The magistrate court found the mother neglected the children because she lack[ed] appropriate parenting and/or disciplinary skills ... failed to demonstrate the ability to meet the childrens needs ... [and failed] to demonstrate any significant changes to [her] parenting strategies. The magistrate court noted this was despite the overriding consensus from every service provider, doctor, therapist and social worker that the mother was provided with a tremendous amount of services and was not able to demonstrate any significant change to her parenting strategies. The magistrate court also found that the mother neglected N.W. because her untreated mental health issues and/or physical health issues impair her ability to provide proper parental care and control. The court noted:
[The mother] is a meek, passive, submissive, medically fragile, emotionally compromised person who cannot live independently and had relied on [the father] to manage her life, attend to their needs and raise and parent their children. For years, [the mother] stood idly by while [the father] severely neglected and physically abused Z.W. on three separate occasions; resulting in two criminal convictions and years of involvement with child protective services.
The mother first claims the magistrate court erred in finding her mental and physical conditions impair her ability to parent because she developed a safety plan in case the father ever started to physically abuse N.W. The mother primarily points to testimony of her therapist, in which the therapist states she felt the safety plan was adequate to protect the children and it seemed as if the mother would follow through with the plan because she showed increased confidence and self-esteem. This Court was presented with a similar issue in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe (2016-32) , 161 Idaho 754, 390 P.3d 1281 (2017) ( Doe II ). In that case, IDHW initiated termination proceedings because the [m]other lacked capacity to protect [the children] from harm and was endangering [the children] by routinely placing them with her abusive boyfriend. Id. at 760, 390 P.3d at 1287. Thereafter, the magistrate judge terminated the mothers parental rights on the basis of neglect because of the mothers inability to protect her children from the boyfriend, among other reasons. Id . Despite improvements in the mothers behavior, this Court upheld the magistrates decision to terminate the mothers parental rights. Id. at 761, 390 P.3d at 1288. (We find no error in the magistrates conclusion that Mothers recent and modest improvements were insufficient to overcome her history of demonstrated unfitness.).
Similar to Doe II , because of the mothers inability to protect her children from the father the magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence the mother neglected her children. Testimony suggests that the mother is not strong enough mentally to stand up to the father and enforce her safety plan. Dr. David Delawyer performed psychiatric evaluations of the mother. Dr. Delawyer is a licensed psychologist in the State of Idaho and had conducted over 2000 psychological examinations during his career. Dr. Delawyer concluded:
As part of her previous case plan, [the mother] agreed to implement a safety plan and call law enforcement and Health and Welfare if her husband became physical with [Z.W.] and harmed her or might harm her. She said she did not intervene during the recent incident and implement her safety plan after [Z.W.] was spanked by her husband because she didnt know he had gotten out of hand and didnt know there was bruising. When asked if she would implement the plan if she knew these things [the mother] said probably and then most likely. In the examiners opinion, she is highly unlikely to act protectively and implement a safety plan in the future when similar circumstances occur. Her husband makes the decisions in the family and [the mother] is passive and unassertive. She is extremely unlikely to go against his wishes and act protectively.
(Emphasis in original). This conclusion is illustrated by two separate incidents observed where the mother unsuccessfully attempted to assert herself against the father during visitations with the children. In one instance a report submitted to the magistrate court noted:
[O]n October 17, 2016, [the mother] attempted to protect [N.W.] by saying Back to the father when he was being aggressive with his words and action regarding the toothpaste and did not follow through with her effort because [the father] ignored [the mother] and [the mother] sat down.
Testimony further supports the conclusion that if N.W. were to return to the mothers custody, N.W. would likely be subject to physical abuse. This is because historically Z.W. was the scapegoat in the family and took the brunt of the fathers abuse. However, if Z.W. is no longer present (due to the no contact order between Z.W. and the father) N.W. would likely become the target of the fathers physical abuse and the mother would likely not deploy the safety plan or intervene. This is illustrated by the fact that the mother has failed to intervene on at least three documented instances in the past while the father was physically abusing Z.W.
