WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
It is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), enacted as part of the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, to knowingly engage in sexual contact with another person without that other persons permission on an international flight. During an overnight flight from Tokyo, Japan to Los Angeles, California, Juan Pablo Price, a forty-six-year-old man, moved from his assigned seat to an open seat adjacent to that of a sleeping twenty-one-year-old female Japanese student, where he fondled her breast and slipped his hand into her underwear, touching her vagina. The jury convicted Price under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), finding that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Price knowingly had sexual contact with the victim and that the sexual contact was without the victims permission. Price appeals his conviction, contending that the government was also required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he subjectively knew that his victim did not consent.
We reject Prices reading of the statute as contrary to its text, the structure of the statutory scheme and its very purpose in penalizing those who sexually prey upon victims on the seas or in the air within federal jurisdiction. Congresss purpose in enacting the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986 was to criminalize sexual contact by focusing on the defendants conduct. If the government were required to prove that the defendant subjectively knew he lacked consent, as Price urges here, every accused sexual predator could defend his admitted sexual contact in the face of no objective sign of permission by asserting a supposed subjective belief that the victim was enjoying herself, a result directly contrary to the purpose of the 1986 Act. Even Price recognized, following his arrest, that it sure is going to be my job not to touch a woman whom he doesnt know and hasnt talked to. As the arresting officer responded to Price, in your forty something years, you shouldve already known that[ ].
Because unwanted sexual contact of the type Price engaged in-touching first, and arguing later that he thought the victim consented-is precisely what § 2244(b) criminalizes, we reject Prices claim of instructional error. We also conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest Price, that he was properly Mirandized, and that the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to read back to the jury portions of the victims testimony. We therefore affirm Prices conviction and sentence.
I.
The objective facts are fairly undisputed. Price, then forty-six, was a passenger on the overnight flight from Tokyo, Japan to Los Angeles, California. A.M., a twenty-one-year-old college student, and her friend, Maki Fujita, were traveling on the same flight. After take-off, Price asked A.M. if he could move from his assigned seat to the unoccupied seat next to her, a seat where the video monitor was not working, explaining that his original seat had limited legroom. A.M. said okay. Price attempted to engage A.M. in conversation, but A.M. could not speak English very well, and he eventually realized that she was not completely understanding what he was saying. A flight attendant, Hidemori Ejima, noticed that Price had changed his seat, and asked him why. When Price responded that he wanted more legroom, Ejima offered Price another seat with a working video monitor and three times more legroom. Price declined the offer-something Ejima had not seen before in his twenty-five years as a flight attendant. After food service, Ejima handed Fujita a note warning Fujita and A.M. to watch out for the person sitting next to them. A.M. interpreted the warning to mean that Price might try to steal her wallet or other belongings. She moved her purse and wallet deeper into her bag and fell asleep.
A.M. woke up to Price touching the right side of her body, including her arm, hip, and leg. Thinking that Price was trying to steal the cell phone in her pocket, she moved the phone to inside the seat pocket and went back to sleep. When A.M. awoke again, Price was touching her breast. A.M. began panicking, but did not want to bother the people around her. She tried to avoid Prices touch by pulling the blankets up to her shoulder and crossing her arms in front of her. Undeterred, Price placed his blanket over both of them, covering his arms, and continued to touch her breast, first over her shirt and then under it. Price then moved his hand into A.M.s jeans and underwear and touched her vagina.
In a state of shock, panic, and fear, and looking for the words to tell Price to stop, A.M. twisted her body toward Fujita on her left, away from Price. Price hauled her back around with strong force and tried to pull her jeans down. At this point, Fujita woke up, and, seeing her awake, Price retreated to his seat. When Fujita asked A.M. if she was okay, A.M. responded that she was not and asked what she should do. Fujita told her to tell the flight attendant. A.M. did not have the English words to explain what happened, although she was able to ask for help.
Prices perception of the encounter differed from the others on the plane. He testified that while his hand was on the armrest, he felt A.M.s hand touch his. Thinking that this could be an invitation, Price began to rub her hand. Price stated that they started holding and rubbing each others hands. As he began moving his hands across A.M.s body and to her breast area, he thought she was enjoying herself because she was arching her body, he could feel her heartbeat, her breathing was intense, and she was opening and closing her eyes. It was only when Price tried to move her face toward him and A.M. would not budge that Price thought something was wrong. At that point, Price noticed that Fujita was awake, and A.M. then got up. According to both A.M.s and Prices accounts, no words were exchanged during this encounter. Price agrees A.M. did not verbally consent to his touching her.
