COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. After exhausting the administrative remedies program within the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Forrest Thomas III appealed to the Marshall County Circuit Court for review of the Departments decision denying him trusty time credit and meritorious earned time credit, the denial of which was based upon his conviction of kidnapping a child under the age of sixteen pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-3-53 and classification as a sex offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-33-23(h)(i). The circuit court denied Thomas relief as well, so Thomas filed the present appeal. While we affirm the circuit courts affirmance of the Departments decision that Thomas is not entitled to credit on his kidnapping conviction, we remand on an issue related to the order in which the Department is running Thomass convictions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. In 2007, Thomas pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the death of Kimberly Norton. He also pleaded guilty to kidnapping their two children, who were both under the age of sixteen, pursuant to Section 97-3-53. The circuit court sentenced Thomas to serve twenty years in the custody of the Department for his manslaughter conviction. In a separate sentencing order, the circuit court sentenced Thomas to serve fifteen years in the custody of the Department, with his sentence for kidnapping to be served consecutively to his manslaughter sentence.
¶ 3. Thomas filed a motion for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed he was not guilty of kidnapping and that his attorney was ineffective. Thomas v. State , 107 So.3d 1046, 1048 (¶ 2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit courts denial of Thomass motion for post-conviction relief. Id. at 1049 (¶ 7).
¶ 4. Then, Thomas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 in the federal court. Thomas v. Outlaw , 2014 WL 3699922, *1 (N.D. Miss. July 24, 2014). The federal court granted the States motion to dismiss due to the untimeliness of Thomass motion. Id. at *2. The federal court dismissed Thomass argument that he was factually innocent of the kidnapping charge by explaining that he had pleaded guilty to the kidnapping charge, acknowledged that he had taken the children against the will of their mother, who had custody [of the children, who had an active restraining order against Thomas,] and who was killed by Thomas. Id. at *3. Further, Thomas pleaded guilty to kidnapping, and he admits that he did not have custody and had no legal right to the children at the time they were taken. Id. Lastly, the federal court addressed Thomass claim that he has received an illegal sentence based on the fact that kidnapping is considered a sex crime, and as such, his sentence is mandatory. Id. The federal court noted that Thomass guilty-plea petition included the following language:
(2) a sentence of fifteen (15) years for kidnapping to serve within the custody and control of the [Department] to run consecutive to the sentence for manslaughter .... The defendant understands and agrees that the sentence imposed for kidnapping pursuant to ... Section 45-33-23(g)(i) is a mandatory day-for-day sentence. The defendant will be given credit for any and all time served in pretrial detention.
Id. In determining that his sentence was not illegal, the federal court said:
Under Mississippi law, the kidnapping of a victim below the age of eighteen is a sex offense or a registrable offense. Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-23(g)(i). Thomas acknowledged the facts of the kidnapping charge at his plea colloquy, including the fact that the children were under the age of sixteen. Therefore, the crime is considered a sex offense under Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-23(g)(i). Moreover, Thomas agreed to a plea offer that explicitly informed him that he would be sentenced pursuant to this statute, and that his sentence would be mandatory. Accordingly, his sentence is not illegal and does not warrant equitable tolling of the federal limitations period. The instant petition will be dismissed as untimely.
Id. at *4.
¶ 5. In February 2015, Thomas filed his first request for administrative remedy relief. Thomas received his response in March 2015, stating that his meritorious earned time and trusty status was removed from his time sheet due to his serving a day-for-day sentence on his kidnapping conviction. Thomas indicated he was unsatisfied with the response and proceeded to step two of the administrative remedy process. He received a response to his second request in June 2015. The response informed him that [k]idnapping under [ Section] 97-3-53 is coded as kidnapping of a minor under the age of [sixteen] is a mandatory crime. You will have to serve the entire [fifteen] years day for day, without any type of good time. Upon completion of the [fifteen] years you may qualify for trusty earned time on the [twenty] years manslaughter charge.
¶ 6. Based upon his dissatisfaction with his second response, he sought judicial review in the circuit court. When the Department did not respond, Thomas filed a motion to compel on September 20, 2016, which the circuit court granted. The circuit court directed the Department to respond to [Thomass] claims of whether 42 U.S.C. § 14071, which was in effect at the time of [Thomass] crime and sentencing, can be applied to exempt [Thomas] from the State of Mississippis sex offender registration requirements. The Department responded and filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court entered an order affirming the Departments decision and Thomas filed the present appeal.
