BRYAN, Justice.
Nautilus Insurance Company (Nautilus) and Lyon Fry Cadden Insurance Agency, Inc. (LFC), separately petition this Court for writs of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit Court (the trial court) to vacate its orders denying their motions to dismiss the action filed against them by Precision Sand Products, LLC (Precision). For the reasons set forth herein, we grant Nautiluss petition and deny LFCs petition.
Facts and Procedural History
During the period from June 10, 2015, to June 10, 2016, Precision had in place a commercial general-liability insurance policy (the policy) it had purchased from Nautilus through LFC, an insurance broker. In March 2016, Terry Williams sued Precision in the trial court, seeking recovery for injuries he allegedly suffered on Precisions property during the period the policy was in effect. Williams later amended his complaint to add his wife, Zandra Williams, as a plaintiff. Pursuant to the terms of the policy, Precision demanded that Nautilus defend and indemnify it against the Williamses claims. Nautilus agreed, under reservation of rights, to defend Precision against the Williamses claims and is currently doing so.
On July 3, 2017, Nautilus filed a declaratory-judgment action against Precision and the Williamses in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (the district court), seeking a judgment declaring that, pursuant to an exclusion in the policy, Nautilus was not obligated to defend and indemnify Precision against the Williamses claims (the federal action). Precision filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to stay the federal action, asking the district court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) (noting that district courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, [ 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a),] even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites). As of the filing of these petitions, the district court has not yet ruled on that motion, and the federal action remains pending.
On October 13, 2017, Precision filed in the Williamses action in the trial court a crossclaim complaint against Nautilus and LFC (the state action). In its complaint, Precision asserted the following claims against both Nautilus and LFC: (1) a claim seeking a judgment declaring that Nautilus and LFC are obligated to defend and indemnify Precision against the Williamses claims; (2) an abnormal bad-faith claim; (3) a bad-faith-failure-to-settle claim; (4) a breach-of-the-enhanced-duty-of-good-faith claim; (5) a fraud claim, alleging that Nautilus and LFC misrepresented to Precision that the policy provided coverage for claims such as the Williamses; and (6) a negligence claim, alleging that Nautilus and LFC had a duty to sell an insurance policy to Precision ... that provides coverage for its business operations and for any potential claims [to which it] might be exposed ....
Nautilus filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it in the state action, arguing that Precisions claims against it were compulsory counterclaims that Precision was required to file in the federal action pursuant to § 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, the abatement statute. LFC, arguing that Precisions complaint failed to state a claim against LFC upon which relief could be granted, filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it in the state action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. Alternatively, LFC argued that, if the trial court dismissed Nautilus from the state action, then LFC was also entitled to a dismissal under Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides for the joinder of persons needed for just adjudication, because, according to LFC, Nautilus is an indispensable party to Precisions claims against LFC.
On November 15, 2017, the trial court, without specifying its reasons, entered separate orders denying Nautiluss and LFCs motions to dismiss, and Nautilus and LFC separately petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate those orders. Nautiluss petition was assigned case no. 1170170; LFCs petition was assigned case no. 1170235. We consolidated the two petitions for the purpose of writing a single opinion, but because the petitions assert different grounds for issuing the writs, we address the petitions separately.
Standard of Review
"The standard of review applied to a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus is well settled:
Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.
Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC, 229 So.3d 751, 756 (Ala. 2017) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995) ).
Case no. 1170170 (Nautilus)
In its petition to this Court, Nautilus makes the same argument it made in its motion to dismiss the state action, i.e., that it is entitled to a dismissal from the state action under § 6-5-440 because, Nautilus says, Precisions claims against it are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action, which was pending when Precision commenced the state action. Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to correct a trial courts failure to properly apply § 6-5-440. Ex parte J.E. Estes Wood Co., 42 So.3d 104, 108 (Ala. 2010). When the facts underlying a motion filed pursuant to § 6-5-440 are undisputed, as is the case here, our review of the application of the law to the facts is de novo. Ex parte Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 974 So.2d 967, 969 (Ala. 2007).
Section 6-5-440 provides:
No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two actions in the courts of this state at the same time for the same cause and against the same party. In such a case, the defendant may require the plaintiff to elect which he will prosecute, if commenced simultaneously, and the pendency of the former is a good defense to the latter if commenced at different times.