While A.M. got up to tell the flight attendant what happened, Price wrote a note that he never ended up giving to A.M., which said, If a man touches you and you dont want him to always feel free to say No. The purser or lead chief flight attendant, Yosri Zidan, then obtained written statements from both Price and A.M. Prices story was that he changed seats because he wanted more legroom; he then fell asleep and awoke to find A.M. stroking his hand.
While still in flight, the pilot sent a message to American Airlines employees at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) that read, "WE NEED LAX POLICE TO MEET AIRPLANE [/] WE
HAVE A MOLESTER/FONDLER ON BOARD." The LAX Police Department (LAXPD) then contacted the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), who in turn contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Special Agent David Gates (S.A. Gates) of the FBI instructed the sergeant at LAX to first investigate the incident to determine if he needed to respond.
On February 18, 2015, after a federal grand jury indicted Price for abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), Price was formally arrested. Price filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found in his bag and cell phone, and his statements to the LAXPD officers and to S.A. Gates, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause upon the flights arrival at LAX and that he was questioned without being given Miranda warnings. The government and Price disputed the 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) jury instruction, based on the statutes use of the word knowingly. The district court ultimately selected the Ninth Circuits Model Criminal Jury Instruction for § 2244(b) and the additional instruction proposed by Price that permission under § 2244(b) can be express or implied, that is[,] inferred from words or actions. The district court denied Prices request to instruct the jury that, in addition, the government must prove that Price knew the sexual contact was without A.M.s permission. The district court reasoned that it is appropriate not to read into the statute that which it does not say it requires.
Price timely appeals.
II.
18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) provides:
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... knowingly engages in sexual contact with another person without that other persons permission shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Sexual contact is defined as the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3). The Ninth Circuits model instruction provides:
The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with abusive sexual contact in violation of Section 2244(b) of Title 18 of the United States Code. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant knowingly had sexual contact with [name of victim ]; Second, the sexual contact was without [name of victim ]s permission; and Third, the offense was committed at [specify place of federal jurisdiction ]. In this case, sexual contact means [specify statutory definition ].
Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 8.180 (2010) (Ninth Cir. Jury Instructions Comm., amended 2015). The model instruction does not ask the jury to find that the defendant subjectively knew that he lacked the victims permission. Price argues that the model instruction was given in error.
Whether a jury instruction misstates elements of a statutory crime is an issue we review de novo. United States v. Knapp , 120 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997). We have not yet addressed whether the term knowingly in § 2244(b) applies to the phrase without that other persons permission. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we generally consider the statutes language, purpose, history, and past decisions and controlling law to determine whether the district court properly instructed the jury. See Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 581, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ; United States v. Lo , 447 F.3d 1212, 1229 (9th Cir. 2006).
A.
Our analysis begins with the text of the statute. In determining what mental state is required to prove a violation of the statute, we look to its words and the intent of Congress. United States v. Johal , 428 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). We keep in mind the background rules of the common law in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded. Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (citation omitted).
We begin with the statutory text and interpret statutory terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute clearly expresses an intention to the contrary. I.R. ex rel. E.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. , 805 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Examining the text of § 2244(b), we conclude that its most natural grammatical meaning is that the government must prove that the defendant knew he engaged in sexual contact, not that it prove that the defendant subjectively knew he lacked consent. The term knowingly modifies only the verb phrase engages in sexual contact with another person and does not modify the adverbial prepositional phrase without that other persons permission.
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. , the Supreme Court examined the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which punishes, inter alia, any person who knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or who knowingly receives, or distributes ..., or knowingly reproduces from such commerce any visual depiction, if-(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 513 U.S. 64, 68, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1988 ed. & Supp. V 1993)). The critical determination the Court had to make was whether the term knowingly, in the phrases knowingly transports or ships and knowingly receives, or distributes modifies not only those verbs but also the phrase the use of a minor. Id. The Court recognized that [t]he most natural grammatical reading ... suggests that the term knowingly modifies only the surrounding verbs: transports, ships, receives, distributes, or reproduces. Id. at 68, 115 S.Ct. 464. Nevertheless the Court was reluctan[t] to simply follow the most grammatical reading of the statute, because the results of that reading were positively absurd and would sweep within the ambit of the statute actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material. Id. at 69-70, 115 S.Ct. 464.