The mother also claims the magistrate court erred in finding her mental and physical conditions impair her ability to parent by pointing to testimony in the record that her self-esteem had improved and that she had become more actively engaged with her children. Although the mother may have made some improvements, this Court has held that despite improvements in a parents behavior, their rights can nonetheless be terminated when they have demonstrated they are unfit to be a parent. See Doe I , 162 Idaho at 245, 395, P.3d at 1278 ([A]lthough Doe made occasional slight improvements, overall she demonstrated an inability to discharge parental responsibilities by failing to make progress with her visitation behavior, employment status, substance abuse, or mental health evaluations. Accordingly, Does argument fails.).
Despite testimony regarding the mothers improvements, she has shown an inability to parent because of her mental and physical conditions. We hold the magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence that she neglected N.W. and we affirm the judgment.
2. The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence that the mother had the inability to discharge her parental responsibilities.
Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(d) provides the Court with the authority to terminate parental rights when it finds [t]he parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child. The magistrate court found the mother had the inability to discharge her parental responsibilities because she lacks the energy and/or ability and/or motivation to be an engaged and protective parent. The mother claims the magistrate court erred in making this finding because testimony in the record shows her parenting abilities improved.
In Doe I , this Court was presented with a similar issue. 162 Idaho at 245, 395 P.3d at 1278. In that case, the magistrate court terminated a mothers parental rights in part because [the mothers] unresolved mental health issues rendered her unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. Id. at 245, 395 P.3d at 1278. This Court upheld the magistrates decision noting although [the mother] made occasional slight improvements, overall she demonstrated an inability to discharge parental responsibilities by failing to make progress with her visitation behavior, employment status, substance abuse, or mental health evaluation. Id.
Similar to Doe I , despite the mothers slight improvements, there was substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate court to find the mother lacks the ability to discharge her parental rights. The GAL for both children noted that the mother cannot read the childrens cues concerning their basic needs. During supervised visits the mother appeared zoned out as if the lights are on, but no one is home. On one visit the mother left without telling anyone or ensuring someone else would be responsible for the children. The GAL further described that over the two years she observed that: during 20% of the visits with the children both parents seemed to have worked hard to use their skills they had been taught; during 70% of the visits the parents seemed to have been ambivalent about the process; and that during 10% of the visits the parents behaved inappropriately. Due to this, in part, the GAL noted that the children would not be safe if they were returned to the mothers custody. The magistrate court explained the GALs (Ms. Walshs) testimony:
Ms. Walsh described how PCIT classes were intended to teach [the parents] to use parenting techniques such as labeled praises with their children. She said that after attending the classes the [parents] used those techniques only sporadically. Ms. Walsh noted that the [parents] had been using those techniques more recently during their visits but felt it was related to the upcoming court dates.
Ms. Baker-Jambretz also testified regarding the mothers parenting ability. The magistrate court described Ms. Baker-Jambretzs testimony as:
[The mother] has not displayed a greater understanding of what her children experienced and the repair work required by her to successfully reunify with them. Additionally she said that during visits with her children, [the mother] does not consistently use the tools she was taught in the many programs she participated in.
Ms. Baker-Jambretz described [the mother] as an observer during visits with her children. She said [the mother] is removed from the visit activities and does not consistently participate or engage. She said, sometimes [the mother] will appear playful but the overall ... quality of her visits is consistently poor.
Ms. Baker-Jambretz further noted that the mother and N.W. appear to have a bond and that the mother has made some improvements in her parenting ability. However, Ms. Baker-Jambretz concluded that those improvements diminished over the three months prior to trial and that they were insufficient to warrant reunification.
Accordingly, despite the mothers improvements in her parenting abilities, the magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence that the mother lacked the energy and motivation to discharge her parental responsibilities. We affirm the magistrates judgment.
B. The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to find termination of the mother and fathers parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
The only issue the father asserts as error in this case is the courts determination that termination was in the best interests of the children. The mother makes a similar claim as to N.W. Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the magistrate court must next determine:
... whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. When considering the best interests of the child, a trial court may consider numerous factors. While a comprehensive list of factors a court must consider does not exist, this Court has considered the following: the stability and permanency of the home, unemployment of the parent, ... improvement of child while in foster care, the parents efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parents continuing problems with the law. Additionally, this Court has considered the testimony from IDHW social workers, and guardians ad litem.
Doe I , 162 Idaho at 244, 395 P.3d at 1277 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The magistrate court concluded that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate both the mother and fathers rights because they lack the appropriate parenting skills to protect their children. The magistrate court concluded:
In conclusion [the mother and father] failed to demonstrate a sincere commitment to completing their case plan, they failed to make genuine improvement to their parenting skills and protective capacities and their children would not be safe in their care .