Regarding the operation of § 6-5-440, this Court has stated:
"This Code section, by its plain language, forbids a party from prosecuting two actions for the same cause and against the same party. This Court has previously held that an action pending in a federal court falls within the coverage of this Code section:
The phrase courts of this state, as used in § 6-5-440, includes all federal courts located in Alabama. This Court has consistently refused to allow a person to prosecute an action in a state court while another action on the same cause and against the same parties is pending in a federal court in this State."
" Ex parte University of South Alabama Found., 788 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Weaver v. Hood, 577 So.2d 440, 442 (Ala. 1991) (citations in Weaver omitted in University of South Alabama ) ). Additionally, a compulsory counterclaim is considered an action for purposes of § 6-5-440. Penick v. Cado Sys. of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So.2d 598, 599 (Ala. 1993). As this Court has noted:
This Court has held that the obligation ... to assert compulsory counterclaims, when read in conjunction with § 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, which prohibits a party from prosecuting two actions for the same cause and against the same party, is tantamount to making the defendant with a compulsory counterclaim in the first action a plaintiff" in that action (for purposes of § 6-5-440 ) as of the time of its commencement. See, e.g., Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr. Corp., 658 So.2d 414 (Ala. 1995) ; Penick v. Cado Systems of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So.2d 598 (Ala. 1993) ; Ex parte Canal Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 582 (Ala. 1988). Thus, the defendant subject to the counterclaim rule who commences another action has violated the prohibition in § 6-5-440 against maintaining two actions for the same cause.
Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., 729 So.2d 849, 851 (Ala. 1999). See also University of South Alabama Found., 788 So.2d at 165 (holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated § 6-5-440 by commencing another action in a state court); Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr. Corp., 658 So.2d 414 (Ala. 1995) (holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratory-judgment action violated § 6-5-440 ).
Ex parte Norfolk S. Ry., 992 So.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Ala. 2008).
In this case, Precision is a defendant and Nautilus a plaintiff in the federal action, which undisputedly had been filed and was pending when Precision commenced the state action. Thus, as we explained in Norfolk, if Precisions claims against Nautilus in the state action are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action, then Precision is a plaintiff in the federal action for purposes of § 6-5-440 and, as such, is precluded under that statute from asserting those claims in a later-filed action, i.e., the state action. See Ex parte Brooks Ins. Agency, 125 So.3d 706, 710 (Ala. 2013) (holding that § 6-5-440 mandated the dismissal of an insureds claims filed in a state-court action because those claims were compulsory counterclaims in the insurers first-filed, declaratory-judgment action in federal court); and Ex parte Canal Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 582 (Ala. 1988) (same). However, before addressing whether Precisions claims against Nautilus are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action, we must first address Precisions argument that § 6-5-440 is not applicable in this case, despite the fact that Nautilus filed the federal action before Precision filed the state action and regardless of whether Precisions claims are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action. In support of its argument, Precision cites Metropolitan, supra.
In Metropolitan, Fred D. Gray filed a claim under a homeowners insurance policy he had with Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan). Metropolitan subsequently filed a declaratory-judgment action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, seeking a declaration that Grays loss was not covered by his policy. However, the federal court entered an order stating that the allegations in Metropolitans complaint were insufficient to invoke that courts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the diversity statute. Although the federal court gave Metropolitan leave to amend its complaint to correct that deficiency, Gray filed an action against Metropolitan in the Macon Circuit Court before Metropolitan filed its amended complaint. Metropolitan moved the state court to dismiss Grays action on the ground that Grays claims were compulsory counterclaims in Metropolitans federal-court action. The state court denied Metropolitans motion, and Metropolitan petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that Gray was barred under § 6-5-440 from bringing his claims in the state-court action. In denying Metropolitans petition, this Court stated:
We agree with Gray that a determination that the federal-court action was pending at the time of the commencement of the state-court action is essential to the reliance by the insurer ... on [ § 6-5-440 ]. The federal courts finding that the allegations of Metropolitans original complaint were insufficient to invoke this courts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 calls into question the existence of the essential prerequisite of priority of the federal-court action.
Metropolitan, 974 So.2d at 971.
This Court noted that Metropolitan had not argued that its amended complaint related back to the filing of its original complaint, and the Court therefore did not address that issue. Rather, in the absence of such argument, the Court merely held that it was questionable whether the federal-court action had priority and that, as a result, Metropolitan had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it had a clear legal right to dismissal from the state-court action under § 6-5-440.
