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David M. LINEHAN, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia2018-08-20No. Civil Action No. 17-cv-10433-PBS
320 F. Supp. 3d 304

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Opinion

majority opinion

Saris, Chief U.S.D.J.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security has moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), for reconsideration of this Courts December 27, 2017 Memorandum and Order (Dkt. No. 26), which remanded this matter to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Defendant asserts that the Court erred in two respects: 1) Dr. Grays treatment notes are not medical opinions entitled to good reasons from the ALJ for the weight that she assigned them, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) ; and 2) any legal error committed was harmless because consideration of Dr. Grays records could not possibly lead the ALJ to a more favorable decision on remand.

DISCUSSION

I. Medical Opinion

In order to qualify as a medical opinion, a treatment providers statement must reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [claimants] impairment(s), including [ ] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [claimants] physical or mental restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). The Commissioner asserts that Dr. Grays notes do not reflect judgments about the nature and severity of Plaintiffs impairments, but instead merely regurgitate his reported symptoms. Dkt. No. 29 at 3 (citing Francis v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 414 F. Appx 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011) ).

However, the Commissioner acknowledges that Dr. Grays diagnosis of major depressive disorder qualifies as a medical opinion in the broadest sense. Dkt. No. 29 at 4. Other statements by Dr. Gray also reflect her professional judgment. See, e.g., R. at 595 ([Plaintiff] will likely benefit from CBT-based approaches to help improve emotion regulation skills.); R. at 564 ([Plaintiff is] in a depressed mood, with flat affect. Other aspects within normal limits given brain injury.). The ALJ committed a legal error when she did not give good reasons, or indeed any reasons, for the weight assigned to Dr. Grays medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

II. Empty Exercise

Notwithstanding the ALJs failure to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), if remand will amount to no more than an empty exercise because of an independent ground on which affirmance must be entered as a matter of law, then the Commissioners decision should stand. Ward v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 2000). To that end, the Commissioner argues that Dr. Grays opinion merely diagnoses Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, but fails to provide any assessment of how he is impaired by that depression. Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, Dr. Grays opinion could not, standing alone, constitute the basis for finding that Plaintiff is disabled. See Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1982) ([S]evere anxiety or depression is not in itself sufficient to establish eligibility for benefits absent a proper showing of related functional loss.).

Dr. Grays records do not exist in a vacuum, however. They must be viewed in light of Dr. Hermans opinion, which does assess Plaintiffs functional loss. As to that, Defendant argues that Dr. Grays opinion could not possibly lead the ALJ to reconsider the weight that she assigned to Dr. Hermans opinion, for two reasons. First, Defendant asserts that unlike Dr. Gray, Dr. Herman did not attribute Plaintiffs cognitive limitations to depression. Dkt. No. 29 at 4. Second, Defendant points out that the ALJ discredited Dr. Hermans opinion due to perceived inconsistencies within Dr. Hermans own notes and findings.

Although Dr. Herman diagnosed Plaintiff with post-concussion symptoms, R. at 559, he also opined that Plaintiff may be depressed and prescribed him anti-depressant medication. R. 549. Dr. Gray and Dr. Herman report many of the same physical and cognitive symptoms, and their opinions corroborate one another. It is plausible that the ALJ will reconsider her assessment of the intrinsic merits of Dr. Hermans opinion, in light of Dr. Grays corroborative records.

To be sure, it is also possible that the ALJ will assign little weight to Dr. Grays opinion and reach the same conclusion on remand. As acknowledged in the Courts original Memorandum and Order (Dkt. No. 26 at 13), certain aspects of Dr. Grays treatment records, like Plaintiffs failure to follow through on cognitive behavior therapy classes, actually militate against a finding of disability. However, this is not a case where the mistake of the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the ... substance of the decision reached. Kurzon v. U.S. Postal Serv., 539 F.2d 788, 796 (1st Cir. 1976).

A goal of the treating source rule is to function as a procedural safeguard. See Francis, 414 Fed. Appx at 805. Where, as here, the Court cannot ascertain a clear understanding of why the ALJ rejected [the treating doctors] opinion, the goal of the treating source rule is not met. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

ORDER

The Commissioners Motion to Alter Judgment (Dkt. No. 28) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.