¶ 7. On appeal, Forrest raises three issues:
I. The Department is unlawfully classifying Thomas as a sex offender pursuant to section 45-33-23(h)(i) and contrary to 42 U.S.C. section 14071 and 42 U.S.C. section 16911, which provide an exception for parents convicted of kidnapping their own children from sex offender classification and registration. Thomas further contends that the classification violates several constitutional rights, including: his right to be free from double jeopardy, his right to fundamental fairness, his right to due process and equal protection, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
II. The Department is unlawfully transforming Mississippis sex offender registration statute, Section 45-33-23(h)(i), into a criminal penalty. Thomas again contends that several of his constitutional rights are violated, including his right to be free from double jeopardy, his right to fundamental fairness, his right to due process and equal protection, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
III. The Departments findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, beyond the power of the agency to make, and violate Thomass statutory and constitutional rights.
As noted above, we identified an issue with the order in which the Department is running Thomass sentences, and we address the issue below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. The Court will not disturb a decision of an administrative agency, like the Department, unless the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, is beyond the agencys scope or powers, or is a violation of the partys constitutional rights. Edwards v. Booker , 796 So.2d 991, 994 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Miss. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy v. Gray , 674 So.2d 1251, 1253 (Miss. 1996) ).
ANALYSIS
I. Order of Sentences Served
¶ 9. The circuit court sentenced Thomas to serve twenty years in the custody of the Department for his manslaughter conviction. In a separate sentencing order, the circuit court sentenced Thomas to serve fifteen years in the custody of the Department for his kidnapping conviction. The sentencing order and the notice-of-criminal-disposition form sent to the Department explicitly state that his kidnapping sentence is to be served consecutively to his manslaughter sentence.
¶ 10. Inexplicably, it appears that the Department is running Thomass sentences in the opposite order, contrary to the unambiguous language of the sentencing order. That is, instead of Thomas serving his manslaughter sentence first, for which he could be eligible for trusty time and meritorious earned time, he is serving his kidnapping sentence, which is a mandatory, day-for-day sentence.
¶ 11. Mississippi Code Section 99-19-21(1) (Rev. 2015) provides that if a person is sentenced for two or more convictions, the imprisonment on the second, or each subsequent conviction shall, in the discretion of the court , commence either at the termination of the imprisonment for the preceding conviction or run concurrently with the preceding conviction. While the Department is vested with the authority and discretion for the management and control of the correctional system pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 47-5-23, the Departments authority and discretion cannot usurp a clear directive from the court via its sentencing orders.
¶ 12. Therefore, the Department erroneously is having Thomas serve his kidnapping sentence before his manslaughter sentence, contrary to the circuit courts sentencing order. We remand for the circuit court to order the Department to correct the error, which has a direct impact on the case sub judice .
II. Sentence Reduction
¶ 13. Though we are remanding for the reason explained in Issue I, Thomass argument that he is entitled to trusty time and meritorious earned time while serving his kidnapping sentence still will be an issue when Thomas begins serving his kidnapping sentence.
¶ 14. The crux of Thomass argument is that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 14071 and 42 U.S.C. Section 16911, a congressional exemption has been created for parents convicted of kidnapping their own biological children from sex-offender registration. Thomas claims that the Mississippi statute, Section 45-33-23, finding his conduct to be a sex crime or sex offense must yield as it is in conflict with the federal statute and is a violation of his constitutional rights. See Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-23 (Rev. 2015).
¶ 15. It is important to note that Section 14071 was repealed in 2009 and Section 16911 was transferred to 34 U.S.C. Section 20911, effective September 1, 2017, also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Nonetheless, Thomas is correct that the old statutes and the most current version ( Section 20911 ) contain language that does not include parents convicted of kidnapping their minor children in registration requirements. The term tier III sex offender means a sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than [one] year and-(B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a parent or guardian) .... 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911(4)(B). Section 14071(A)(i) stated: The term criminal offense against a victim who is a minor means any criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is comparable to or which exceeds the following range of offenses: (i) kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent[.]
