SOUTER, Associate Justice.
Defendant Kenny Pacheco pleaded guilty to conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and to using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of 70 months in prison on the first offense and 60 months on the second. On appeal, Pacheco argues that his firearms conviction and sentence duplicate his prior conviction and sentence for a firearms offense under Puerto Rico law, and thus violate the Fifth Amendments guarantee against double jeopardy.
We conclude that the record as presented here does not permit evaluation of Pachecos double jeopardy claim, containing as it does only the untranslated, Spanish-language judicial documentation of the Puerto Rico firearms conviction. This is inadequate by the terms of the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864, which prohibits federal courts from considering untranslated documents. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, but we do so without prejudice to Pachecos right to raise his double jeopardy claim on the basis of translated records in future, collateral-review proceedings.
I
Before reaching the difficulty with the double jeopardy claim, however, we must resolve a threshold issue: whether Pachecos plea agreement waiving his right to appeal in some circumstances bars the claim on appeal. We conclude it does not.
A waiver of appellate rights is enforceable provided that, among other things, the defendant enter[ed] into the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2001) ). The text of the written plea agreement and the change-of-plea colloquy are of critical importance to the necessary enquiry, id.: a waiver may be treated as knowing and voluntary if the written plea agreement clearly delineates the scope of the waiver, United States v. González-Colón, 582 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2009), and if the change-of-plea colloquy shows that the district court specifically inquired ... about the waiver by questioning of the defendant sufficient to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, id., with respect to any subsequently contested scope.
The appeal waiver in Pachecos plea agreement provided that he knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal the judgment and sentence in this case, provided that [he] is sentenced in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Sentence Recommendation provisions of this Plea Agreement. Plea Agreement ¶ 9. If our enquiry ended there, the absence of any dispute that the total of Pachecos two sentences was in accordance with the[se] terms and conditions would point to an effective knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal the ensuing judgment and sentence actually imposed.
As just explained, however, reference to the text does not mark the end of the enquiry, for we also look to the change-of-plea colloquy. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 24. At Pachecos colloquy, the judge detailed the scope of Pachecos waiver: There may be a waiver of appeal in your particular Plea Agreements, but there is always the possibility of the right to appeal if a sentence is imposed illegally. Change-of-Plea Tr. 31-32.
In stating that Pacheco could argue on appeal that his sentence was imposed illegally, the judge seemed to contradict the terms of the written waiver, Sotirion, 617 F.3d at 35, and he offered no correction or modification of that statement during the rest of the colloquy, Teeter, 257 F.3d at 27. To be sure, at a later point, the judge did tell Pacheco that he would be waiving [his] right to appeal if he was sentenced according to the stipulations that appear in the Plea Agreement. Change-of-Plea Tr. 45. But the judge never told Pacheco that this subsequent statement meant that he would be foreclosed from arguing on appeal that such a sentence was imposed illegally, id. at 32, or that a sentence is imposed illegally only if it conflicts with the stipulations that appear in the Plea Agreement, id. at 32, 45.
The upshot is that we cannot say with the requisite assurance that Pachecos surrender of his appellate right was sufficiently informed, Teeter, 257 F.3d at 27, insofar as it would extend to a sentence characterized as imposed illegally, as Pacheco claims of the firearms sentence. Indeed, in practical terms, the judges explanation during the change-of-plea colloquy instructed Pacheco that his waiver was not as broad as the literal terms of the written agreement, and that he was not waiving the right to appeal any element of the subsequent sentence that could fairly be characterized as an illegal imposition. The Government did not object to the judges explanation of the limit on the waiver, and naturally Pacheco had no objection to conceding less than he originally had bargained for. At his later sentencing hearing, Pacheco confirmed his understanding of the scope of his appeal waiver, making both the court and the Government fully aware of his position, and there were no objections or clarifications. He now seeks to enforce the limited scope of his waiver, as it appears to have been understood by all parties at the conclusion of the plea colloquy. Cf. United States v. Gil-Quezada, 445 F.3d 33, 37 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2006) (judges comments at later disposition hearing have no bearing on extent of any waiver made at prior plea hearing but may shed light upon the defendants understanding at that time).
That is the case here. Accordingly, the appeal waiver does not bar Pachecos double jeopardy claim, which call[s] into question the Governments power to constitutionally prosecute him, Class v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 798, 805, 200 L.Ed.2d 37 (2018) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) ), as the premise of his contention that the ensuing sentence was illegally imposed.
II
Pacheco asserts that his federal firearms conviction duplicates his Puerto Rico firearms conviction because the federal conviction does not require[ ] proof of a fact beyond the facts required for his Puerto Rico conviction. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). He says that the federal conviction requires proof that he used or carried a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and that his Puerto Rico conviction required proof of the same fact: Puerto Rico law provides that the use of an illegal weapon to commit or attempt to commit any crime is an aggravating circumstance that increases the statutory maximum punishment. 25 L.P.R.A. § 458c. His position thus depends partly on whether he was convicted of the aggravated version of the Puerto Rico firearms offense.
When we turn to evaluate the merits of this argument, however, we hit a roadblock. We cannot determine whether Pacheco was convicted of the aggravated version of the Puerto Rico offense because the record on appeal lacks English-language translations of the Spanish documentation of that earlier conviction, an absence that implicates the federal Jones Act.
The Jones Act provides that all pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language, 48 U.S.C. § 864, and one consequence of the requirement that all federal court proceedings must be conducted in English, United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002), is that federal judges must not consider any untranslated documents placed before them, United States v. Millán-Isaac, 749 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2014). As relevant here, that rule prohibits federal courts from considering any untranslated, Spanish-language copy of a Puerto Rico judgment of conviction. United States v. Reyes-Rivas, 909 F.3d 466, 468, 470 (1st Cir. 2018). The Act consequently bars us from taking account of the untranslated court documents bearing on Pachecos Puerto Rico firearms conviction and requires that we set [them] aside without attempting to render them into English. Id. at 470.
Since the want of a record compliant with the Jones Act leaves us unable to determine the merits of Pachecos argument, we dismiss his appeal. We take no position, however, on the underlying merits of his claim, and this dismissal is without prejudice to his right to raise it again in a future, collateral-review proceeding, as under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
So ordered.
Although our conclusion is a product of the colloquy at the change-of-plea hearing, see Gil-Quezada, 445 F.3d at 36-37, we have noted, as confirmation, that it is a conclusion accepted by the court and both parties at the later sentencing hearing. There, Pachecos counsel explained that he was not waiving his constitutional right to raise [a] double jeopardy claim on appeal, Sentencing Hearing Tr. 7, and that he brought the double jeopardy issue to the District Courts attention so that it would be understood to the Court that [he was] not waiving that right,id. at 8. The District Court acknowledged counsels statements with a one-word answer: Okay. Id. The Government, meanwhile, concedes that it did not object to counsels statements. Appellee Br. 9. Because our conclusion does not rest on an unpreserved Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error, there is no occasion to apply the plain-error standard of review. United States v. Morillo, 910 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2018).