CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge The National Womens Political Caucus (NWPC) brings this trademark infringement and unfair competition suit against Metropolitan Louisville Womens Political Caucus (MLWPC). MLWPC has moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case to a more appropriate venue. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny all of MLWPCs motions and retain jurisdiction over the case.
I. Background
The Court here provides a brief factual overview to orient the personal jurisdiction and venue analysis. Further details relevant to that analysis will be set forth later in the opinion.
Founded in 1971, NWPC is a multi-partisan, grassroots political organization that seeks to increase womens participation in politics. Compl. ¶ 6. A nonprofit corporation organized under District of Columbia law, NWPCs lone office and employee are located in the District. Id. ¶ 1. In July 1971, NWPC began using in commerce the trademarks National Womens Political Caucus, NWPC, and an interlocking five-circle logo, intended to represent women of different races working together toward a common purpose. Id. ¶¶ 8-11. In 2004, NWPC began using in commerce a modernized version of the logo. Id. ¶ 12. NWPC contends that one or the other of the two designs have been in continuous commercial use since 1971. It also contends that it has acquired proper registration for these marks. See id. ¶¶ 18-23.
MLWPC was established in 1972 as a local chapter of NWPC. Id. ¶ 24. It is a nonprofit corporation organized under Kentucky law and headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky. Id. ¶ 2. NWPC says that it permitted MLWPC to use its marks so long as MLWPC remained a local chapter in good standing, which requires the payment of membership dues to NWPC, attendance at NWPC meetings, and compliance with NWPCs bylaws, among other things. Id. ¶¶ 27-29.
In October 2016, however, NWPC became concerned that MLWPC was violating NWPCs bylaws, including by endorsing male candidates for office and by failing to collect and transmit membership dues to NWPC. Id. ¶ 30. In December 2017, an NWPC attorney sent MLWPC a demand letter that purported to revoke MLWPCs permission to use any NWPC mark. Id. ¶ 32. MLWPC refused to comply, even after NWPC repeated its demands. See id. ¶¶ 33-36.
NWPC filed suit in June 2018. It brought claims for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) ; trademark infringement, unfair competition, false designation of origin, and trade name infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ; and common-law trademark infringement, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. MLWPC thereafter moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case to Kentucky, which it contends is a more appropriate venue. Those motions are now ripe for the Courts resolution.
II. Legal Standards
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
When a defendant moves to dismiss a lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Bigelow v. Garrett, 299 F.Supp.3d 34, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted). To do so, the plaintiff must provide sufficient factual allegations, apart from mere conclusory assertions, to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Howe v. Embassy of Italy, 68 F.Supp.3d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2014). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this burden, the Court is not limited to the four corners of the operative complaint, but rather may receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter to assist in determining jurisdictional facts. Xie v. Sklover & Co., LLC, 260 F.Supp.3d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). All factual discrepancies, however, must be resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Bigelow, 299 F.Supp.3d at 41.
B. Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for Improper Venue
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit for improper venue. In considering a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiffs well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiffs favor, and resolves any factual conflicts in the plaintiffs favor. Hunter v. Johanns, 517 F.Supp.2d 340, 343 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Darby v. Dept of Energy, 231 F.Supp.2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2002) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
MLWPC moves to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The Court begins with the personal jurisdiction question.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdiction. Xie, 260 F.Supp.3d at 39 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ). General jurisdiction exists where a defendant is so at home in the forum state that they can be sued there for any reason, whether related to the defendants activities in the forum or not. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846. Specific jurisdiction, as its name implies, means that the defendants contacts with the state must be tethered to the subject of the suit. Id. NWPC contends that the Court would have either form of jurisdiction over MLWPC, though it offers a serious argument only in regard to the latter. The Court will accordingly focus its analysis on that issue.
Determining whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant like MLWPC turns, at first glance, on two questions: first, whether the D.C. long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction, see D.C. Code § 13-423, and second, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with federal due process. Xie, 260 F.Supp.3d at 39. But these two questions are really one and the same: The D.C. long-arm statute, as most relevant here, authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over any defendant transacting any business in the District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), and this prong of the statute has been held to be coextensive with the due process clause,
Xie, 260 F.Supp.3d at 39 (quoting Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ).
