PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Richard V. Fletcher, appeals the denial of his postconviction motion, after an evidentiary hearing, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses who would have offered substantial testimony in support of his primary theory of defense. Specifically, at the evidentiary hearing, Appellant offered two witnesses who provided testimony to support the defense theory that the victims mother, Appellants then wife, induced the victim to fabricate the allegations of lewd or lascivious molestation against Appellant so that the mother could engage in a relationship with Appellants friend. We reverse for a new trial.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated pursuant to Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the claimant must demonstrate that his counsel was deficient by identifying particular acts or omissions of his trial counsel that are outside the wide range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Conde v. State , 35 So.3d 660, 662 (Fla. 2010). Second, the movant must also allege prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for his trial counsels allegedly deficient performance. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). The failure to call a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the witness might be able to cast doubt on the defendants guilt. Gutierrez v. State , 27 So.3d 192, 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
Here, the jurys verdict hinged on crediting the victims and the victims mothers testimony as there was no physical evidence of abuse. Without the testimony of two exculpatory witnesses, Appellant was unable to offer evidence to explain his theory of defense, which was alluded to at trial but not developed. Specifically, while defense counsel argued to the jury that the victims mother wanted her then-husband, Appellant, out of her and her childrens lives, defense counsel failed to establish a reason why she wanted Appellant out of the way. The two witnesses would have provided testimony to explain that the victims mother allegedly wanted Appellant out of her and her childrens lives so she could engage in a relationship with Appellants friend. Further, this testimony would have been damaging to the States case in light of evidence offered at trial that Appellants son asked the victim why she said things about his dad, and the victim responded that she had to or her mother would be mad at her. See Fletcher v. State , 177 So.3d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
Notwithstanding, the postconviction court denied Appellants motion below, reasoning that counsel could not have called the two witnesses at trial because the trial court had granted a motion in limine which would have barred their testimony. However, counsel herself inexplicably failed to oppose the motion in limine, stating at the hearing on the motion, Your Honor, I cant think of a legal basis for which to allow that in. Of course, the legal basis would have been that the testimony was relevant, going to the issues of bias and motive of the victims mother and the victim herself, which were central to Appellants defense at trial, a defense that would have cast doubt on Appellants guilt if believed by the jury. As a result, we cannot conclude that the order in limine excuses counsels otherwise deficient performance for failing to call these two exculpatory witnesses. Thus, we find there is a reasonable probability that if defense counsel had presented the testimony of these two witnesses, the jury would have returned a verdict of not guilty. Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction courts order denying Appellants motion for postconviction relief and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SAWAYA, EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.