1. Any offense listed in subsection B;
2. Criminal homicide;
3. Murder;
4. A sexually violent offense;
5. Any offense similar to those listed in subdivisions 1 through 4 under the laws of any foreign country or any political subdivision thereof, the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and
6. Any offense for which registration in a sex offender and crimes against minors registry is required under the laws of the jurisdiction where the offender was convicted.
Subsection (B) lists a number of Virginia crimes that require registration. Subsection (C) defines the term Criminal homicide. Subsection (D) defines Murder. Subsection (E) specifies what Virginia and United States offenses qualify as Sexually violent offenses. Subsection (F) provides that
Any offense listed in subsection B, criminal homicide as defined in this section, murder as defined in this section, and sexually violent offense as defined in this section includes (i) any similar offense under the laws of any foreign country or any political subdivision thereof, the United States or any political subdivision thereof or (ii) any offense for which registration in a sex offender and crimes against minors registry is required under the laws of the jurisdiction where the offender was convicted.
The case turns on the interpretation of Code § 9.1-902(F)(ii). [W]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. DAmico v. Commonwealth , 287 Va. 284, 288, 754 S.E.2d 291 (2014).
Turner argues that the language and structure of Code § 9.1-902 only requires the most stringent restraints on liberty for individuals classified as sexually violent offenders, or out-of-state offenders whose convictions are similar to a Virginia sexually violent offense, and not, as the Court of Appeals has concluded, for every out-of-state offender required to register in their state of conviction. The plain language of Code § 9.1-902(F), however, does not support the interpretation he advances. The plain import of subpart (ii) is to place within the definition of any offense listed in subsection B, criminal homicide as defined in this section, murder as defined in this section, and sexually violent offense as defined in this section all persons convicted of any offense for which registration in a sex offender and crimes against minors registry is required under the laws of the jurisdiction where the offender was convicted. Since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no reason to consider the intent of the legislature, or the wisdom of the law. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co ., 208 Va. 467, 474-75, 158 S.E.2d 750 (1968). [I]t is the function of the courts to interpret and apply the acts of the legislature as written and not to rewrite or correct them. Id. at 474, 158 S.E.2d 750.
Furthermore, although Turner argues that this interpretation creates an absurdity, we have limited the application of the absurdity canon of construction to two narrow situations: when the law would be internally inconsistent, and when the law would be otherwise incapable of operation. Covel v. Town of Vienna , 280 Va. 151, 158, 694 S.E.2d 609 (2010). Our interpretation of Code § 9.1-902(F)(ii), however, does not create a conflict within the statute. The effect of the statute is to treat some persons convicted in another state differently than some persons convicted in Virginia, by imposing on some out-of-state convicts a more onerous registration regime. Although the policy basis for this difference in treatment is not clear, it is not an internal inconsistency in the statute. The plain language interpretation also does not render the statute incapable of operation. Accordingly, we do not resort to the absurdity canon to circumvent its plain language.
Turner was required to register as a sex offender in Idaho. Constrained by the text of Code § 9.1-902(F)(ii), we conclude that he was required to register as a sexually violent offender in Virginia. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, upholding Turners conviction for failure to register as required.
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.
No obvious explanation emerges for why the General Assembly decided to treat all persons who must register in their state of conviction to register in Virginia as violent sex offenders and register under the criminal homicide and murder perpetrators and persons having committed one of the offenses listed in Code § 9.1-902(B), all for what may well be a lesser non-homicidal sex crime.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in comparing the Idaho statute to the Virginia statute. Turner v. Commonwealth , No. 0826-17-2, 2018 WL 1801266 (Va. Ct. App. 2018). In light of our holding, we need not reach the question of whether and under what circumstances a comparison of statutes might be required.