For the exercise of jurisdiction to be consistent with the due process clause, it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quotations omitted). But where the defendant deliberately has engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum, he has sought the benefits and protections of the forums laws, and it is therefore presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. Id. at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (quotations omitted).
In addition to finding that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum states benefits and protections, the Court must also conclude that the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (quoting Intl Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ). This inquiry requires courts to consider relevant factors beyond the burden on the defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (instructing courts to consider factors like the forum states interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the judiciarys interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies).
The Court will first address what turns out to be the most difficult question: whether MLWPCs contacts with, and activities in, the District of Columbia are sufficient to find that it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business here. The Court will then consider the propriety of exercising jurisdiction-regardless of MLWPCs contacts-in light of the fair play and substantial justice factors. Finally, the Court will examine the case-specific jurisdiction question, i.e. whether the contacts MLWPC has with the District are sufficiently related to the subject of the suit for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over MLWPC.
Purposeful Availment. It is evident that MLWPCs activities within the District of Columbia are ample enough to constitute purposeful availment.
Chief among these activities is MLWPCs decades-long practice of collecting and sending membership dues to NWPC in D.C. See Pls Opp., Exs. E-F to Lent Decl. (documenting several years of payments from MLWPC to NWPC). Several features of this practice are key to the jurisdictional question. For one, MLWPC sought and received-from NWPC, while in D.C.-permission to collect membership renewal fees. Pls Opp., Ex. L to Lent Decl. (1989 MLWPC meeting minutes reporting that its representative did ask National while in Washington if locals have the right to send out local renewal notices, which was affirmed). For another, it appears that both parties to the suit believed MLWPC was required to collect and remit national member dues to NWPC in D.C. Though MLWPC now disputes that it was obligated to collect NWPC dues from its members, exhibits submitted by NWPC tell a different story. NWPCs bylaws require local caucuses to [c]ollect and forward to the national office on a regular and timely basis ... the national portion of any and all NWPC membership dues paid at the state or local level. Pls Opp., Ex. A to Lent Decl., at 4. MLWPC, at least for a time, acted accordingly; in 1990, for instance, the bulk of an MLWPC members annual dues-$ 20 of $ 35-was set aside for NWPC. Id., Exs. J-K. to Lent Decl. Indeed, it was, at least in part, MLWPCs decision to stop collecting and forwarding national member dues that caused NWPC to threaten to de-credential MLWPC and demand that it stop using NWPC marks. Id., Exs. CC-DD to Lent Decl.
The record contains additional evidence of MLWPC and NWPCs close and continuing relationship. MLWPCs own bylaws, for example, state that membership in the local caucus is open to all persons, 18 years or older, who subscribe to the principles of the National Womens Political Caucus, and that the goals of [MLWPC] shall be ... [t]o encourage and support the efforts of women who run for or are appointed to office, who support the goals of the National Womens Political Caucus. Id., Ex. D to Lent Decl. This was more than just lip service; internal discussions demonstrate that MLWPC took seriously its obligation to observe NWPC protocol. See, e.g., Id., Ex. BB. to Lent Decl. (1991 MLWPC minutes reporting that NWPCs rule against endorsing male candidates made advocacy difficult in certain local races). The bylaws also provide that if MLWPC were to dissolve, its property [would] be distributed to the state and or national Womens Political Caucus. Id., Ex. D. to Lent Decl. And finally, the very subject of the suit-MLWPCs allegedly infringing use of NWPCs marks-stands as further evidence of the parties ongoing relationship.
That is not all. NWPC has also provided evidence of significant interaction between MLWPC members and NWPC. See Pls Opp. at 8-10. The exhibits attached to NWPCs opposition show that MLWPC routinely encouraged its members to attend NWPC conventions and seek leadership roles in NWPC. Id., Exs. O-R, V. They also show that MLWPCs leadership consistently communicated with NWPC leadership. Id., Exs O, T-V. While these contacts are not as significant to the Courts analysis as are the paying of dues and the agreement to abide by NWPCs rules-especially because they speak more to the actions of individual MLWPC members rather than of the organization itself-they still counsel in favor of finding personal jurisdiction.
So this is what we know: MLWPC regularly collected and sent dues to NWPC in D.C.; it agreed to conduct itself according to NWPCs rules and envisioned itself as furthering the goals of NWPC, as reflected in its bylaws and through its use of NWPCs marks; it encouraged its members to participate in NWPC activities; and it maintained regular communication with NWPC since its inception. Taken together, these are strong indicia that MLWPC maintained an ongoing relationship with a D.C.-based entity, such that it purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law. It strikes the Court that these systematic and continuous contacts with the District ought to make MLWPC amenable to a lawsuit here.