We followed suit in construing the most natural grammatical reading of a statute in United States v. Backman , 817 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2016). There we construed an analogous mens rea requirement in a criminal sex trafficking statute, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. That statute required proof that the defendant knowingly -(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person. Id. at 666-67 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) ). We rejected the defendants argument that the government must prove, in addition to proving knowing recruitment, that he knew his acts affected interstate or foreign commerce, concluding it is most natural to read the adverb knowingly in [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1591(a) to modify the verbs that follow: recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains. The phrase in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce describes the nature or extent of those actions but, grammatically, does not tie to knowingly. Id. at 667.
Similarly, here, the phrase without that other persons permission describes the nature or extent of the prohibited action engag[ing] in sexual contact but, grammatically, does not tie to the term knowingly. 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Price attempts to distinguish Backman on the ground that the phrase in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce is jurisdictional, but that was only a secondary rationale for our Backman holding, which we found persuasive in a Seventh Circuit opinion, United States v. Sawyer , 733 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 2013). The principal rationale in Backman was our view of the statutes most natural grammatical reading, which demonstrates the statutes ordinary meaning.
Our reading of § 2244(b) is consistent with our precedent for interpreting mens rea requirements in criminal statutes. When interpreting federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state, we read into the statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct. Elonis v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2010, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, although courts must be careful not to interpret crimes too broadly, [i]n some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is itself an adequate safeguard. Id.
Here, the other elements of § 2244(b) provide that adequate safeguard. First, the statute already provides for a mens rea requirement that the defendant engage in sexual contact knowingly, rendering unnecessary a second mens rea requirement. See Lo , 447 F.3d at 1230 (finding that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) did not require knowledge that the substance was a listed chemical, because the mens rea requirement that the defendant knowingly possessed or distributed the chemical was sufficient to ensure that apparently innocent conduct is not criminalized). Second, the government must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual contact was without the victims permission, which is sufficient to render it wrongful. See, e.g. , United States v. Gavin , 959 F.2d 788, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1992). As the district court properly recognized in instructing the jury on permission, although it is an objective concept, it includes both explicit and implicit permission, and may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Thus, hewing close to the natural grammatical reading of knowingly here does not portend absurd results that would sweep up innocent actors not intended to be covered by the statute. Cf. X-Citement Video , 513 U.S. at 69, 115 S.Ct. 464.
Flores-Figueroa v. United States , 556 U.S. 646, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), is inapposite. In Flores-Figueroa , the Supreme Court considered a federal aggravated identity theft statute that provided for an increased criminal penalty of an additional two years of imprisonment for certain offenses if the offender knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The Court concluded that the term knowingly modified the entire sentence such that the government needed to show that the defendant knew that the means of identification belonged to another person.
Flores-Figueroa , 556 U.S. at 657, 129 S.Ct. 1886 ; see also id. at 650, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (It makes little sense to read the provisions language as heavily penalizing a person who transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority a something , but does not know, at the very least, that the something (perhaps inside a box) is a means of identification. Would we apply a statute that makes it unlawful knowingly to possess drugs to a person who steals a passengers bag without knowing that the bag has drugs inside?).
Price argues that Flores-Figueroa requires us to adopt his interpretation of § 2244(b) because courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word knowingly as applying that word to each element. Id. at 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886. But Price erroneously takes the Flores-Figueroa holding out of the context of the aggravated identity theft statute. As the Court reasoned, Flores-Figueroa s directives were specific to particular grammatical contexts that [i]n ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in the sentence. Id. at 650, 129 S.Ct. 1886. This grammatical structure does not appear in § 2244(b), where the phrase in question-without that other persons permission-is not the object of the sentence but an adverbial prepositional phrase.
