PRESTON, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, George Fetters (Fetters), appeals the October 2, 2017 judgment entry of the Mercer County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division dismissing his action against defendant-appellee, Cathy Duff (Duff), for an accounting under R.C. 1337.36. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Fetters and Duff are brother and sister, and the underlying dispute concerns Fetterss allegations that Duff abused her position as attorney-in-fact for their mother, Phyllis Lauth (Lauth). Fetters was originally designated as Lauths attorney-in-fact through a written power of attorney executed by Lauth in May 2015. (Doc. Nos. 4, 12). However, after serving as his mothers attorney-in-fact for three months, Fetters was removed by Lauth in August 2015. (Doc. No. 12). Lauth appointed Duff to serve as her attorney-in-fact in Fetterss place, a role Duff occupied until Lauths death on April 18, 2016. (Id. ).
{¶ 3} On July 13, 2016, Fetters, by letter, requested that Duff render an accounting of her time as Lauths attorney-in-fact. (Doc. Nos. 1, 12). Duff did not produce an accounting in response to Fetterss demand. (Doc. No. 1).
{¶ 4} On January 24, 2017, Fetters filed, in the Probate Court, a complaint under R.C. 1337.36 requesting an accounting of Duffs tenure as Lauths attorney-in-fact. (Doc. No. 1).
{¶ 5} Duff filed her answer on March 2, 2017. (Doc No. 4). Duffs March 2, 2017 pleading also set forth a counterclaim against Fetters under R.C. 1337.36 requesting that Fetters be ordered to render an accounting for the brief period of time during which he served as Lauths attorney-in-fact. (Id. ).
{¶ 6} In the following months, Fetters and Duff exchanged position memoranda and reply briefs. (See Doc. Nos. 9, 12, 13, 14, 15). Fetters filed his Memorandum of Plaintiff on May 17, 2017. (Doc. No. 9). Duff submitted her Defendants Memorandum on May 22, 2017. (Doc. No. 12). Fetters submitted his Response to Memorandum of Defendant on May 25, 2017. (Doc. No. 13). Duff filed her Defendants Response Memorandum on June 5, 2017. (Doc. No. 14). On June 12, 2017, Fetters filed his Response to Defendants Response Memorandum. (Doc. No. 15).
{¶ 7} A final hearing on Fetterss complaint and Duffs counterclaim was held on August 24, 2017. (See Doc. Nos. 17, 22).
{¶ 8} On October 2, 2017, the trial court dismissed Fetterss complaint and Duffs counterclaim. (Doc. No. 22). In its entry, the trial court noted that [n]o challenges to the inventory or accounting, or other actions were filed in the estate case while it was opened. (Id. ). The trial court concluded: The Court finds that the purpose of the law in the ORC is to provide for finality in estates. (Id. ).
{¶ 9} On October 25, 2017, Fetters filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 23). Fetters raises one assignment of error.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff-Appellants request for an account in accordance with Ohio Revised Code § 1337.36.
{¶ 10} In his sole assignment of error, Fetters argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint requesting an order compelling Duff to render an accounting of her time as Lauths attorney-in-fact under R.C. 1337.36. In particular, Fetters argues that R.C. 1337.36 does not impose a requirement that a beneficiary of the estate of a deceased principal file an action requesting an accounting of the deceased principals attorney-in-fact during the pendency of the principals estate. Because Fetterss complaint was filed while Lauths estate was still pending, we decline to rule on this specific issue. However, for the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 11} Fetters appeals from the trial courts judgment entry dismissing his complaint requesting an order directing Duff to render an accounting of her tenure as Lauths attorney-in-fact. Accounting issues and the award of damages that may appear to be necessary fall within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cartwright v. Batner , 2014-Ohio-2995, 15 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 20, quoting Schafer v. RMS Realty , 138 Ohio App.3d 244, 300, 741 N.E.2d 155 (2d Dist. 2000), citing Sandusky Properties v. Aveni , 15 Ohio St.3d 273, 274-275, 473 N.E.2d 798 (1984). Thus, we will not overturn a trial courts decision to grant or deny a request for an accounting unless the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
R.C. 1337.36 provides, in relevant part:
(A) Any of the following persons may petition a court to construe a power of attorney or review the agents conduct and grant appropriate relief:
* * *
(4) The principals spouse, parent, or descendant;
(5) An individual who would qualify as a presumptive heir of the principal;
(6) A person named as a beneficiary to receive any property, benefit, or contractual right on the principals death or as a beneficiary of a trust created by or for the principal that has a financial interest in the principals estate.
R.C. 1337.36(A)(4), (5), (6).
{¶ 12} As a preliminary matter, we must address Duffs contention that Fetters did not have standing under R.C. 1337.36 to file his complaint with the trial court. Fetters is Lauths son. (Doc. No. 12). Thus, as Lauths descendant, Fetters has standing under R.C. 1337.36(A)(4) to pursue the action.
{¶ 13} Having found that Fetters has standing to file his petition for an accounting, we turn now to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Fetterss request for an accounting and dismissing the action.
{¶ 14} An action requesting an accounting of an attorney-in-facts tenure is a matter based in equity. See Sandusky Properties v. Aveni , 15 Ohio St.3d 273, 274-75, 473 N.E.2d 798 (1984) ; Bonnell v. B. & T. Metals Co. , 52 Ohio Law Abs. 1, 4, 81 N.E.2d 730 (2d Dist. 1948) ([A]ccounting * * * is of equitable cognizance.), citing Nordin v. Coulton , 142 Ohio St. 277, 51 N.E.2d 717 (1943). Equity cannot be determined by any [fixed] rule, but depends upon the peculiar facts and equitable considerations of each case. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. , 179 Ohio App.3d 385, 2008-Ohio-5991, 902 N.E.2d 53, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Tiffin v. Shawhan , 43 Ohio St. 178, 183, 1 N.E. 581 (1885). Given the particular circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Fetterss complaint requesting an accounting from Duff.