MLWPCs efforts to challenge that intuition all come up short. As for the dues issue, MLWPC makes three points: first, that it was not required to collect dues on behalf of NWPC; second, that it merely gave local members the option to join the national organization; and third, that it never paid NWPC out of its own coffers and only served as a pass through for its members dues. See Defs Reply at 6; Woodward Aff. ¶ 11-12. The trouble with the first two arguments, however, is that they run counter to NWPCs allegations and supporting exhibits-which plausibly show that both NWPC and MLWPC, for at least some period of their relationship, believed the local caucus was required to collect dues on behalf of the national organization and that local members may have automatically paid national dues by joining the local organization. See supra 4. And, on a motion to dismiss, a plaintiffs factual allegations must be accepted as true unless they are directly contradicted by an affidavit, which here they are not. Azamar v. Stern, 662 F.Supp.2d 166, 171 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). MLWPCs third dues argument likewise fails, because it is unimportant for personal jurisdiction purposes whether it was transmitting to D.C. the local groups own money or that of its individual members-what matters is that, in either case, MLWPC was in continuous contact with the national organization in D.C.
As for MLWPCs attempts to paint itself an independent actor, see Defs Reply at 3, it is true that the local organization has its own bylaws, but it is equally true that those bylaws reflect the groups close affiliation with NWPC. See supra 7; Pls Opp., Ex. D to Lent Decl. Evidence of this relationship abounds throughout NWPCs supporting exhibits: MLWPC understood it had to abide by NWPC rules, the MLWPC mission statement tracks verbatim NWPCs mission statement, and the two organizations used the same five-circled design mark that is the subject of this suit, compare id., Ex. A to Lent Decl. with Ex. D to Lent Decl. In light of all this, MLWPCs attempts to minimize its relationship with NWPC, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, are unavailing.
The cases MLWPC cites do not alter the analysis. Hoping to lessen the import of MLWPCs affiliation with NWPC, it cites both Lapointe v. Van Note, No. CIV. 03-2128, 2004 WL 3609346, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2004) and Am. Assn of Cruise Passengers v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 691 F.Supp. 379, 381 (D.D.C. 1987). But both cases involved far more attenuated contacts than this one. In Lapointe, the court held that Earth Island Institutes (EII) membership in the media consortium Monitor-EIIs lone contact with the District of Columbia-did not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction. 2004 WL 3609346, at *5. Missing from Lapointe, however, is anything like MLWPCs solicitation, collection, and transmission of dues to a D.C.-based entity, or the understanding that one organization would have to abide by the others rules and regulations. Cunard, meanwhile, is even further afield. There, the defendants contacts with D.C. consist[ed] entirely of sporadic attendance at trade association meetings held in [D.C.] and limited communications with a national office in D.C. that had nothing to do with the plaintiff. 691 F.Supp.3d at 381. Needless to say, there is a stark difference between membership in a D.C. organization-replete with dues-paying obligations and conformity to rules and regulations of a governing body-and sporadic attendance at trade association meetings.
In support of its argument that the collection and transmission of dues to NWPC does not create a basis for personal jurisdiction in D.C., MLWPC urges the Court to consider COMSAT Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M., 900 F.Supp. 515 (D.D.C. 1995). MLWPC cites COMSAT for the proposition that [p]erforming administrative services on behalf of a Washington, D.C. entity does not, standing alone, provide a basis for personal jurisdiction. Defs Reply at 7 (quoting COMSAT, 900 F.Supp. at 522 ). There are several problems with MLWPCs reliance on COMSAT. As an initial matter, even if the case did stand for the proposition MLWPC claims it does, neither NWPCs argument nor the Courts conclusion is to the contrary; it is not the transmission of dues to NWPC in D.C. standing alone that renders MLWPC subject to personal jurisdiction in D.C., but instead all the various other contacts just described taken together. Whats more, COMSAT is factually nowhere close to this case. There, a nonresident accounting firm (defendant Finshipyards) acted as an intermediary between a D.C.-based telecommunications firm (plaintiff COMSAT) and COMSATs customers in Zaire. COMSAT would provide Finshipyards with invoices for its Zaire customers; Finshipyards would transmit those invoices to the Zaire customers; those customers would provide payment to Finshipyards; and Finshipyards would then transfer the funds to a COMSAT bank account in New York City. Id. The COMSAT court held that this was clearly insufficient to show any desire of Finshipyards to do business with COMSAT in Washington, D.C., id. at 523, and for good reason: its only real contact with D.C. was receiving phone bills for COMSATs Zaire customers that reflected COMSATs Washington, D.C., address. That fortuitous and attenuated connection is nothing like MLWPCs longstanding relationship with NWPC in the District.
