Ed.2d 341 (2017) (right to mental health expert as required by Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ). These cases show that each case must be assessed on its own, and that we continue to have the duty to correct a misapplication of clearly established federal law when that error meets the statutory standards.