Precision contends that, under Metropolitan, when there is a question as to the courts jurisdiction in a first-filed action, § 6-5-440 does not mandate the dismissal of a later-filed action asserting claims that would be compulsory counterclaims in the first-filed action. Given that premise, Precision points to the fact that, in this case, the district court has yet to rule on Precisions motion to dismiss or to stay the federal action. Thus, Precision argues, the district court might ultimately choose not to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the federal action, and, therefore, there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the district court, just as, Precision says, there was in Metropolitan. Precisions response to Nautiluss petition, at 10.
However, Metropolitan is distinguishable from this case. In Metropolitan, there was not, as Precision contends, a question as to the jurisdiction of the federal court; Metropolitan clearly indicates that Metropolitans amended complaint invoked that courts jurisdiction. Metropolitan, 974 So.2d at 971. Rather, because Metropolitans original complaint failed to invoke the federal courts jurisdiction, and because Gray filed the state-court action before Metropolitan corrected that deficiency, there was a question as to which action had priority. In this case, it is undisputed that the allegations in Nautiluss complaint in the federal action, which Nautilus filed before Precision filed the state action, were sufficient to invoke the district courts diversity jurisdiction, and nothing in the materials before this Court indicates that the district court elected not to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the federal action. As a result, there is no question, as there was in Metropolitan, that the federal action has priority over the state action. Precisions speculation that the district court might decide at some future moment not to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the federal action does not call into question the priority of the federal action. The circumstances here are not analogous to the circumstances in Metropolitan, where the substance of Metropolitans original complaint and the timing of the parties filings raised an actual, existing question as to whether Metropolitans federal-court action had priority over Grays state-court action. Thus, Metropolitan provides no support for Precisions argument. Accordingly, as noted earlier, because the federal action has priority over the state action, § 6-5-440 mandates the dismissal of Precisions claims against Nautilus in the state action if those claims are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action.
Nautilus argues that Precisions claims against it are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action because, Nautilus says, both its claims in the federal action and Precisions claims in the state action
arise out of Nautiluss issuance of the [p]olicy to Precision, Precisions demand that Nautilus defend and indemnify Precision against the Williamses claims, and Nautiluss provision of a defense under reservation of rights. Hence, the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and are based on the same operative facts.
Petition, at 15-16. We agree with Nautilus.
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory, this Court applies the logical-relationship test.
A counterclaim is compulsory if there is any logical relation of any sort between the original claim and the counterclaim. Committee Comments on 1973 adoption of Rule 13, [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] ¶ 6. Under the logical-relationship standard, a counterclaim is compulsory if (1) its trial in the original action would avoid a substantial duplication of effort or (2) the original claim and the counterclaim arose out of the same aggregate core of operative facts. Ex parte Canal Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 582, 584 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Brooks v. Peoples Natl Bank of Huntsville, 414 So.2d 917, 919 (Ala. 1982) ). In determining whether the claims arose out of the same aggregate core of operative facts, this Court must determine whether (1) the facts taken as a whole serve as the basis for both claims or (2) the sum total of facts upon which the original claim rests creates legal rights in a party which would otherwise remain dormant. Canal Ins., 534 So.2d at 584.
Ex parte Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 806 So.2d 376, 380 (Ala. 2001).
As noted above, the crux of the federal action is Nautiluss obligations, if any, and Precisions rights, if any, under the policy. Likewise, Precisions declaratory-judgment claim and its claims of abnormal bad faith, bad-faith failure to settle, breach of the enhanced duty of good faith, fraud, and negligence are based upon either Nautiluss alleged refusal to perform what, Precision says, are Nautiluss duties under the policy or Nautiluss alleged misconduct in issuing the policy. Thus, the policy is the nucleus of each partys claims, and it is the facts concerning Nautiluss issuance of the policy, the facts concerning the manner in which Nautilus is handling Precisions claim under the policy, and the interpretation of relevant terms of the policy that serve as the basis for the parties claims, or, put differently, the claims all arose out of the same aggregate core of operative facts. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 806 So.2d at 380 (quoting Canal Ins., 534 So. 2d at 584 ). As a result, litigating the parties claims in the same forum would avoid a substantial duplication of effort. Id. It would avoid circuity of actions and ... enable the court to settle all related claims in one action and thereby avoid a wasteful multiplicity of litigation on claims that arose from a single transaction or occurrence. 806 So.2d at 379 (quoting Grow Grp., Inc. v. Industrial Corrosion Control, Inc., 601 So.2d 934, 936 (Ala. 1992) ). Accordingly, Precisions claims against Nautilus meet the logical-relationship test and are therefore compulsory counterclaims in the federal action. This Courts caselaw in similar cases between an insurer and its insured is in accord. See, e.g., Brooks Ins. Agency, 125 So.3d at 710 (holding that, under § 6-5-440, the insurers first-filed, declaratory-judgment action in federal court precluded the insureds later-filed, state-court action because all the claims in both the federal court and the state court arise from the same facts and circumstances-Nationwides issuance of the insurance policies to Guster and its handling of Gusters ... claim); Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 806 So.2d at 381 (holding that the insureds state-court claims that depend[ed] on the homeowners policy that was the subject of the insurers first-filed, declaratory-judgment action in federal court meet the logical-relationship test and noting that [i]t would have served the purposes of Rule 13 [, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] for [the insured] to have litigated her claims against [the insurer] in the same action in which [the insurer] sought a declaration of its rights and obligations under the homeowners insurance policy; it would have avoided a multiplicity of actions, and all matters could have been resolved in one action); and Canal Ins. Co., 534 So.2d at 583 (holding that, under § 6-5-440, the insurers first-filed, declaratory-judgment action in federal court precluded the insureds later-filed, state-court action in a case where [t]he facts and circumstances alleged in support of [the insureds] complaint arose out of the issuance of the insurance policy and the proof of loss claim filed with [the insurer]).