Second, and most importantly, in Flores -Figueroa , the mens rea requirement was necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct. Elonis , 135 S.Ct. at 2010 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By contrast, [h]ere, there is no potential for the penalization of innocent conduct nor do we face constitutional avoidance concerns. United States v. Jefferson , 791 F.3d 1013, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding it unnecessary to extend the knowingly or intentionally mens rea to the type and quantity of drugs at issue, where the requirement that the government prove the other elements of the case was sufficient to ensure the statute penalizes only culpable conduct). We have explicitly rejected the notion that the Courts reading of knowingly in Flores-Figueroa compels the same reading in every criminal statute that uses the word knowingly. See id. at 1017-18 (Because [ 21 U.S.C.] § 960s statutory text and structure are not parallel to that of § 1028A(a)(1), the ordinary grammatical interpretive rules articulated in Flores-Figueroa do not apply here.); United States v. Stone , 706 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) ([T]he Court in Flores-Figueroa did not announce an inflexible rule of construction. Rather, statutory interpretation remains a contextual matter. (citations omitted)); United States v. Castagana , 604 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the argument that the court treat with intent the same way the Supreme Court treated knowingly in Flores-Figueroa because the language of the statute in Flores-Figueroa is not parallel to that of [ 18 U.S.C.] § 1038(a)(1)). Indeed, the Flores-Figueroa Court itself cautioned that the inquiry into a sentences meaning is a contextual one. 556 U.S. at 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886.
As the X-Citement Video Court advised, however, this does not necessarily end our analysis because of the respective presumptions that some form of scienter is to be implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed. 513 U.S. at 69, 115 S.Ct. 464. We therefore next examine the structure, Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC , 904 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018), and legislative history of the statute, to determine if we, like the X-Citement Video Court, should be reluctant to simply follow the most grammatical reading of the statute, 513 U.S. at 70, 115 S.Ct. 464.
B.
Section 2244(b) is part of a statutory scheme criminalizing abusive sexual contact. First, subsection (a) criminalizes conduct that, had the sexual contact been a sexual act, would be punished [elsewhere] by this chapter. 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). Second, subsection (b) criminalizes sexual contact [i]n other circumstances. Id. § 2244(b). Finally, subsection (c) enhances the sentence [i]f the sexual contact that violates this section (other than subsection (a)(5)) is with an individual who has not attained the age of 12 years. Id. § 2244(c).
Subsections 2244(a) and 2244(b) work in parallel ways, and we must read the two subsections together. See United States v. Lewis , 67 F.3d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1995) (Particular phrases must be construed in light of the overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory scheme.). Both § 2244(a) and (b) require that the defendant knowingly have sexual contact and set forth one additional element of the offense. In § 2244(a), the additional element the government must prove is that the sexual contact would be punishable by certain other statutes if the sexual contact had instead been a sexual act; in § 2244(b), the additional element is the victims lack of permission. The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the second element of § 2244(a) was met-in other words, the government need not prove that the defendant knew that the sexual contact he engaged in would have been punished by another law if the contact had risen to the level of a sexual act. We have not read § 2244(a)(3) to tie the word knowingly to the second element. Courts have instead read the second element as subject to objective proof. United States v. Granbois , 376 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2004) (delineating the elements for conviction under § 2244(a)(3), which does not include a mens rea requirement for the second element); see also United States v. Jennings , 496 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that to determine a violation of § 2244(a)(3), under the straightforward language of the statute, we are to read § 2243(a) and determine whether [the defendant] had committed that offense, substituting for sexual act the term sexual contact ). To read knowingly to apply to the second element in § 2244(a) would both be grammatically unnatural and produce absurd results. Because a conviction under § 2244(a) does not require that the government prove the defendants knowledge of the additional element, we should read § 2244(b) in the same manner.
Price argues that reading the statute along with its neighboring provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and § 2243(a), requires the opposite interpretation. Section 2244(b) follows the same general sentence structure as the other two subsections-although the other two subsections address sexual acts with minors, a more serious crime than sexual contact. According to Price, because § 2241(d) and § 2243(d) expressly provide that the Government need not prove that the defendant knew the age of the minor, the absence of such a provision in § 2244(b) indicates that Congress intended that the government must prove that the defendant knew that sexual contact was without permission. We disagree.