Perhaps recognizing the absence of helpful case law, MLWPC makes much of the fact that NWPC cites no case under which any court-much less a court in this jurisdiction-found specific personal jurisdiction over an organization based solely on its affiliation with or membership in an in-state entity. Defs Reply at 4. But NWPC need not cite a case standing for that proposition, because a holding in favor of NWPC does not depend on that proposition. Far from finding personal jurisdiction based on the status of the relationship between MLWPC and NWPC, it is the specific contours of that relationship-including MLWPCs active efforts to affiliate with NWPC, its collection and transmission of dues to NWPC in D.C., and the fact that MLWPC had to conform to NWPC rules to retain its status as a local caucus-that expose MLWPC to suit in the District.
And though no precise analog appears to exist, courts have suggested these sorts of contacts create a basis for personal jurisdiction. In Burger King, for example, a Florida-based franchisor sued a Michigan-based franchisee for breach of the franchise agreement and trademark infringement. 471 U.S. at 468-69, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Though the defendants resided in Michigan and had hardly any physical ties to Florida, the Supreme Court concluded that a Florida court could exercise personal jurisdiction over them because they had deliberately reached out beyond Michigan and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide organization. Id. at 479-80, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (cleaned up). That affiliation envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida, including long-term and exacting regulation of his business by the Florida headquarters and the regular payment of royalties to the same. Id. at 480, 105 S.Ct. 2174. These contacts-and the Florida choice-of-law provision in the franchise agreement-made it presumptively reasonable that the nonresident defendants would be called to account in Florida. Id. Many of the salient facts in Burger King are present here, including (1) a nonresident defendants decision to reach out and establish a relationship with an entity in the forum state, (2) an ongoing relationship requiring the defendant to conduct itself in accord with the forum state entitys specifications, and (3) payment from the defendant to the forum state entity.
Granted, the Burger King analogy is not a perfect one. Here, there was no written contract between the two entities, nor was MLWPC subject to the national organizations exacting regulation of virtually every conceivable aspect of ... operations. Id. at 465, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (emphasis added). To the contrary, MLWPC had wide latitude to chart its own course, and focused much of its time and resources on supporting local candidates; that is the very point of local caucuses.
All the same, these distinctions are not enough to compel a different conclusion on the personal jurisdiction question. Burger King made clear that the existence of a contract is not dispositive in either direction. Id. at 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (emphasizing that personal jurisdiction does not turn on mechanical tests (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ). And even if Burger King exercised a greater degree of control over its franchisees than NWPC did over MLWPC, that does not mean the degree of control in Burger King must always exist to subject a local affiliate to personal jurisdiction in a national organizations home forum; such reasoning confuses what was sufficient in one case with what is necessary in every other case. Courts have had no trouble extending the principles embodied by Burger King to other types of relationships, even when obvious factual differences obtain. In Hogar CREA, Inc. v. Hogar CREA Intl of Connecticut, Inc., to take one example, a Puerto Rican court exercised personal jurisdiction over Massachusetts and Connecticut entities because they voluntarily chose to affiliate with an existing Puerto Rico organization, rather than form an independent local entity, thereby creat[ing] long-term relationships with [Puerto Rico] and voluntarily submitt[ing] to regulation and oversight from entities in Puerto Rico. 708 F.Supp.2d 158, 172-73 (D.P.R. 2009). In so holding, the court leaned heavily on Burger King, despite acknowledging that it was unclear whether the plaintiff and defendants entered into a contract and that the defendants were subject to more limited regulations than the franchisee in Burger King. Id. at 171.