Because the federal action had been filed and was pending when Precision filed the state action, and because the claims Precision asserted against Nautilus in the state action are compulsory counterclaims in the federal action, Nautilus has demonstrated that it has a clear legal right under § 6-5-440 to dismissal from the state action. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue the writ directing the trial court to enter an order dismissing Nautilus from the state action.
Case no. 1170235 (LFC)
As a threshold matter, we note that Precision contends in its brief to this Court that it has amended its complaint to clarify that its declaratory-judgment claim and its claims alleging abnormal bad faith, bad-faith failure to settle, and breach of the enhanced duty of good faith are asserted against Nautilus only. Precision has attached to its brief a copy of its amended complaint, which confirms Precisions contention that it is not asserting those four claims against LFC. See Precisions brief, Exhibit E. LFC agrees that Precisions amended complaint clarified that those four claims are no longer asserted against LFC. See LFCs reply brief, at 8. Accordingly, in addressing whether LFC has a clear legal right to dismissal of Precisions claims, we are concerned only with Precisions fraud and negligence claims against LFC.
Initially, LFC argues that it was entitled to a dismissal of Precisions claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because, LFC says, those claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon Rule 12(b)(6) is not reviewable by petition for a writ of mandamus. Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 78 So.3d 959 (Ala. 2011). Any alleged error in the [trial] courts decision to deny [LFCs] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim ... can be adequately remedied by appeal. 78 So.3d at 979. Accordingly, we do not address LFCs arguments in this regard.
LFC also argues that it was entitled to a dismissal of Precisions claims under Rule 19, which, as noted, provides for the joinder of persons needed for just adjudication, i.e., an indispensable party. LFC argues that, if Nautilus is dismissed from the state action (as it is to be pursuant to this opinion), then Precisions claims against LFC are also due to be dismissed because, LFC says, Nautilus is an indispensable party to those claims. However, LFC has not cited any authority indicating that the denial of a motion to dismiss predicated upon a failure to join an indispensable party is an issue properly reviewable by petition for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte U.S. Bank Natl Assn, 148 So.3d 1060, 1064 (Ala. 2014) (setting forth the issues this Court will review by petition for a writ of mandamus).
Regardless, even if this issue is reviewable by petition for a writ of mandamus, LFC has failed to satisfy each of the four elements required for issuance of the extraordinary writ. Specifically, LFC has failed to demonstrate that the trial court had an imperative duty ... to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so. Caremark, 229 So.3d at 756 (quoting Integon Corp., 672 So.2d at 499 ) (emphasis added). Granted, if Nautilus was an absent indispensable party to Precisions claims against LFC, the trial court would have had a duty to dismiss the state action without prejudice. See Liberty Natl Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So.2d 1013, 1022 (Ala. 2003) ( The absence of a necessary and indispensable party necessitates the dismissal of the cause without prejudice or a reversal with directions to allow the cause to stand over for amendment. (quoting J.C. Jacobs Banking Co. v. Campbell, 406 So.2d 834, 850-51 (Ala. 1981) ) ). However, Precision included Nautilus as a defendant in the state action, and the trial court denied Nautiluss motion to dismiss. Thus, Nautilus has been a party to the state action since its inception. As a result, it would be illogical to conclude that the trial court had a duty to dismiss the state action for failure to join Nautilus, and that it refused to do so, when Nautilus has, at all times in the proceedings below, been a party to the action. It is only after this Courts decision in case no. 1170170 that Nautilus will no longer be a party to the state action, and it is therefore only after the issuance of this opinion that the trial court could even potentially incur any duty to dismiss the state action for failure to join an indispensable party. Thus, because LFC cannot demonstrate that the trial court had a duty to dismiss the state action for failure to join an indispensable party and that it refused to do so, LFC is not entitled to the writ on that basis. Caremark, supra.