Sections 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse) and 2243 (sexual abuse of a minor or ward) impose severe penalties, with maximum sentences of life imprisonment and fifteen years, respectively. By contrast, § 2244(b) prescribes a maximum sentence of no more than two years. We generally expect that criminal laws subject to potentially more severe penalties would require more stringent mens rea requirements. See Staples , 511 U.S. at 618, 114 S.Ct. 1793 ([A] severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.); cf. United States v. Gomez-Leon , 545 F.3d 777, 793 (9th Cir. 2008) (Commensurate with lesser punishment is a lesser mens rea requirement .... (citation omitted)). Thus, Congresss decision to expressly eliminate the mens rea requirements in § 2241 and § 2243 is not instructive of the proper interpretation of § 2244(b). Sections 2241 and 2243, with their harsh sentencing maximums, require the explicit statement that the Government need not prove that the defendant knew the age of the minor victim in order to overcome the strong presumption that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement. Staples , 511 U.S. at 618, 114 S.Ct. 1793. Section 2244(b) does not give rise to the same strong presumption because its violation bears a dramatically less severe consequence. Moreover, § 2243(c) provides that mistake about age can be a defense, making § 2243(d) necessary to clarify that knowledge of age is not an element. Therefore, Congresss decision not to explicitly eliminate the knowledge requirement in § 2244(b) is of no import. It would have been redundant to do so because it was already clear from the language of the statute itself, together with its relatively light penal consequence, that the government need not prove knowledge as to the second element.
Furthermore, Prices logic would produce absurd results in interpreting § 2244 as a whole. Subsection 2244(c) provides that, If the sexual contact that violates this section (other than subsection (a)(5)) is with an individual who has not attained the age of 12 years, the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for the offense shall be twice that otherwise provided in this section. That the only mens rea requirement in § 2244(a) and (b) is the defendants knowing engagement in sexual contact is only bolstered by § 2244(c)s omission of any explicit provision that the defendant need not know the person was under the age of twelve. Prices argument would read into subsection (c) a requirement that the government prove that the defendant knew that the child was under twelve to sustain a conviction under § 2244(c). Congress could not have intended to impose that extra mens rea requirement on sexual contact with a child under § 2244(c), with less severe penalties, when it chose not to impose that requirement on sexual abuse of a child under § 2241(c) and § 2243(a), with penalties as severe as life in prison.
C.
Although we need not rely on legislative history because the statute is unambiguous, the legislative history of the statute and common sense support our conclusion. Castagana , 604 F.3d at 1164. Congresss stated purpose in enacting the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986 was to modernize[ ] and reform[ ] Federal rape provisions by ... defining the offenses so that the focus of a trial is upon the conduct of the defendant and expanding the offenses to reach all forms of sexual abuse of another, among other changes. H.R. Rep. No. 99-594, at 10-11 (1986). The House Report also communicated Congresss expectation that the law would simplify law enforcement activities. Id. at 21. It would be inconsistent with these goals to hold that Congress intended to require proof that the defendant subjectively knew the victim did not consent.
In enacting the 1986 Act, Congress was concerned with whether lack of consent needed to be an element at all, and it consistently described this element in objective terms. See, e.g. , id. at 13 (Where the Committee believes it appropriate to the offense to require the prosecution to show that the conduct was engaged in without the victims permission, such a requirement has explicitly been set forth.). Congress would not have singled out § 2244(b) for an onerous burden of proof without comment given that its goal was to facilitate prosecutions. See id. at 12 (explaining that the 1986 Act was drafted broadly to cover the widest possible variety of sexual abuse); cf. Lo , 447 F.3d at 1231 (9th Cir. 2006) ([I]t seems very unlikely that Congress would have chosen to make prosecution more difficult by requiring proof that the defendant knew that the chemical was a listed chemical, while at the same time seeking to expand the scope of prosecution for the possession and distribution of precursor chemicals by increasing the number of chemicals that could provide the basis for prosecution.).
III.
Price also argues that all of his statements and the evidence seized from him when he was escorted from the plane and handcuffed by LAXPD Officers Christopher Faytol and Ngan Lee, and at least one U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer, should be suppressed. He contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him at the arrival gate. The district court concluded that because the officers did not arrest Price at that time, there was no need to demonstrate probable cause. While we disagree with the district court as to whether an arrest occurred, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest Price as he disembarked from the plane. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying Prices suppression motion.