Just so here. MLWPC voluntarily chose to affiliate with NWPC, thereby creating an ongoing relationship between the two entities. The fact MLWPC was obligated-according to NWPCs allegations, which the Court must take as true for the purposes of this motion-to remit membership dues to the national organization in D.C., all while abiding by NWPCs rules, using NWPCs marks, and encouraging its members to attend and participate in NWPC events, suggests MLWPC reach[ed] out beyond one state and create[d] continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state, namely D.C. Travelers Health Assn v. Com. of Va. ex rel. State Corp. Commn, 339 U.S. 643, 647, 70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950). That is a quintessential act of purposeful availment. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citing Travelers for the proposition that continuing obligations is indicative of purposeful availment).
Fair Play and Substantial Justice Factors. MLWPC devotes little space in its submissions to the argument that, even if the Court were to find that MLWPC purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in D.C., it would nevertheless be gravely unfair to subject it to suit there. It appears MLWPC believed that the battle has likely been lost if the fight reached this front-and they are correct. None of the factors courts typically consider suggest exercising jurisdiction over MLWPC would offend our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe, 66 S.Ct. at 160 ; see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (listing considerations). The District of Columbia has a strong interest in adjudicating the dispute, since NWPC is headquartered here, and the marks NWPC seeks to protect are used here. The plaintiffs interest in obtaining speedy relief and the judiciarys interest in efficiently resolving the controversy either auger in favor of keeping the case in this Court-thereby avoiding the delay caused by dismissal and starting the case from scratch elsewhere-or break in neither direction. The Court therefore determines that subjecting MLWPC to suit in the District of Columbia would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Relationship Between Contacts and Subject of Suit. That leaves only the question whether NWPCs causes of action arise out of or relate to MLWPCs contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). The Court concludes that they do. While NWPC sues MLWPC for trademark infringement and unfair competition that occurred in Kentucky, NWPC contends that were it not for MLWPCs purposeful contacts with NWPC and this District, MLWPC never would have had the implied license [to use its mark] in the first place. Pls Opp. at 18 (citing Lent Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11-21). Taking that allegation as true for the purposes of this motion, this lawsuit arise[s] out of MLWPCs contacts with NWPC in the District of Columbia. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, the test for trademark infringement and unfair competition-likelihood of consumer confusion-might well turn on the nature and closeness of the relationship between MLWPC and NWPC. See Am. Socy for Testing & Materials, et al. v. Pub.Res.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (listing factors, including similarity of the marks, the proximity of the goods, ... [and] the defendants intent in adopting the mark). In this way, then, MLWPCs contacts with NWPC in D.C. also relate to the subject of the litigation. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868. The subject matter of the litigation and MLWPCs contacts with the District of Columbia are therefore sufficiently connected to support specific jurisdiction.
B. Venue
MLWPC next moves either to dismiss the case for improper venue or to transfer it to a more convenient forum. The Court will reject both requests.
Venue law ensures that only courts with some interest in the dispute or the parties adjudicate the claims at issue. Under the general venue provisions for federal question cases set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in the district where (1) a defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) the events giving rise to the suit occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the suit is located; or (3) if venue would not be proper in any district for those reasons, wherever the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction. Venue is plainly proper under section 1391(b)(1) : MLWPC is a corporation, and a corporation is deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the courts personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. § 1391(c)(2). Because the Court has already held that MLWPC is subject to personal jurisdiction in D.C., the District is also an appropriate venue.
Even where venue is technically proper, however, a case may be transferred to a more convenient forum. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought if it serves the convenience of the parties and witnesses and is in the interest of justice. The first question is could this case have been brought in Kentucky? The answer is clearly yes, since MLWPC is at home there and the alleged infringement took place there. The second question is should the case, for the convenience of the parties and in the interest of justice, nevertheless be litigated in Kentucky? The Court thinks not, but that answer warrants a bit more discussion.
Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) ). This inquiry requires the Court to use[ ] its broad discretion to balance case-specific factors related to the public interest of justice and the private interests of the parties and witnesses. Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F.Supp.2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2009). [P]rivate-interest factors include: (1) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) the defendants choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.
Aishat v. U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., 288 F.Supp.3d 261, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (quotation omitted). The relevant public-interest factors include: (1) the transferees familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the transferor and transferee courts; and (3) the local interest in having local controversies decided at home. Id. (quotation omitted). [T]he burden of demonstrating that an action should be transferred is on the movant." Air Line Pilots Assn v. E. Air Lines, 672 F.Supp. 525, 526 (D.D.C. 1987).
