Opinion by JUDGE BOORAS
¶ 1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage proceeding, Sylvia Cook (mother), now known as Sylvia Dean, appeals the district courts adoption of the magistrates finding of contempt and award of attorney fees in favor of Andre L. Cook (father). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶ 2 Mother and father divorced in 2006. At that time, the court named mother the primary residential parent for the parties two children but allowed the parties to determine their own liberal parenting time schedule.
¶ 3 Six years later, mother moved to stop fathers parenting time, asserting that he had not seen the children in more than two years and had no interest in seeing them. Father responded that mother had denied him parenting time, and he requested a more formal parenting time schedule.
¶ 4 Eventually the parties stipulated to, and the court adopted, a parenting time arrangement. As now relevant, the parties agreed that father (1) would have parenting time every Wednesday from after school until 7:00 p.m. and (2) shall be entitled to have Thanksgiving this year [2013] with the children from 10:00 a.m. on Thursday until taking the children to school on the following Monday morning.
¶ 5 Father later filed a verified motion and affidavit for contempt, requesting remedial contempt sanctions for mothers noncompliance with the two above-mentioned portions of their stipulation.
The following reflects how the contempt motion proceeded:
• The advisement hearing occurred on March 3, 2014.
• The parties appeared for the contempt hearing on May 19, 2014, but agreed to set it over until September 22, 2014, so that they could participate in a settlement meeting. The parties also agreed that mother would contact a therapist, and the court ordered her to start therapy within thirty days.
• On September 22, the contempt hearing was set over to October 6, 2014.
• The magistrate began the contempt hearing on October 6 and finished it on November 3, 2014, when she found mother in remedial contempt and ordered her to pay fathers attorney fees. The magistrate further ordered that mother could purge the contempt by allowing father to have the children during their 2014 Thanksgiving break.
• Sentencing occurred on January 28, 2015, at which time the court ordered mother to pay fathers $4926.25 in attorney fees.
¶ 6 Mother timely filed a C.R.M. 7 petition challenging the magistrates orders. The district court adopted the magistrates orders on review.
II. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 7 C.R.C.P. 107 provides the authority under which courts are to conduct contempt proceedings. See In re Marriage of Nussbeck , 974 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1999). Remedial sanctions for contempt must be supported by findings of fact establishing that the contemnor (1) did not comply with a lawful order of the court; (2) knew of the order; and (3) had the present ability to comply with the order. In re Marriage of Cyr , 186 P.3d 88, 92 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 8 Like the district court, we must accept the magistrates factual determinations as to contempt unless there is no support in the record for those findings or the findings are clearly erroneous. See C.R.M. 7(a) ; In re Marriage of Webb , 284 P.3d 107, 108-09 (Colo. App. 2011) ; see also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning G.E.R. , 264 P.3d 637, 638-39 (Colo. App. 2011) (reviewing court engages in a second layer of appellate review of the magistrates order, and must accept the magistrates findings unless they are clearly erroneous). A courts factual findings are clearly erroneous only if there is no support for them in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy , 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12, 292 P.3d 1201.
III. Sua Sponte Reconsideration of Sanctions
¶ 9 Mother first contends that the magistrate improperly reconsidered the May 19 order when, on November 3, she changed the nature of the sanctions imposed. We reject this contention because no sanctions were imposed until November 3, when the magistrate found mother guilty of remedial contempt. See Wright v. Dist. Court , 192 Colo. 553, 555, 561 P.2d 15, 17 (1977) (finding of contempt must precede imposition of sanctions).
¶ 10 We acknowledge that the magistrate entered an order on May 19 requiring mother to engage in therapy. However, the record reveals that the magistrate simply adopted the parties stipulation concerning the same; the order was not imposed to force mothers compliance with the parenting time stipulation. See C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5) (defining remedial sanctions).
IV. Evidence and Findings
¶ 11 Mothers second, third, and fifth contentions challenge the evidence presented at the contempt and sentencing hearings, the weight placed on that evidence by the magistrate, and the findings and inferences the magistrate made in her orders. We do not disturb the orders.
¶ 12 A party seeking review of a magistrates order has the burden to provide the reviewing court with a record justifying the rejection or modification of that order. In re Marriage of Rivera , 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004) ; see also Yadon v. Southward , 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App. 2002) (pro se litigants must adhere to the same rules of procedure applicable to attorneys).
¶ 13 If an appellant argues that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. C.A.R. 10(b). Where the appellant fails to provide such a transcript, the reviewing court must presume that the record supports the judgment. See C.R.M. 7(a)(9) ; In re Marriage of Beatty , 2012 COA 71, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 1225.
