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IN RE Disqualification of ADKINS. The State of Ohio v. Chebegwen.

Supreme Court of Ohio2018-09-20No. No. 18-AP-103
122 N.E.3d 1932018 Ohio 5438155 Ohio St. 3d 1308

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Opinion

majority opinion

OConnor, C.J.

{¶ 1} Michael P. Dailey, counsel for the defendant, Clouvis Chebegwen, has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court pursuant to R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Dennis J. Adkins from presiding over any further proceedings in the above-referenced case.

{¶ 2} According to Mr. Dailey, his client fled from Cameroon after numerous acts of violence against him and his family and has an application for asylum pending with the United States government. In the underlying matter, Mr. Chebegwen is charged with theft, pandering obscenity involving a minor, and pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor. Mr. Dailey states that according to Mr. Chebegwens attorney in the asylum case, Mr. Chebegwens convictions on the indicted charges would result in his deportation back to Cameroon where he would be imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

{¶ 3} Prior to the scheduled trial in this matter, Mr. Dailey and an assistant prosecutor negotiated a plea agreement in which the state agreed to amend or dismiss the charges relating to obscenity and sexually oriented material involving a minor. Mr. Dailey avers that Judge Adkins should be removed from this case based on his reaction to the proposed plea agreement. Specifically, Mr. Dailey alleges that the judge demonstrated bias or an appearance of impropriety based on the following: (1) after the parties presented their plea agreement, the judge commented, Why are we fighting so hard to keep this guy in our country; (2) the judge initially rejected the plea agreement, although Mr. Dailey is not aware of the judge rejecting any other plea agreement in the past several years; (3) the judge involved supervisors from the prosecutors office in the plea negotiations; (4) the judge refused Mr. Daileys request to continue the scheduled trial; and (5) the judge showed general disdain toward [Chebegwens] immigration status.

{¶ 4} Judge Adkins has responded in writing to the affidavit and denies any bias against the defendant. The judge acknowledges making a comment similar to the one alleged by Mr. Dailey, but the judge believes that Mr. Dailey has taken the comment out of context. According to the judge, he made the comment in response to Mr. Daileys argument that the proposed plea agreement should be accepted solely to protect Mr. Chebegwen from being deported. The judge states that he has sympathy for Mr. Chebegwens situation but that he never considers a defendants immigration status in handling criminal cases.

{¶ 5} Judge Adkins also states that he never told counsel that he was unwilling to accept the proposed plea agreement in this case. Rather, after counsel advised him of their proposal, he asked the assistant prosecutor whether she had obtained her supervisors approval. According to the judge, the prosecutors office has an internal policy requiring supervisor approval of plea negotiations in certain types of cases, including sexually oriented offenses. The judge asserts that after the assistant prosecutor informed him that she had not sought approval, the judge advised counsel that he would accept the agreement but only if supervisors in the prosecutors office first approved it. As it turned out, the supervisors did not approve of the proposed plea agreement. Therefore, Judge Adkins asserts that contrary to Mr. Daileys allegation, he did not reject the parties plea agreement. Judge Adkins also explains his reasons for denying Mr. Daileys request to continue the scheduled trial.

{¶ 6} Three of Mr. Daileys colleagues and the assistant prosecutor and her supervisor also submitted affidavits in this proceeding.

{¶ 7} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to order the disqualification of Judge Adkins.

The timing of the affidavit

{¶ 8} R.C. 2701.03(B) requires that an affidavit of disqualification be filed not less than seven calendar days before the day on which the next hearing in the proceeding is scheduled. This statutory deadline may be set aside only when compliance with the provision is impossible, such as when the alleged bias or prejudice occurs fewer than seven days before the hearing date. In re Disqualification of Leskovyansky , 88 Ohio St.3d 1210, 723 N.E.2d 1099 (1999). Here, Mr. Dailey filed his affidavit of disqualification on the same day as the scheduled trial. Mr. Dailey contends that it was impossible for him to timely file the affidavit because Judge Adkinss challenged conduct occurred within five days of the trial date. In light of Mr. Daileys averments, the clerk properly accepted the affidavit for filing despite the seven-day requirement of R.C. 2701.03(B). See In re Disqualification of Squire , 110 Ohio St.3d 1202, 2005-Ohio-7157, 850 N.E.2d 709, ¶ 3.

The merits of the affidavit

{¶ 9} In disqualification requests, [t]he term bias or prejudice implies a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts. In re Disqualification of ONeill , 100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt , 164 Ohio St. 463, 469, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956). The proper test for determining whether a judges participation in a case presents an appearance of impropriety is * * * an objective one. A judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer would harbor serious doubts about the judges impartiality. In re Disqualification of Lewis , 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359, 884 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8. The reasonable observer is presumed to be fully informed of all the relevant facts in the record-not isolated facts divorced from their larger context. In re Disqualification of Gall , 135 Ohio St.3d 1283, 2013-Ohio-1319, 986 N.E.2d 1005, ¶ 6.

{¶ 10} Based on this record, Mr. Dailey has not established that Judge Adkins is biased against the defendant or that an objective observer would question the judges impartiality. Judge Adkinss challenged comment was apparently made in the context of determining whether to accept the proposed plea agreement and in response to Mr. Daileys emphasizing the immigration consequences to the defendant if he were convicted of the original charges. That isolated comment, however, does not demonstrate that Judge Adkins is biased against Mr. Chebegwen based on his immigration status. Taken out of context, the comment may appear insensitive, but the record here, including Judge Adkinss response to the affidavit of disqualification, does not indicate that he is hostile toward the defendant or unable to fairly and impartially preside over the underlying case. See, e.g. , In re Disqualification of Martin , 149 Ohio St.3d 1233, 2016-Ohio-8590, 75 N.E.3d 225, ¶ 6 (Notwithstanding [the judges] isolated comment in a moment of frustration, the content and tone of the judges response to [the] affidavits of disqualification show that the judge is neither hostile toward nor biased against the defendants).

{¶ 11} Moreover, a judges decision regarding whether to accept a plea bargain or to continue a trial is within his or her discretion and, in general, is not evidence of bias or prejudice. See, e.g. , In re Disqualification of Mitrovich , 74 Ohio St.3d 1219, 1220, 657 N.E.2d 1333 (1990) (Whether the refusal to accept the plea bargain constitutes an abuse of discretion is a legal issue subject to appeal and is not grounds to sustain an affidavit of disqualification); In re Disqualification of Millard , 74 Ohio St.3d 1235, 657 N.E.2d 1343 (1992) (The granting of a continuance is within a judges discretion and the denial of a continuance is not by itself evidence of bias or prejudice). And the record supports Judge Adkinss position that he did not reject the parties proposed plea agreement. Rather, he advised counsel that he would accept the agreement if supervisors from the prosecutors office approved it. Although Judge Adkinss conditional acceptance of the plea agreement may have been unusual, he explains that he did so because of his knowledge of an internal policy at the prosecutors office-not because of this defendants immigration status.

{¶ 12} The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy. * * * A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions. In re Disqualification of George , 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5. Those presumptions have not been overcome in this case.

{¶ 13} The affidavit of disqualification is denied. The case may proceed before Judge Adkins.