Among the private-interest factors, the plaintiffs choice of forum generally warrants paramount consideration, id., and here plaintiffs have chosen to litigate in D.C. MLWPC asserts that NWPCs choice of forum deserves less deference because the balance of convenience strongly favors Kentucky, Defs MTD at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted), but it offers little support for this claim. MLWPC obviously would prefer to litigate the case in Kentucky, but the Court is unconvinced that Kentucky would be any more convenient than D.C., let alone clearly so. It is likely the case will involve witnesses located in D.C., Kentucky, and elsewhere around the country; neither forum would eliminate the need for at least some witnesses to travel. As for the convenience of the parties, NWPC is based in D.C., and its key board member in the case, president Donna Lent, would prefer to litigate here. While it would be more convenient for MLWPC to litigate in Kentucky, where all its board members reside, transfer for this reason would simply shift inconvenience to the plaintiffs rather than lead to an overall increase in convenience for the parties. U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 771 F.Supp.2d 42, 48 (D.D.C. 2011). The final convenience factor, the ease of access to sources of proof, is also a wash; MLWPC admits that the main sources of proof will consist of documentary evidence that can be readily exchanged electronically, and so this factor favors neither venue. Defs Opp. at 16.
To be sure, there are certain other situations where the plaintiffs choice of forum warrants substantially less deference, including where the venue chosen is not plaintiffs home forum and there is an insubstantial factual nexus between the case and the plaintiffs chosen forum, New Hope Power Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 724 F.Supp.2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2010), or where a forum-selection clause applies, Revis v. Tustin Constr. Servs., LLC, 322 F.Supp.3d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2018). But neither of those features is present in this case.
Not much need be said on the public-interest factors. MLWPC spends most of its single paragraph on this issue explaining why D.C. is not the superior forum rather than explaining why Kentucky is. But that argument supports the status quo, not transfer. MLWPC does claim that Kentucky has a stronger local interest in the case since MLWPC is a Kentucky organization, with Kentucky-based board members, and with an entirely local focus. Defs Reply at 17. All that is true, but much the same could be said for the other side: NWPC is a D.C.-based organization, with its only office and employee in the city. The Court therefore cannot see how Kentuckys interest in the parties trademark infringement and unfair competition dispute is any stronger than D.C.s.
For all these reasons, the Court will deny MLWPCs motion to transfer the case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that [8] Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the Defendant shall file an answer to the complaint on or before February 11, 2019.
SO ORDERED .
The Court acknowledges that MLWPC disagrees with NWPCs interpretation of the bylaws, but at the motion to dismiss stage, all fact disputes must be resolved (and all permissible inferences must be drawn) in a plaintiffs favor.
As with the dues, MLWPCs later failure to abide by the no-male-endorsement rule played a part in NWPCs decision to reprimand and eventually de-credential the local chapter. Id., Exs CC-DD to Lent Decl.
Here the Court must also note that MLWPC-intentionally or not-misreports the analysis in COMSAT. MLWPC states, in relevant part, that [t]his Court held that although the accounting authority had conduct[ed] business in the District of Columbia by billing for Zaires communication service, this activity was related to its supplying telecommunications service to Zaire , not for the provision of any services to [the accounting authority] or receipt of services from [the accounting authority]. Defs Reply at 7 (quoting COMSAT, 900 F.Supp. at 522 (alterations MLWPCs) ). But the court in fact said something very different. It said that COMSAT -not the accounting authority (defendant Finshipyards)-conducted business in D.C. by billing for Zaires telecommunications, but that those D.C. activities had nothing to do with Finshipyards and thus could not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction in D.C. with respect to Finshipyards. See COMSAT, 900 F.Supp. at 522 (To be sure, COMSAT did conduct business, including billing for Zaires telecommunications service, in the District of Columbia.)
Moreover, its not as if every factual distinction that exists between Burger King and this case shows that the former presented a comparatively stronger basis for personal jurisdiction. One example pointing in the opposite direction: the franchisee-defendants in Burger King were subject to supervision emanating from Burger Kings district office in [Michigan], which the court of appeals and the dissent believed in effect severed the tie to Florida. Here, by contrast, MLWPC cannot and does not argue that its relationship with some more local entity, for instance the Kentucky Womens Political Caucus, caused it to believe that [its] working relationship with [the national organization] began and ended in Kentucky. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 489, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).