Melnick, J.
¶ 1 A jury convicted Shelly Arndt of numerous crimes, including premeditated murder in the first degree and arson in the first degree. She appeals the trial courts denial of her motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct and requests reversal of her murder conviction. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.
FACTS
I. TRIAL
¶ 2 On February 23, 2014, Arndt and her boyfriend, Darcy Veeder Jr., spent the night at their friends home. State v. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 2, 2017 WL 6337458 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished) (http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/). Late that night, the house caught fire. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 2. Everyone in the home escaped except Veeder, who died. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 2-3.
¶ 3 After an investigation, the State charged Arndt with murder in the first degree with an aggravating circumstance of arson in the first degree, felony murder in the first degree with aggravating circumstances, arson in the first degree, and six counts of assault in the second degree. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 3.
¶ 4 The trial court instructed the jury that [a] person commits the crime of murder in the first degree ... when, with a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person. Clerks Papers (CP) at 169 (Instr. 9). It further instructed:
Premeditated means thought over beforehand. When a person, after any deliberation, forms an intent to take human life, the killing may follow immediately after the formation of the settled purpose and it will still be premeditated. Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time. The law requires some time, however long or short, in which a design to kill is deliberately formed.
CP at 182 (Instr. 22). The jury found Arndt guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Arndt to life in prison without the possibility of release or parole.
¶ 5 Arndt appealed her convictions.
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT
¶ 6 Months after the verdict, Juror 2 approached a woman whom she did not know was the sister of Arndts trial attorney. Juror 2 related that in Arndts trial, she struggled with the term premeditation. She further related that to better understand the term, she looked it up on the internet. The attorneys sister told her brother what she had learned.
¶ 7 Defense investigator James Harris then met with Juror 2, explained that he worked for Arndts trial attorney, and asked to speak with her about her experience as a juror. Juror 2 spoke with Harris and told him that during deliberations she did internet research on the word premeditation. Juror 2 provided Harris with additional information, including sites she may have viewed. The States investigator also interviewed Juror 2.
¶ 8 Arndt moved for a new trial on grounds of juror misconduct. At a hearing on the motion, the court heard testimony from Juror 2 and Harris. Juror 2 testified that she had researched the term premeditation and had found different sites, but did not remember whether she had viewed any of the specific sites she had showed Harris when he earlier interviewed her. She said I believe it was from Wedipedia [verbatim], whatever that does when you Google, and thats the definition. Report of Proceedings (RP) (Feb. 6, 2017) at 21. She stated that the key thing that stuck out to her in the definitions she viewed was that [o]ne of the definitions was about premeditation being short. RP (Feb. 6, 2017) at 24. She said that she looked at a couple different definitions, but it was the word short that made her understand. Juror 2 also testified that she had not shared her research with other jurors.
¶ 9 The trial court entered a written memorandum opinion with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court made explicit credibility determinations. It found that during deliberations, Juror 2 performed an internet search for the definition of premeditation from her home. The trial court found it could not determine the exact websites and content Juror 2 had viewed. Juror 2 consistently said that the definitions she viewed included the word short or the phrase however short. CP at 136. The court found that Juror 2s sworn statements in court were more reliable than her out-of-court statements to the two investigators which were used in an attempt to impeach her in-court testimony. The court also found that Juror 2 had not shared her research with the other jurors.
¶ 10 The court concluded that Juror 2 had committed misconduct which created a presumption that Arndt was entitled to a new trial. It determined that it must grant a new trial unless it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence Juror 2 found in her research did not contribute to the verdict.
¶ 11 The court ruled:
Here, the facts show that Juror #2 conducted outside research on the definition of premeditation, and that the definitions she viewed included the word short or the phrase however short. In substance, the Court finds that the definitions viewed by Juror #2 were indistinguishable to the jury instruction and were consistent with the law. Because the known research results, as presented to the Court, were consistent with the jury instruction on premeditation and the law, the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Juror #2s research could not have affected the verdict. Therefore, the motion for a new trial is denied.
CP at 138. It stated [t]o base a decision for a new trial on what is not known would be inapposite to the strong, affirmative showing requirement and would endanger the stability of all jury verdicts. Therefore, this Courts decision relies on evidence that has been credibly presented, not on unknowns. CP at 138 n.49. Arndt appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 12 Arndt urges us to review the trial courts denial of her motion for a new trial de novo because it infringed her constitutional rights. She acknowledges the existence of inconsistent case law on this issue, but maintains that State v. Jones , 168 Wash.2d 713, 230 P.3d 576 (2010), and State v. Iniguez , 167 Wash.2d 273, 217 P.3d 768 (2009), provide the proper guidance for what standard should apply.
