May, Judge.
[1] John W. Anthony appeals the trial courts determination he violated Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3, which prohibits driving with a sign, poster, sunscreening material, or other nontransparent material upon the front windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows of the vehicle that obstructs the drivers clear view of the highway or an intersecting highway. As the State did not present any evidence to prove Anthony violated that statute, we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 25, 2017, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Kenneth Greer observed a car being driven by Anthony. The car had plastic bags of trash, canned foods, clothes, piled from the bottom of [its] floor to the ceiling ... on the dashboard and along the side windows and rear windows. (Tr. Vol. II at 6.) After looking around the car and being able to see in only the drivers window, Officer Greer issued a citation to Anthony for violation of Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3.
[3] On November 13, 2017, at a bench trial, Anthony represented himself and denied violating the statute. Throughout his testimony Anthony repeatedly noted the statute prohibits nontransparent material upon the windows, Ind. Code § 9-19-19-3 (emphasis added), and argued he didnt have nothing on the windshield. [He] didnt have nothing on the side windows. [He] did have items in the automobile. (Tr. at 13) (errors in original).
[4] The State, during its cross-examination of Anthony, told Anthony he was not understanding the statute correctly. The following exchange occurred:
[State:] A person may not drive a motor vehicle with a sign, poster or non-transparent material, thats debris, on the front windshield, side windows, rear window of the vehicle, obstructs the drivers clear view of the highway or intersection highway. You read this?
[Anthony:] It says nothing on the windshield. I dont have nothing on the windows.
[State:] I dont believe you understand what Im saying, sir.
[Anthony:] I understand what youre saying. I understand what Im reading too.
[State:] So you do understand that non-transparent materials is not a decal? Thats not a sticker. Its any nontransparent material, do you understand?
[Anthony:] Yeah, its not on the windows. Its in the vehicle.
[State:] Thats correct and as you can see here, it actually says that you cannot have those things inside your vehicle to obstruct your view of the highway.
(Id. at 17.) The trial court found Anthony had committed the violation and assessed a fine. Anthony paid the fine and filed this appeal.
Discussion and Decision
Statutory Interpretation
[5] Anthony was cited for violating Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3, which provides:
(b) A person may not drive a motor vehicle with a sign, poster, sunscreening material, or other nontransparent material upon the front windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows of the vehicle that obstructs the drivers clear view of the highway or an intersecting highway. However, signs, posters, or other nontransparent material not larger than four (4) inches square may be placed upon the front windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows in the lower corner farthest removed from the drivers position.
[6] Anthony asserts the State presented no evidence of any nontransparent materials upon [his] windshield or windows[.] (Appellants Br. at 7) (formatting changed). Although Anthony concedes his car had items stacked to the ceiling, he argues the statute requires the items to be upon the windows and they were not. The State argues the legislatures intent was to prevent drivers having their view obstructed by items blocking the windows. Further, it argues the word upon should be construed broadly and not just mean affixed because the legislature uses that word in other statutes and would have used it here if it meant the nontransparent material only applied to items affixed to the windows. (Appellees Br. at 7-8.) The crux of the parties arguments, and thus our review, focuses on the meaning of the word upon.
[7] When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo . In re M.W. , 913 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We first decide if the statute is ambiguous. Id. If not, we need not and do not interpret it, but instead apply its plain and clear meaning. Id. If the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must determine the legislatures intent so that we can give effect to that intent. Maroney v. State , 849 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Statutes must be read in harmony with related statutes. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Poland, 828 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We assume the legislature intended statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statutes underlying policy and goals. B.K.C. v. State , 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[8] Upon was defined in Clark v. Clark , 971 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 2012), a case that interpreted Indianas Guest Statute. Our Indiana Supreme Court held:
The word upon, both at the time it was originally added to the Guest Statute, see Act of Mar. 11, 1937, ch. 259, § 1, 1937 Ind. Acts 1229, and when the statute was most recently amended, see Pub.L. 68-1984, 1984 Ind. Acts 925, should be given its literal meaning: [u]p and on or simply on. The New Century Dictionary 2112 (1929); American Heritage Dictionary 1328 (2d college ed. 1985). Being in or upon the motor vehicle thus connotes a physical connection to or contact with the vehicle, such as being in a car or upon a motorcycle or truck bed. ... Thus, if the injury is sustained at a time when a passenger is in mere physical contact with the motor vehicle but standing outside of or off of it or at a time when the passenger is not being transported by the vehicle, then the Indiana Guest Statute does not bar a passengers damage action against the driver.
Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted).
[9] The plain meaning of the word upon has not changed. Simply, it means on. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upon (last visited May 2, 2018). The definition of the word on is a function word to indicate position in contact with and support by the top surface of[.] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on (last visited May 2, 2018). The word on (and thus, the word upon) does not merely mean near but rather fixed to or in some way resting atop or dependent on. The word upon in this statute is not ambiguous. It clearly means the listed items are not allowed to be affixed to the windows.
[10] The State argues the statute should be construed broadly to include the circumstances at issue herein. However, the legislature has already seen fit to prohibit the operation of a vehicle when the drivers view of the roadway is obstructed by materials loaded in the vehicle. Indiana Code section 9-21-8-43 provides: A person may not drive a vehicle when [it] is loaded in a manner ... so as to obstruct the view of the person who drives the vehicle to the front or sides of the vehicle. Because the legislature has already provided a means to punish citizens who drive vehicles loaded in a manner that obstructs the drivers view, we need not interpret Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3 so broadly that on means more than its plain and ordinary meaning. See House of Prayer Ministries, Inc. v. Rush Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 91 N.E.3d 1053, 1063-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (if the language of the statute is plain, the judiciary has no discretion to substitute different language for that of the statute[;] however, even if the language is ambiguous, the judiciary would be obliged to avoid interpreting it in a way that would lead to an absurd result).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11] [T]raffic infractions are civil, rather than criminal, in nature and the State must prove the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the evidence. Rosenbaum v. State , 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courts judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 1995), rehg denied. The decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). If there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the trial courts judgment, it will not be overturned. Rosenbaum , 930 N.E.2d at 74.
[12] While there seems to be little doubt Anthonys vehicle was full of items that obstructed his view, those items were not affixed to the windows or dependent on the windows for their support. Rather, the items in Anthonys car were resting on the floors, the seats, and the dashboard. By all accounts, his operation of the vehicle raised safety concerns because his view was obstructed. However, Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3 does not prohibit an obstructed view, generally. It prohibits placement of material upon ... windows ... that obstructs the drivers clear view. Ind. Code § 9-19-19-3. The State did not present such evidence. Accordingly, we reverse. See Atteberry v. State , 911 N.E.2d 601, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (States failure to properly charge ... is no mere technicality ... the State must prove the elements of the crime it charged, not the elements of some other crime the defendant may have committed.).
[13] Reversed.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Anthony submitted a picture of his vehicle as Defendants Exhibit A. An affidavit from the court reporter indicates the Exhibit was admitted but could not be located when the Exhibit volume was being prepared for appeal.
Indianas Guest Statute provides one is not responsible for damages arising from injuries to or death of [certain family members or hitchhikers] resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle while [those persons were] being transported ... in or upon the motor vehicle[.] Ind. Code § 34-30-11-1.