¶ 14 Here, the transcripts from the contempt and sentencing hearings are in the appellate record. However, mother did not provide them to the district court when she sought review of the magistrates orders under C.R.M. 7(a). Consequently, we confine our review of mothers arguments to the record considered by the district court, which did not include any transcripts. See Rivera , 91 P.3d at 466.
¶ 15 Without reviewing the transcripts, we are unable to evaluate the evidence to determine whether it sufficiently supports the magistrates orders. See C.R.M. 7(a)(9) ; G.E.R. , 264 P.3d at 639. To the contrary, we must presume that the record supports the magistrates orders that mother failed to comply with the parties stipulation and was, therefore, in remedial contempt. See C.R.M. 7(a)(9) ; Beatty , ¶ 10 ; see also People v. Wells , 776 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo. 1989) (reviewing court cannot conclude that district courts judgment is erroneous when the record is insufficient).
¶ 16 Mothers related argument that she cannot be held in contempt because she did not willfully violate the order is misplaced. Willfulness is not a requirement for finding remedial contempt. See Cyr , 186 P.3d at 91-92.
V. Order as to Compliance with Parenting Time
¶ 17 We agree with mothers fourth contention that the magistrate exceeded her authority when she ordered mother
to remove all privileges for up to a month for the children if they do not comply with her instruction to go to [father]s home. This means no TV, no cable, no music, no friends, no cell phone, no I-pads, no computers, unless the parenting time is exercised with the [father]. Each violation of failure to attend parenting time will result in a one month restriction of these items for the children by [m]other.
We therefore strike these three sentences from paragraph 9 of the magistrates order.
¶ 18 Contrary to fathers assertion, mother properly preserved this claim in her petition for district court review. Hence, we may consider the issue on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L-P. , 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 19 To resolve disputes concerning parenting time, courts have broad authority to make or modify parenting time orders that are in the best interests of the children. See §§ 14-10-129(1)(a), - 129.5(2)(h), C.R.S. 2016. But there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 58, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) ; In Interest of Baby A , 2015 CO 72, ¶ 23, 363 P.3d 193.
¶ 20 However, the magistrates order disregards that presumption by concluding that mother should be disciplining her children if they choose not to visit with father and specifying the disciplinary actions that mother must take. See Troxel , 530 U.S. at 73-74, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (noting that a court cannot interfere with a fit parents decisions simply because it believes a better decision could be made). We do not suggest that mother may violate the parenting time order by allowing her children to refuse to visit with father. We simply conclude that by specifying the methods that she must employ in order to obtain the childrens compliance, the order improperly ignores the fit parent presumption. Accordingly, we conclude that the magistrate exceeded her authority in entering paragraph 9 of her order, and we therefore strike it. Insofar as the district court adopted that portion of the magistrates order, we reverse the district courts order.
¶ 21 The dissent contends that the district court was precluded from requiring mother to take even unspecified measures to require the children to submit to the parenting time order, and that it had no authority to impose contempt sanctions absent mother taking actions that would thwart enforcement of the parenting time order. However, a district court has inherent authority to enforce obedience to its orders through contempt sanctions. People v. McGlotten , 134 P.3d 487, 489-90 (Colo. App. 2005). Additionally, under section 14-10-129.5(2)(e), a court may hold a parent in contempt of court and impose a fine or jail sentence where the parent does not comply with a parenting time schedule.
¶ 22 Although it might be difficult to compel a child, particularly a teenager, to comply with a court-ordered parenting plan, this does not excuse a parent from making reasonable good faith efforts to secure the childs compliance. See In re Marriage of Marez , 377 Mont. 304, 340 P.3d 520, 527 (2014) ([W]here a parent fails to make reasonable efforts to require a recalcitrant child to attend visitation as provided for in a parenting plan, the parent has not made a good faith effort to comply with the parenting plan, and a contempt order may be appropriate.). As the Supreme Court of Montana noted in Marez , [a] parent is not a powerless bystander in the decisions and actions of a child, and has an obligation to attempt to overcome the childs resistance to visitation. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Rideout , 150 Wash.2d 337,77 P.3d 1174, 1182 (2003) ). In other words, a parent is expected to do more than refrain from discouraging visitation; a parent is expected to take affirmative action to encourage visitation. Although the dissent views a reasonable good faith efforts standard as vague, good faith efforts may be considered in contempt proceedings to determine compliance with a court order. See Arevalo v. Colo. Dept of HumanServs. , 72 P.3d 436, 440 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that departments failure to make good faith efforts supported trial courts conclusion that department intentionally failed to comply with courts order); In re Marriage of Hartt , 43 Colo.App. 335, 336, 603 P.2d 970, 971 (1979) (considering case wherein trial court deferred contempt sentence for two months to consider contemnors good faith efforts to pay support and arrears payments).
¶ 23 Because a parent should make reasonable good faith efforts to comply with a courts visitation order, and the magistrate found with record support that the mother had not made such efforts, the contempt finding was not an abuse of discretion.
