RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Hope Lee-Thomas brings suit against Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America (LabCorp) for failing to protect her privacy and confidentiality in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). LabCorp moved to dismiss on the ground that Ms. Lee-Thomass complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because HIPAA does not provide individuals with a private cause of action. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants LabCorps motion and dismisses Ms. Lee-Thomass case.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Hope Lee-Thomas was a patient at Providence Hospital in Washington, D.C. on June 15, 2017, where she received treatment from Defendant, LabCorp. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1-1. Ms. Lee-Thomas was instructed by a LabCorp technician to submit her medical information using a computer intake station on the premises. Pl.s Atty Letter (Letter) at 1. LabCorps computer intake station was in close proximity to a Quest Diagnostics intake station, and Ms. Lee-Thomass personal health information was visible to another patient who was using the Quest Diagnostics station. Compl. at 3. When Ms. Lee-Thomas realized her health information was being disclosed within eyesight and earshot of another patient, she informed a LabCorp technician of the violation and photographed the two stations in question. Id.
On July 3, 2017, Ms. Lee-Thomas sent a letter to Providence Hospital informing them of possible HIPAA privacy violations. See Letter. She then filed a complaint with the Department of Health and Human Servicess (HHS) Office of Civil Rights. HHS Compl. at 2. On October 10, 2017, Ms. Lee-Thomas filed an additional complaint with the District of Columbias Office of Human Rights (OHR) citing LabCorps failure to make proper public accommodations by maintaining non-HIPAA compliant facilities. Compl. at 2-3.
Both of Ms. Lee-Thomass administrative complaints were unsuccessful. See HHS Resp.; OHR Resp. On November 15, 2017, HHS informed Ms. Lee-Thomas the agency would not pursue her claim. HHS Resp. at 1-3. On November 28, 2017, the District of Columbia alerted Ms. Lee-Thomas that her complaint was similarly dismissed based on her failure to state a claim. OHR Resp. at 1-2. The District of Columbia informed Ms. Lee-Thomas of her right to bring a private action before the D.C. Superior Court and Ms. Lee-Thomas proceeded to do so. Id. at 2. LabCorp removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Def.s Notice of Removal (Notice), ECF No. 1.
Before the Court is LabCorps motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that Ms. Lee-Thomas failed to state a claim because HIPAA does not provide for a private cause of action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; Def.s Mot. Dismiss (Def.s Mot.), ECF No. 3. For the forthcoming reasons, the Court grants LabCorps motion to dismiss.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits, but rather whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A court considering a motion to dismiss presumes the complaints factual allegations are true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).
[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Assuming all factual allegations are true, a plaintiffs right to relief must rise above the speculative level. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (citations omitted).
Because she has filed this lawsuit pro se , Ms. Lee-Thomass claim is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ). That being said, pro se plaintiffs must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch , 656 F.Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and the Court need not assume the role of plaintiffs advocate. See Davis v. Kelly , 160 F.3d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1998) ; Sun v. D.C. Govt , 133 F.Supp.3d 155, 168 n.6 (D.D.C. 2015) ([I]t is not the Courts job to canvass the record for documents supporting a pro se partys position.).
IV. ANALYSIS
Ms. Lee-Thomas alleges that the public nature of LabCorps medical intake computer station violated HIPAAs privacy protections. Compl. at 3. LabCorp contends that no private cause of action exists under HIPAA and, as such, Ms. Lee-Thomass claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Def.s Mot at 1-2. Additionally, after LabCorp moved for dismissal on March 16, 2018, Ms. Lee-Thomas failed to file a timely memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to LabCorps motion and, therefore, pursuant to Local Rule 7(b), conceded her opposition to the motion. See Local Civ. R. 7(b). The Court will address both grounds for dismissal below.
A. Private Cause of Action Under HIPAA
LabCorp asserts that dismissal of Ms. Lee-Thomass claim is appropriate because HIPAA provides for no private cause of action. Def.s Mot. 1-2. HIPAA regulates the confidentiality of medical information by imposing privacy requirements on the Department of Health and Human Services, healthcare providers, and insurers. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 262 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to d-8); Logan v. Dept of Veterans Affairs , 357 F.Supp.2d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2004). While the statute provides both civil and criminal penalties for improperly handled or disclosed information, the language of the statute specifically limits enforcement action to HHS and individual states attorneys general. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to d-6 (defining terms and enforcement protocol); Hudes v. Aetna Life Ins., Co. , 806 F.Supp.2d 180, 196 (D.D.C. 2011), affd , 493 F. Appx 107 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Furthermore, courts in this and other circuits that have considered the question have reached a consensus that the statutory language of HIPAA grants no private right of action. See, e.g. , Adams v. Eureka Fire Prot. Dist. , 352 F. Appx 137, 138-39 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that Courts have repeatedly held that HIPAA does not create a private right of action); Acara v. Banks , 470 F.3d 569, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (Every district court that has considered this issue is in agreement that the statute does not support a private right of action.); Briscoe v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 61 F.Supp.3d 78, 90 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that plaintiffs complaint lacked cognizable legal theory because HIPAA provides no private cause of action); Hudes , 806 F.Supp.2d at 195-96 (collecting cases indicating no private HIPAA cause of action); Johnson v. Quander , 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 100 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing HIPAA claim involving disclosure of medical information because no private cause of action existed), affd , 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
LabCorps alleged HIPAA violation is the only cause of action Ms. Lee-Thomas has included in her case. Compl. at 2-3. Given the statutory language and the clear consensus among courts that have addressed the question, no private action exists under HIPAA and accordingly Ms. Lee-Thomas has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Plaintiffs Failure to Respond to the Motion Under Local Rule 7(b)
While this Court does not recognize a private cause of action under HIPAA, even if Ms. Lee-Thomass complaint had stated a cognizable claim, Ms. Lee-Thomass failure to respond to LabCorps motion to dismiss further necessitates dismissal of her case. See Local Civ. R. 7(b) (Within 14 days of the date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded.) Though this circuit has rejected the application of this standard to motions for summary judgment, see Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean , 843 F.3d 503, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 2016), it remains in place for motions to dismiss. Id. at 508 ([N]othing in this opinion is meant to address the applicability of Local Rule 7(b) to motions other than motions for summary judgment); see, e.g. , Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia , 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming district court decision to grant motion to dismiss as conceded under local rule); Habliston v. FINRA Dispute Resolution, Inc. , 251 F.Supp.3d 240, 245 (D.D.C. 2017) (applying Local Civ. R. 7(b) to motion to dismiss).
Thus, when a plaintiff fails to address or respond to a motion to dismiss, as happened here, the Court may treat that motion as conceded. See Local Civ. R. 7(b). LabCorp filed a motion to dismiss on March 16, 2018. See Def.s Mot. at 3. The Court ordered Ms. Lee-Thomas to file a response by April 25, 2018. Fox/Neal Order at 2, ECF No. 8. Ms. Lee-Thomas never filed a response, and therefore, under Local Rule 7(b), the matter is conceded.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant LabCorps Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts the plaintiffs factual allegations as true. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).
Unless indicated otherwise, all relevant documents are filed under ECF No. 1-1. The citations are paginated in relation to each individual document therein.
Although the D.C. OHR informed Ms. Lee-Thomas of her ability to pursue a private action in D.C. Superior Court, see OHR Resp. at 2, OHR was referring solely to a claim pursuant to the D.C. Human Rights Act, which plaintiff does not raise here. See D.C. Code §§ 2-1402 -1403 ; OHR Resp. at 2.