{¶ 15} Fetters filed his complaint on January 24, 2017-just before Lauths estate was closed on February 3, 2017 but well after the estate was opened on May 10, 2016. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 12, 22). From the time that Lauths estate was opened until Fetters filed his complaint, Fetters took no formal steps through the trial court or otherwise to challenge Duffs conduct as Lauths attorney-in-fact. Fetters did not submit exceptions to the inventory submitted by Duff. (See Doc. No. 22). Moreover, he neglected to challenge any account rendered by Duff, including the final account submitted less than three weeks before he filed his complaint. (See id. ). Prior to filing his complaint, Fetterss only apparent indication that he had objections to Duffs handling of their mothers power of attorney and that he believed Duff may have misused funds belonging to Lauths estate was through a letter sent in July 2016 demanding an accounting from Duff. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 12). Duff did not produce an accounting in response to this informal request. (Doc. No. 1). After this futile effort to elicit an accounting from Duff, Fetters made no further attempt to address his concerns about Duffs use of Lauths power of attorney until he filed his complaint over six months later. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 12, 22).
{¶ 16} It is not the case that dismissing Fetterss complaint requesting an accounting was tantamount to denying Fetters any remedy at all. During the estate proceedings, Fetters had access to numerous mechanisms through which he could have sought to hold Duff accountable for alleged exploitations of the power of attorney executed by Lauth. However, he failed to use any of them. (See Doc. Nos. 12, 22).
{¶ 17} Duff was the executor of Lauths estate as well as her attorney-in-fact. (Doc. No. 12). Accordingly, she was required to render an account of the estates administration and compile an inventory under R.C. 2109.301 and 2115.02, respectively. In response to the account and inventory, Fetters, as a beneficiary and person indisputably interested in Lauths estate, could have filed exceptions to Duffs account and inventory under R.C. 2109.33 and 2115.16, respectively. While exceptions brought under R.C. 2109.33 and 2115.16 typically go to the conduct of the executor or administrator in their capacity as executor or administrator, given the expansive power that probate courts have over executors and administrators, Duff could have been called to account for funds allegedly missing from the estate due to any financial misconduct as Lauths attorney-in-fact. See R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c) ([T]he probate court has exclusive jurisdiction * * * [t]o direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators * * *). Despite ample opportunity to do so, Fetters did not challenge Duffs financial conduct as Lauths attorney-in-fact using any of the customary methods used to account for a decedents assets.
{¶ 18} Finally, Fetters produced no competent evidence which the trial court could have relied on to credit his claim that Duff abused her position as Lauths attorney-in-fact. Fetterss first and only specific objection to Duffs handling of Lauths power-of-attorney was a conclusory statement contained in his final brief to the trial court submitted in June 2016. (Doc. No. 15) (The problem here is it is clear from the records we have that there has been misspending by Cathy Duff during her term as POA which could not have been discovered through an estate inquiry. She needs to answer why there were multiple expenditures on Ebay and other internet accounts and for dining out and doing other things when the decedent, in her last month, was essentially an invalid.). However, the trial court record does not contain any document which would naturally comprise part of the record Fetters allegedly relied on to substantiate his claim that Duff misused her position as Lauths attorney-in-fact. There are no bank or credit card statements, no receipts, no confirmations of internet shopping orders, and no other documents from which the trial judge could have reasonably concluded that Fetterss allegations were plausible and that an accounting from Duff was necessary to clarify the matter.
{¶ 19} In light of the foregoing, we find that the judgment of the trial court was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and that it therefore did not abuse its discretion is dismissing Fetterss request for an accounting.
{¶ 20} Fetterss assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
Lauths will was probated on May 10, 2016 in another case. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 12, 22). As executor of Lauths estate, Duff filed a final account on January 4, 2017 which was approved on February 3, 2017. (See Doc. Nos. 12, 22). No challenges to the inventory or the account or other actions were filed during the pendency of the estate. (Doc Nos. 12, 22).
Although Duffs counterclaim was dismissed along with Fetterss complaint, Fetters apparently produced an accounting voluntarily in response to Duffs counterclaim. (See Doc. No. 15) (It should be noted that apparently Defendant believed that she had a right to file for an accounting and did so and received an accounting subsequent to Plaintiffs filing.).
Fetters filed his request for an accounting on January 24, 2017, more than a week before the estate was officially closed on February 3, 2017. (Doc. Nos. 1, 12, 22). There is some ambiguity as to whether Fetterss request was filed in Lauths estate itself or as a parallel action in the trial court. (See Doc. No. 22) (This matter for the accounting was filed January 24, 2017 as a separate action in this case.). Regardless, as the question concerns whether Fetterss petition was required to be filed during the pendency of Lauths estate and because there is no question that Lauths estate was still open when this request was filed, it is unnecessary to rule on Fetterss specific objection.
We also note that this matter is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. R.C. 2101.24(B)(1)(b) vests probate courts with concurrent jurisdiction with the general division of the court of common pleas over any action that involves a power of attorney. An action brought under R.C. 1337.36 requesting an accounting from a deceased principals attorney-in-fact clearly involves a power of attorney such that the trial court has concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over the action with the general division of the court of common pleas. See Cartwright , 2014-Ohio-2995, 15 N.E.3d 401, at ¶ 45-54.