McLAUGHLIN v. UNITED STATES

Supreme Court of the United States1986-04-29No. No. 85-5189

476 U.S. 1690 L. Ed. 2d 15106 S. Ct. 1677SCDB 1985-0741986 U.S. LEXIS 146

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that an unloaded handgun constitutes a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).

A defendant robbed a bank while displaying an unloaded handgun and was convicted of assault during bank robbery by use of a dangerous weapon. The central issue was whether an unloaded firearm qualifies as a "dangerous weapon" under the federal bank robbery statute. The Court held that an unloaded gun constitutes a dangerous weapon for purposes of this statute, based on three independent rationales: guns are inherently dangerous articles designed for dangerous purposes; displaying a firearm creates fear and risk of violent escalation; and a gun can inflict harm even when used as a striking instrument.

The Court rejected the notion that a weapon's operational status determines its legal classification. Instead, the law may presume that firearms are dangerous instruments regardless of whether they are loaded at a particular moment. The decision resolved conflicting interpretations among lower courts about whether only loaded or functional weapons could qualify.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an unloaded firearm qualifies as a dangerous weapon under federal bank robbery statute
Whether the operational status of a gun affects its legal characterization as dangerous
Whether displaying a firearm creates sufficient danger to support dangerous weapon designation

Procedural posture

The defendant pleaded guilty to bank robbery and larceny, was found guilty of assault during bank robbery with a dangerous weapon by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether an unloaded handgun is a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute.

At about 9:30 a.m. on July 26, 1984, petitioner and a companion, both wearing stocking masks and gloves, entered a bank in Baltimore. Petitioner thereupon displayed a dark handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While petitioner remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion vaulted the counter and placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. The two robbers were apprehended by a police officer as they left the bank. Petitioner’s gun was not loaded.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and, on the basis of stipulated evidence, was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery “by the use of a dangerous weapon.” The latter conviction depends on the validity of the District Court’s conclusion that petitioner’s unloaded gun was a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 2113(d). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court, and so do we.

Three reasons, each independently sufficient, support the conclusion that an unloaded gun is a “dangerous weapon.” First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one, and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous even though it may not be armed at a particular time or place. In addition, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen; as a consequence, it creates an immediate danger that a violent response will ensue. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

The federal bank robbery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 2113, provides in pertinent part:

“(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association . . .

“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

“(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;. . .

“(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.”

We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 944 (1985), to resolve an apparent conflict. See, e. g., United States v. Wardy, 777 F. 2d 101, 105-106 (CA2 1985); United States v. Terry, 760 F. 2d 939, 942 (CA9 1985).

The floor debate on the provision that became § 2113(d) indicates that Congress regarded incitement of fear as sufficient to characterize an apparently dangerous article (such as a wooden gun) as “dangerous” within the meaning of the statute. See 78 Cong. Rec. 8132 (1934) (colloquy among Reps. Sumners, Blanton, and Dockweiler).