¶ 13 We have expressly stated that we review a trial courts investigation of juror misconduct for abuse of discretion. State v. Gaines , 194 Wash. App. 892, 896, 380 P.3d 540, review denied , 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 125 (2016). We also review a trial courts decision denying a motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion. Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540. [W]hile great deference is due to the trial courts determination that no prejudice occurred, greater deference is owed to a decision to grant a new trial than a decision not to grant a new trial. State v. Johnson , 137 Wash. App. 862, 871, 155 P.3d 183 (2007).
¶ 14 Iniguez , 167 Wash.2d at 281, 217 P.3d 768, and Jones , 168 Wash.2d at 719, 230 P.3d 576, reviewed de novo the denial of the constitutional rights to a speedy trial and to present a defense, respectively. Neither case affects the standard of review that we utilize to review a trial courts decision on a mistrial motion for juror misconduct. It remains abuse of discretion. Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540.
¶ 15 Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. Lohr , 164 Wash. App. 414, 418, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011). Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight. State v. Hart , 195 Wash. App. 449, 457, 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review denied , 187 Wash.2d 1011, 388 P.3d 480 (2017). Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review. Hart , 195 Wash. App. at 457, 381 P.3d 142.
¶ 16 A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts on untenable grounds or its ruling is manifestly unreasonable. Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540. A decision is based on untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard. State v. Rohrich , 149 Wash.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (quoting State v. Rundquist , 79 Wash. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995) ). A decision is manifestly unreasonable if the court, despite applying the correct legal standard to the supported facts, adopts a view that no reasonable person would take, and arrives at a decision outside the range of acceptable choices. Rohrich , 149 Wash.2d at 654, 71 P.3d 638 (quoting State v. Lewis , 115 Wash.2d 294, 298-99, 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) ; Rundquist , 79 Wash. App. at 793, 905 P.2d 922 ).
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT
¶ 17 Based on the trial courts unchallenged finding of misconduct, both parties proceed from the premise that Juror 2 committed misconduct. They disagree on whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding the misconduct did not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 18 Arndt contends that Juror 2s internet research could have affected the verdict of guilty. She argues that the juror misconduct gives rise to a presumption of prejudice that the State can only overcome by a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct could not have affected the verdict. She contends that the State failed to meet this burden. Because the trial court made unchallenged findings of fact that support its legal conclusions, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the misconduct did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 19 A strong, affirmative showing of misconduct is necessary in order to overcome the policy favoring stable and certain verdicts and the secret, frank and free discussion of the evidence by the jury. State v. Balisok , 123 Wash.2d 114, 117-18, 866 P.2d 631 (1994). [T]he consideration of novel or extrinsic evidence by a jury is misconduct and can be grounds for a new trial. Balisok , 123 Wash.2d at 118, 866 P.2d 631.
¶ 20 Juror use of extraneous evidence is misconduct and entitles a defendant to a new trial, if the defendant has been prejudiced. State v. Boling , 131 Wash. App. 329, 332, 127 P.3d 740 (2006). The court need not delve into the actual effect of the evidence, [b]ut any doubts must be resolved against the verdict. Boling , 131 Wash. App. at 332-33, 127 P.3d 740. The subjective thought process of the jurors inheres in the verdict. Boling , 131 Wash. App. at 333, 127 P.3d 740.
¶ 21 Once juror misconduct is established, prejudice is presumed. Boling , 131 Wash. App. at 333, 127 P.3d 740. The court must grant a new trial unless it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict. Boling , 131 Wash. App. at 333, 127 P.3d 740. We do not disturb the courts ruling denying the motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct unless the court abused its discretion. Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540
¶ 22 Washington law defines premeditation as the deliberate formation of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life and [it] involves the mental process of ... deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short. State v. Condon , 182 Wash.2d 307, 315, 343 P.3d 357 (2015) (quoting State v. Pirtle , 127 Wash.2d 628, 644, 904 P.2d 245 (1995) ). Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time. Condon , 182 Wash.2d at 315, 343 P.3d 357 (quoting RCW 9A.32.020(1) ). The trial courts instructions to the jury in this case stated:
Premeditated means thought over beforehand. When a person, after any deliberation, forms an intent to take human life, the killing may follow immediately after the formation of the settled purpose and it will still be premeditated. Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time. The law requires some time, however long or short, in which a design to kill is deliberately formed.
CP at 182 (Instr. 22).