We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, although we review underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Fernandez-Castillo , 324 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). The determination of probable cause to arrest a suspect is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. United States v. Nava , 363 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
In the context of an international border, an arrest occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he is being subjected to more than the temporary detention occasioned by border crossing formalities. United States v. Bravo , 295 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We ask, considering the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief questioning he or she would not be free to leave . Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [H]andcuffing is a substantial factor in determining whether an individual has been arrested-although it alone is not determinative. Id. at 1010 ; see also United States v. Guzman-Padilla , 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) ([O]fficers with a particularized basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may handcuff or point a gun at an individual without converting an investigative detention into an arrest.).
Price was escorted by three armed law enforcement officers off the plane at a remote gate, while the rest of the passengers remained seated. Officer Faytol performed a pat-down search and Officer Lee handcuffed him. This was not a routine border airport screening and search process, as the district court found. Although the officers cited safety justifications for handcuffing Price, including the fear that Price might become aggressive as other passengers deplaned, the officers kept Price in handcuffs until the FBI interviewed him-from the time Price deplaned at approximately 9:08 AM, until after S.A. Gates arrived at around 11:30 AM. This was not a temporary detention occasioned by border crossing formalities; this was an arrest. Bravo , 295 F.3d at 1009 (citation omitted).
We nevertheless conclude that the officers had probable cause to believe Price had committed a crime when they arrested him. Police may arrest a suspect if under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the defendant had committed a crime. Beier v. City of Lewiston , 354 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal alteration marks and citation omitted). We must consider the nature and trustworthiness of the evidence of criminal conduct available to the police. Id. at 1064. The police need not know, however, precisely what offense has been committed. See United States v. Chatman , 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (finding probable cause where officers believed only that the defendant was clandestinely engaging in illegal business of some kind).
Here, the officers had reasonably trustworthy information to arrest Price as he deplaned. Beier , 354 F.3d at 1064. They knew that a female passenger had reported that Price had perpetrated a sexual offense. The pilot had sent an advance message asking LAXPD to meet the airplane, stating WE HAVE A MOLESTER/FONDLER ON BOARD. The actions of the flight crew demonstrated that they viewed the allegations as credible as they sought law enforcement assistance.
We reject Prices argument that the officers lacked probable cause because the information available to the officers was not trustworthy. We acknowledge the minor differences in the officers recollections of the event at the suppression hearing-Faytol recalled that the incident was a 290, the code for sexual battery, while Lee recalled that the incident was a 311, the code for indecent exposure. However, these differences did not render the information untrustworthy. Price also points to S.A. Gatess testimony that mid-flight reports can be unreliable because they involve a series of messengers. Although we disagree that mid-flight reports are categorically so untrustworthy that they can never establish probable cause, we need not address these concerns here because before arresting Price, the officers spoke directly with the purser, lead flight attendant Zidan, who reported that a female passenger had complained about a male passenger touching her and gave details about where both individuals were sitting on the plane. Based on purser Zidans report, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the defendant had committed a crime. Id. at 1065 (internal alteration marks and citation omitted).
IV.
Price also moved to suppress the statements he made to S.A. Gates when he was interviewed, contending that he did not adequately understand his rights when he waived them. He points to the transcript of the interview where he expressed confusion as to whether he was being arrested. We agree with the district court, however, that though Price may have been confused about whether he was under arrest, there was no doubt that his Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that his statements were voluntarily made. We review a district courts ruling on a Miranda waiver under two standards: Whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Whether the waiver was voluntary is a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado , 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), amended by 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005). We review de novo the voluntariness of a confession and the factual findings supporting the determination for clear error. United States v. Heller , 551 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Before S.A. Gates interviewed Price, he removed the handcuffs. S.A. Gates then explained to Price his Miranda rights, describing it as just like you see on T.V. Price first sought clarification that he was not arrested, which S.A. Gates confirmed, and S.A. Gates then recited the Miranda rights, as Price read along and responded Mm-hmm at various points. At the end, Price asked once again whether or not he was under arrest, noting that in movies, when you hear Miranda rights, you know that somebody is being arrested. S.A. Gates again assured Price that he was not under arrest. Price signed the Advice of Rights form. At the end of the interview, S.A. Gates cited Price with simple assault and allowed him to leave.