¶ 16. While Thomas contends the federal statutes are in conflict with our own statute, the difference is that the federal statutes are considered the floor or minimum of what a state must require in order to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. In the national guidelines to the implementation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the federal government, through the Department of Justices Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, stated: The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ... provides a new comprehensive set of minimum standards for sex offender registration and notification in the United States. Dept of Justice, The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification , https://smart.gov/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf 3 (last visited March 13, 2018) (emphasis added). In a further explanation, the guidelines state:
[The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act] establishes a national baseline for sex offender registration and notification programs. In other words, the Act generally constitutes a set of minimum national standards and sets a floor, not a ceiling, for jurisdictions programs. Hence, for example, a jurisdiction may have a system that requires registration by broader classes of convicted offenders than those identified in [the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.]
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). Finally, and most importantly to the present case, the guidelines explain that [i]t is left to jurisdictions discretion under these clauses whether registration should be required for such offenses in cases where the offender is a parent or guardian of the victim. Id. at 19.
¶ 17. Therefore, our statute and the federal statutes are not in conflict such that our statute violates Thomass constitutional rights, as Thomas contends. Rather, our Legislature decided to expand the definitions found in the federal statutes to include, as a sex offense subject to classification and registration, the crime of kidnapping a minor under the age of sixteen. The Legislatures expansion of the sex-offender registration laws was permissible and not violative of Thomass constitutional rights. Thomass argument is without merit.
¶ 18. Thomas next argues that the Department is unlawfully transforming Mississippis sex offender registration statute into a criminal penalty .... Thomas acknowledges and relies on the Courts opinion in Garrison v. State , 950 So.2d 990, 993 (¶ 4) (Miss. 2006), relying on Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), wherein the Court explained that our sex-offender registration law was a civil, non-punitive regulatory scheme. Thomas does not argue that the Court incorrectly decided Garrison or that the statute itself is punitive, but rather, it appears that he is arguing that the Departments actions denying him trusty time or meritorious earned time are punitive because it is increasing his sentence. Thomas equates the Departments denial of any reduction to his sentence to be the Department resentencing him.
¶ 19. The Court has explained that the permissive language found in the sentence-reduction statutes means that correctional officials are vested with discretionary power to award time under certain conditions, and therefore, inmates are not entitled to it. Ross v. State , 584 So.2d 777, 779 (Miss. 1991). Thomass argument that his sentence is extended by the denial of any reduction presupposes that he is entitled to such reduction, which he is not. The Department requiring Thomas to serve his full, fifteen-year sentence, consistent with Sections 45-33-23 and 47-7-3, imposed by the circuit court, is not an extension or increase in Thomass sentence.
CONCLUSION
¶ 20. In summary, Thomas was convicted of kidnapping a minor under the age of sixteen pursuant to Section 97-3-53. Section 45-33-23(h)(i) defines a sex offense as a conviction pursuant to Section 97-3-53if the victim was below the age of eighteen (18)[.] Pursuant to Section 47-7-3(1)(b), a person convicted of a sex crime or sex offense shall not be eligible for parole, and also, Section 47-7-3(2) provides that the person shall not be eligible to receive any earned time, good time, or any other administrative reduction of time[.] It is apparent that Thomass conviction falls within each of the above statutes, making him ineligible for parole and ineligible for any reduction in his sentence. Therefore, we affirm the Marshall County Circuit Courts affirmance of the Departments denial of Thomass claim that he is being improperly classified as a sex offender and is entitled to trusty time or meritorious earned time, as the decision is supported by substantial evidence, not arbitrary or capricious, not beyond the scope of the Department to make, and does not violate Thomass constitutional rights. Additionally, we remand for the circuit court to order the Department to run Thomass sentences consistently with the sentencing orders.
¶ 21. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, J.
Thomass innocence argument was that he could not kidnap his own children, and that because his ex-wife was dead at the time he took the children, he could not have taken them against her will. Thomas , 2014 WL 3699922, at *3.
In 2014, the Mississippi Legislature amended Section 45-33-23, so the language in subsection (g)(i) was moved and is now found in subsection (h)(i). There was no change to the language, only the location. See Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-23 (Supp. 2017).