Therefore, termination of [the mother and fathers] parental rights is in the childrens best interest.
(Emphasis added).
The father argues that the district court erred by concluding that he failed to internalize the parenting techniques he was taught. The father alleges the testimony of Ms. Baker-Jambretz (that the magistrate court relied on) was biased. Ms. Baker-Jambretz testified at length that the father did not internalize the parental training he received, is not invested in making necessary changes in his parenting, and that she was gravely concerned that he will revert to his past abusive behaviors. The father points to no evidence to prove bias, except the fact Ms. Baker-Jambretz had the opinion that the fathers rights should be terminated. This Court must conduct an independent review of the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate courts judgment, as the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties. Doe I v. Doe II , 161 Idaho 532, 535, 387 P.3d 785, 788 (2016) (quotations and citations omitted). We will defer to the magistrate courts determination of credibility.
Second, the father claims the magistrate court relied on subjective, rather than objective evidence, and did not give enough weight to his own testimony (and that of other witnesses) that his parenting ability has improved. Father further claims that the court relied too much on past events and not on the progress the father ostensibly made. This Court disagrees. The father testified that he used the parenting techniques he was taught at every opportunity and was even able to explain these techniques at trial. The father also points to testimony from other witnesses stating that his parenting ability has improved. Despite this evidence, this Court does not reweigh evidence, but defer[s] to the trial courts unique ability to accurately weigh the evidence and judge the demeanor of the witnesses and take into account the trial courts superior view of the entire situation.
Doe v. Doe , 148 Idaho 243, 246, 220 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2009). The magistrate court heard testimony from at least four other witnesses that both parents parenting skills have diminished and/or they failed to internalize the parenting techniques they were taught. The magistrate court explained:
[The father and mothers] parenting skills may have improved to the extent that they may know more about what is appropriate vs. inappropriate parenting or discipline and they may have developed more skills regarding various parenting techniques. However, neither parent has internalized the information provided to them. If [the parents] had truly internalized new parenting philosophies and discipline techniques it would have been obvious during visits with their children; gradual changes would have started to naturally appear without being forced.
No matter how intensely [the parents] express that they want to change or have changed how they parent, there is simply no credible evidence to convincingly support their perceptions. [Father] cannot let go of his need to control almost everything that has to do with his wife and children. Even after two years of therapies and classes, [fathers] behaviors and moods are often still unpredictable, inconsistent and dysregulated and he continues to startle and frighten the children .
(Emphasis added).
The magistrate noted as well that the parents seem to view this case from a subjective lens of their own, rather than from an objective one. The court concluded Until [the parents] are able to see themselves through the actual objective lens and gain the necessary insight into why they are not safe and protective parents, they will never be amendable [sic] to intervention or treatment; their circumstances will never change; and their children will always be at risk in their care. The court thus exercised objective judgment, based on substantial and credible evidence, to conclude that the childrens best interests favored termination of the fathers rights. No witness other than the parents testified they thought the father could be a safe and protective parent. Accordingly, we defer to the magistrate courts judgment in weighing the evidence. There was substantial and competent evidence to find termination of the fathers parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
The mother similarly claims the district court erred by failing to take into account her own testimony. The magistrate court found the mothers testimony was disingenuous. For the same reasons as stated above, we will defer to the magistrates judgment in weighing the mothers testimony. Second, the mother points to the testimony of Ms. Noggle (a social worker who testified at trial) that N.W. had a strong bond with the mother and that it would be detrimental for N.W. to lose her relationship with her parents. This Court was presented with a similar case in Doe I , 162 Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 1269. In that case, the mother argued it is not in the best interests of the Children to terminate her parental rights because severing the parent-child relationship would be devastating to the Children. Id. at 245, 395 P.3d at 1278. This Court dismissed that argument stating: Doe fails to cite authority supporting her claim that the Childrens devastation should outweigh facts that suggest that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Childrens best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate courts judgment. Id. at 246, 395 P.3d at 1279. Any claim that N.W. might be devastated from the termination of the mothers rights alone does not override facts demonstrating termination was in the best interest of the child.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the magistrate courts judgments terminating the mother and fathers parental rights.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justice BRODY, Justice pro tem GRATTON and Justice pro tem MELANSON concur.