To admit an inculpatory statement made by a defendant during custodial interrogation, the defendants waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. United States v. Shi , 525 F.3d 709, 727 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including
(i) the defendants mental capacity; (ii) whether the defendant signed a written waiver; (iii) whether the defendant was advised in his native tongue or had a translator; (iv) whether the defendant appeared to understand his rights; (v) whether the defendants rights were individually and repeatedly explained to him; and (vi) whether the defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system.
United States v. Crews , 502 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Price disputes only the fourth factor-whether he understood his rights. Price argues that his questions to S.A. Gates showed that he did not understand that he could exercise his Miranda rights. However, Prices questions were all directed towards clarifying whether or not he was actually under arrest. As the district court found, Price was not confused as to the nature and extent of his rights but rather was confused about why (the reason) he was being read his rights given that SA Gates had told him only moments earlier that he was not under arrest.
We must also find that both Prices waiver and the statements themselves were voluntary. A Miranda waiver is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the confession was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than coercion or improper inducement. United States v. Doe , 155 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citation omitted). We find the confession voluntary unless, considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspects will was overborne. Heller , 551 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted).
We agree with the district court that both Prices waiver and his statements were voluntary. Price mischaracterizes the record of the interview. S.A. Gates never threatened Price with his power to detain him unless he answered S.A. Gatess questions. It is evident from the record that S.A. Gates stated in a jocular manner that he could find a reason to arrest Price if Price wanted-a joke that elicited Prices laughter-and S.A. Gates explained that it was his expectation that Price would walk out of here that day. The interview does not reveal any sign of coercion: Price was not in handcuffs or otherwise physically restrained, and the FBI agents asked Price if he was doing okay and if he needed water or to use the bathroom.
V.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to read back A.M.s testimony when requested by the jury. We review denials of a jurys request to read back a witnesss testimony for abuse of discretion and have noted the district courts great latitude to address requests for readbacks. United States v. Medina Casteneda , 511 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2008). In general, rereading is disfavored because of the emphasis it places on specific testimony and the delay it causes in the trial. United States v. Nolan , 700 F.2d 479, 486 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). During deliberations, the jury asked for a transcript of Prices FBI interview and of A.M.s testimony. We reject Prices argument that because the district court acquiesced to the jurys request by replaying the recording of Prices FBI interview, the simultaneous decision not to read back A.M.s testimony was improper.
Here, the district court gave two appropriate reasons for denying the readback. First, it cited the logistical difficulties in preparing a readback, and second, it expressed concern that reading back A.M.s testimony without also reading back Prices testimony would lead to an unfair focus on one part of the trial over others. We have determined that the district courts rationale is appropriate as a basis for declining a readback of testimony. See, e.g. , Medina Casteneda , 511 F.3d at 1249 (finding no abuse of discretion in the district courts denial of the jurys request for a readback because of the concern that the jury would focus on one particular piece of evidence at the expense of other evidence).
VI.
In enacting the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, of which 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) is a part, Congress sought to expand criminal culpability for sexual acts and contacts and facilitate prosecution of those crimes. Thus it placed the burden on the actor who knowingly engages in sexual contact with another person to first obtain that persons consent, objectively given. The government need not prove that the defendant subjectively knew he lacked consent, as Price asserted here. It need only prove that the victim did not consent as an objective matter. Because Prices remaining contentions also lack merit, we AFFIRM his conviction and sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) defines the term sexual act as
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight;
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus;
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
The district court sentenced Price to probation for three years.
Price points to an Eighth Circuit opinion that relied on this comparison with § 2241(c) and § 2243(a) to hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2), which addresses sexual abuse of an incapacitated person, requires that the defendant knew the victim was incapacitated or unable to grant consent. United States v. Bruguier , 735 F.3d 754, 761 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc). We are not persuaded by Prices argument because § 2242(2) also has a severe maximum penalty of life imprisonment, unlike § 2244(b). We do not think the Eighth Circuits interpretation of § 2242(2) affects our analysis of § 2244(b) in any way.
We agree with Judge Gilmans conclusion that even if the statute required the government to prove that Price subjectively knew the sexual contact was without permission, any error in the jury instruction was harmless. See United States v. Pierre , 254 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2001). Given the totality of the circumstances, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Price subjectively knew that he did not have permission to have sexual contact with A.M.