DILLON, Judge.
North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (collectively referred to as the DMV or the Respondents) appeal from a trial court order reversing an agency decision that revoked Jennifer Anne Wolskis drivers license. After careful review, we affirm the trial courts order.
I. Background
In April 2015, a Huntersville police officer arrested Jennifer Anne Wolski for driving while under the influence.
After being advised of her rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a) (2013) at police department headquarters, Ms. Wolski refused to both submit to a breathalyzer test and sign the provided statutory form (Rights Form).
The officer, who is a certified chemical analyst, executed a sworn affidavit and revocation report that contained conflicting information regarding Ms. Wolskis refusal to submit to breathalyzer testing. Although the affidavit referred to an attached Rights Form as evidence of Ms. Wolskis refusal to submit to testing, the attached Rights Form did not indicate that Ms. Wolski had refused testing.
The officer later amended the attached Rights Form to reflect Ms. Wolskis refusal to submit to testing. The officer did not re-execute the affidavit to reflect this change.
The DMV notified Ms. Wolski of the impending revocation of her drivers license. Ms. Wolski requested a hearing to challenge the imminent revocation on jurisdictional grounds. The hearing officer rejected Ms. Wolskis jurisdictional arguments and affirmed the DMVs decision to revoke her drivers license.
Ms. Wolski appealed the DMV hearing officers decision. The trial court reversed the revocation of Ms. Wolskis drivers license. The DMV filed an appeal.
II. Standard of Review
As the trial court reviewed the hearing officers decision as an appellate court , see Johnson v. Robertson , 227 N.C.App. 281, 286, 742 S.E.2d 603, 607 (2013) (reaffirming principle that a trial court acts as an appellate court when reviewing certain, final agency decisions), our standard of review is limited to (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly, ACT-UP Triangle v. Commn for Health Servs. of the State of N.C. , 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial courts appropriate scope of review is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commissioners findings of fact and whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact and whether the Commissioner committed an error of law in revoking the license. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(e) (2013). Questions of law are reviewed de novo . See Davis v. Dept of Crime Control & Pub. Safety , 151 N.C.App. 513, 516, 565 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2002).
III. Analysis
The DMV contends in part that the trial court erred as the officers affidavit was executed in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(c1). For the following reasons, we disagree.
At the outset, we note that the trial court applied the correct standard of review. The trial court revealed that [t]he standard of review applied ... is ... whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support Respondents findings of fact, whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact and whether Respondents committed an error of law in revoking the license.
As to the DMVs substantive argument, we hold that Lee v. Gore , 365 N.C. 227, 717 S.E.2d 356 (2011) controls and therefore conclude that the DMV lacked jurisdiction to revoke Ms. Wolskis drivers license. In Lee , our Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Appeals decision reversing license revocation, holding that an affidavit materially altered outside the presence of someone authorized to administer oaths, or an affidavit that omits entirely the material element of willfulness, is not properly executed for the purposes of section 20-16.2(d). Id. at 233-34, 717 S.E.2d at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Much like the officer in Lee , id. at 233, 717 S.E.2d at 361, the officer here failed to modify the Rights Form in front of a magistrate or an official authorized to administer oaths. Although the modification at issue in Lee was made directly on the affidavit form, id. at 228-29, 717 S.E.2d at 358, the officers modification here nevertheless related to a material requirement under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(c1) -namely, whether Ms. Wolski submitted to testing. Moreover, the Rights Form was specifically incorporated by reference in the affidavit. See Patterson ex rel. Jordan v. Patterson , 137 N.C.App. 653, 659, 529 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2000) (applying general principle of incorporation by reference to affidavits). Therefore, any material alteration to the Rights Form required re-execution of the affidavit in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(c1). Accordingly, we hold that the officers failure to modify the Rights Form in front of a magistrate or official stripped the DMV of jurisdiction to revoke Ms. Wolskis drivers license.
IV. Conclusion
As the Rights Form was not modified in front of a magistrate or official, we hold that the DMV lacked jurisdiction to revoke Ms. Wolskis license. We therefore affirm the trial courts ruling.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and ZACHARY concur.
While the two are separate entities, a number of the pleadings and documents before this Court refer to the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as one single, fused entity.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(c1) (2013), the arresting officer and chemical analyst must execute an affidavit setting forth: (1) the alleged, implied-consent offense-generally a driving under the influence charge, (2) information regarding the arrest and offense at issue, (3) information establishing that the arrestee was advised of her statutory rights, and (4) information establishing whether the arrestee submitted to breathalyzer testing. Id. Execution entails completion of the affidavit and signage by the arresting officer and chemical analyst in front of an official authorized to administer oaths. Id.
The affidavit indicated that Ms. Wolski had both submitted and refused to submit to breathalyzer testing.
The DMVs notice of appeal refers to the Respondents-namely the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles-as one single, fused entity. Nevertheless, we have appellate jurisdiction to review this matter as the DMVs intent to appeal the trial courts order as two separate entities can be fairly inferred from the notice [of appeal]. State v. Springle , --- N.C.App. ----, ----, 781 S.E.2d 518, 521 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).