¶ 23 In State v. Fry , a juror looked up the word substantial in a dictionary at home and brought the dictionary to deliberations. 153 Wash. App. 235, 238, 220 P.3d 1245 (2009). The juror did not share the definition or the dictionary with other jurors until after the jury had delivered its verdict to the bailiff. Fry , 153 Wash. App. at 238, 220 P.3d 1245. She said that the definition had a little bit to do with her verdict, but it wasnt the majority of it by any means. Fry , 153 Wash. App. at 238, 220 P.3d 1245. The trial court found that the juror was not enlightened by the definition and that the instruction for third degree assault, the crime charged, contained the word substantial. Fry , 153 Wash. App. at 238, 220 P.3d 1245. It ruled that the jurors conduct did not influence the verdict. Fry , 153 Wash. App. at 238, 220 P.3d 1245.
¶ 24 Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court concluded that there was no showing of prejudice. Fry , 153 Wash. App. at 238, 240, 220 P.3d 1245. The trial court concluded, based on adequate findings of fact, that neither the dictionary nor the jurors use of the dictionary influenced the verdict and the defendant ma[de] no showing that the language in the dictionary, even if someone did look at it, adversely influenced the resolution of the case. Fry , 153 Wash. App. at 240, 220 P.3d 1245.
¶ 25 In this case, the trial court found that the exact websites and content that Juror #2 viewed is unclear and that her research resulted in her viewing definitions of premeditation that included the word short or the phrase however short. CP at 136-37. Based on these findings, it concluded that, in substance:
[T]he definitions viewed by Juror #2 were indistinguishable to the jury instruction and were consistent with the law. Because the known research results, as presented to the Court, were consistent with the jury instruction on premeditation and the law, the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Juror #2s research could not have affected the verdict.
CP at 138. It reasoned that [t]o base a decision for a new trial on what is not known would be inapposite to the strong, affirmative showing requirement and would endanger the stability of all jury verdicts. Therefore, this Courts decision relies on evidence that has been credibly presented, not on unknowns. CP at 138 n.49.
¶ 26 Like Fry , the juror in this case researched the meaning of a critical word in a jury instruction and the trial court ruled that the jurors conduct did not influence the verdict. Unlike Fry , however, the trial court was unable to identify what specific definitions Juror 2 found in her research so as to evaluate their prejudicial effect.
¶ 27 The trial court here applied the correct legal standard. It found juror misconduct. It presumed prejudice that the State could overcome by satisfying the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict. It determined that it must make a finding of not only whether misconduct occurred, but also the nature and extent of the misconduct. CP at 138.
¶ 28 Although the exact websites Juror 2 visited and the precise definitions she viewed are unknown, the part of those definitions that had an impression on her and affected her verdict were the word short and phrase however short. As the trial court ruled, these definitions were indistinguishable to the jury instruction and were consistent with the law. CP at 138. This ruling is sufficient to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict and to overcome the presumption of prejudice. The court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Juror 2s research did not contribute to the verdict. Accordingly, we affirm Arndts conviction.
I concur:
Johanson, J.
This aggravating circumstance is under RCW 10.95.020(11)(e). The State also alleged the aggravating circumstance of a particularly vulnerable victim. See RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b).
This aggravating circumstance is under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b).
Before a mandate issued, Arndt appealed on the issue we are presented with in this appeal.
Because neither party challenges any of the trial courts findings of fact, they are considered verities on appeal. State v. Lohr , 164 Wash. App. 414, 418, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011).
The dissent says it is reviewing the evidence for an abuse of discretion; however, it appears to review the evidence de novo. It also fails to consider the unchallenged findings of fact as verities.
This standard of review is consistent with the one used for dismissal of a juror. See State v. Depaz , 165 Wash.2d 842, 852, 204 P.3d 217 (2009). We use this standard because the trial court is able to observe the jurors demeanor and, based on that observation, interpret and evaluate the jurors answers to determine the jurors impartiality. State v. Davis , 175 Wash.2d 287, 312, 290 P.3d 43 (2012).
Arndt urges us to consider the federal case United States v. Lawson , 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012). In Lawson a juror conducted online research and the court was unable to definitively determine the content of the definitions the juror viewed, like this case. 677 F.3d at 639-40. Lawson is not persuasive and we instead rely upon Washington law.
The dissent fails to acknowledge this reasoning by the trial court. Instead it says that because the exact nature of Juror 2s research is unknown, the State could never establish beyond a reasonable doubt that her research could not have affected the verdict. This interpretation improperly ignores the role of the trial court as fact finder and the equal weight direct and circumstantial evidence are afforded. It also exceeds what is necessary to decide this case.