VI. Bias
¶ 24 We disagree with mothers sixth contention that the magistrate demonstrated a bias against her and should have been disqualified. Mothers allegations are based only on the magistrates legal rulings and the resolution of conflicting evidence, which are not bases for disqualification. See Smith v. Dist. Court , 629 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1981) (holding that it is proper for a judge to use what has been learned in his or her judicial capacity in making observations about a matter); see also People in Interest of S.G. , 91 P.3d 443, 447 (Colo. App. 2004) (noting that a judges ruling on a legal issue or the opinions formed against a party are not bases for disqualification); In re Marriage of Nussbeck , 899 P.2d 347, 350 (Colo. App. 1995) (adverse rulings do not constitute grounds for claiming bias or prejudice).
¶ 25 Further, the record reveals that mother did not seek the magistrates disqualification under C.R.C.P. 97. See In re Marriage of Zebedee , 778 P.2d 694, 699 (Colo. App. 1988) (declining to consider bias argument when the matter was not raised in a C.R.C.P. 97 motion for disqualification). While mother argues in her reply brief that she previously requested the magistrates recusal, we note that her prior request was legally insufficient because it was unsupported by an affidavit. See C.R.C.P. 97 (requiring that motion for disqualification be supported by an affidavit).
VII. Rules of Professional Conduct
¶ 26 We decline to consider mothers seventh and final contention that fathers attorney violated the rules of professional conduct. This court has no jurisdiction over allegations that an attorney has violated the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. That jurisdiction lies in the supreme court and with the presiding disciplinary judge. See C.R.C.P. 251.1(b).
VIII. Attorney Fees
¶ 27 Mother argues that the magistrate should have held a hearing on the reasonableness of fathers attorney fee affidavit. We agree.
¶ 28 Mother objected to fathers fee affidavit on the basis that it was ambiguous and lacked clarity, and she requested a hearing on the issue of reasonableness. Once she raised these assertions, the magistrate should have held a hearing on this issue.
¶ 29 While C.R.C.P. 107 does not impose an express requirement of a hearing on the amount of an attorney fee award, we nevertheless conclude that, upon request of a party, an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine the issue of reasonableness. See Pedlow v. Stamp , 776 P.2d 382, 386 (Colo. 1989) (construing sections 13-17-101 to - 203, C.R.S. 2016, as requiring an evidentiary hearing).
¶ 30 We thus remand for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of reasonableness of the award imposed as a contempt sanction.
IX. Issues Raised in Reply Brief
¶ 31 We do not consider the arguments mother makes for the first time in her reply brief or those that seek to expand upon the contentions she raised in her opening brief. See In re Marriage of Drexler , 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24, 315 P.3d 179.
X. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 32 We decline to award mother her requested [a]ttorneys fees, fines and damages. Not only is mother not entitled to attorney fees as a pro se party, see Smith v. Furlong , 976 P.2d 889, 890 (Colo. App. 1999) (holding that there is no basis to award attorney fees to a pro se litigant, because no attorney fees exist in such situations), but she has failed to cite any legal basis for her request. See C.A.R. 39.1 (requiring that party requesting attorney fees explain the legal and factual basis therefor).
¶ 33 Father requests an award of his appellate attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2). Because father has incurred attorney fees in connection with the contempt proceeding, id. we remand the case for the district court to determine his entitlement to and the amount of attorney fees, if any, incurred on appeal. See C.A.R. 39.1 ; Madison Capital Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII , 214 P.3d 557, 562 (Colo. App. 2009).
XI. Conclusion
¶ 34 We reverse that portion of paragraph 9 of the magistrates order that mandates mother to discipline her children. The district courts order is reversed to the extent it adopts that portion of the magistrates order.
¶ 35 In all other respects the orders are affirmed, and the case is remanded for the court to consider the reasonableness of the attorney fee award to father and fathers request for appellate attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2).
Terry, J., concurs
Berger, J., dissents
Similarly, in Violette v. Violette , 120 A.3d 667 (Me. 2015), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine disapproved of a trial court order requiring the parties to enforce visitation by requiring the refusing child to stay in his or her bedroom without access to the Internet, a telephone, text messaging, a television, or video games during such time. Although the court did not reach the constitutional issue under Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), the court concluded that requiring the parents to discipline their children in such a very specific and inflexible fashion with no discretion left to the parents was an abuse of discretion. Violette , 120 A.3d at 676.
In our view, reasonable good faith efforts would not require that the parent take actions that would harm a child. The magistrate specifically stated that the required discipline of the children would not include physical punishment. And although the magistrate used the term discipline, a parent might, in his or her discretion, elect to employ a reward as an incentive to obtain compliance with the courts visitation order.