Lastly, LFC argues that it is entitled to a dismissal of Precisions claims because, LFC says, those claims are not ripe for adjudication and, thus, the trial courts subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims was not invoked. See Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So.2d 557, 562 (Ala. 2005) (Ripeness implicates subject-matter jurisdiction.). The only authority LFC cites in support of its argument is Ex parte Safeway Insurance Co. of Alabama, 990 So.2d 344 (Ala. 2008), in which this Court held that an insureds bad-faith claim against its insurer for refusal to pay uninsured-motorist benefits was not ripe-and thus did not invoke the trial courts subject-matter jurisdiction-until the insured established the amount of his damages. 990 So.2d at 352. This case, however, does not concern uninsured-motorist benefits, and nothing in Safeway provides that Precisions claims of fraud and negligence with respect to LFCs procurement of insurance are not ripe at this stage of the proceedings.
More significantly, even if we assume that Safeway is analogous to this case, LFC ignores this Courts more recent decision in Ex parte Safeway Insurance Co. of Alabama, 148 So.3d 39 (Ala. 2013), in which this Court concluded that an insureds assertion of a bad-faith claim for refusal to pay uninsured-motorist benefits before any adjudication of the uninsured motorists liability and the amount of damages was not a ripeness issue that affected the trial courts subject-matter jurisdiction. In rejecting the insurers argument that the insureds bad-faith claim was not ripe and that the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim, this Court stated:
We disagree that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court does have the authority to hear the case and may dismiss it on the merits. The outcome of the case ought to depend on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, not a Rule 12(b)(1) [ (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) ] motion to dismiss, and proving fault and damages ought to be an evidentiary or elemental prerequisite for showing an insurers bad-faith failure to pay benefits, not a jurisdictional prerequisite.
148 So.3d at 42 (third and fourth emphasis added; footnote omitted). That is to say, the insureds bad-faith claim, filed before the uninsured motorists liability and the resulting damages had been established, potentially suffered from a defect in merit but, regardless, did not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.
In this case, LFC argues that Precision cannot recover against LFC for fraudulently procuring inadequate insurance or for negligently failing to procure adequate insurance unless and until Precision is actually denied coverage for, or a defense against, the Williamses claims. In accord with the more recent Safeway decision, that argument goes to Precisions ability to prove the merits of its claims, not to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to preside over those claims. See Safeway, 148 So.3d at 43 (There are ... no problems with subject-matter jurisdiction merely because a party files an action that ostensibly lacks a probability of merit.). The trial court, as a court of general jurisdiction, Ala. Const. 1901, Art. VI, § 142, clearly has the constitutional and statutory authority to hear the types of claims Precision has asserted against LFC. Id. (quoting Russell v. State, 51 So.3d 1026, 1028 (Ala. 2010), quoting in turn Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006) ). Thus, LFC has not demonstrated that it has a clear legal right to dismissal from the state action based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over Precisions claims.
Conclusion
Nautilus has demonstrated that, under § 6-5-440, it has a clear legal right to dismissal from the state action. Accordingly, we grant Nautiluss petition and issue the writ directing the trial court to dismiss Nautilus from the state action. LFC has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it has a clear legal right to dismissal from the state action. Accordingly, LFCs petition is due to be and is hereby denied.
1170170-PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1170235-PETITION DENIED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
Williamss complaint named other defendants who are not parties to these appellate proceedings.
Although Precision labeled its claims cross-claims, those claims are actually third-party claims because neither Nautilus nor LFC was a party to the Williamses action. Compare Rule 13(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., providing that a party may assert cross-claims against a co-party, with Rule 14(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., providing that a defendant may file, as a third-party plaintiff, a complaint upon a person not a party to the action. (Emphasis added.)
Nautiluss complaint indicates that Nautilus is a citizen of Arizona; that Precision and the Williamses are citizens of Alabama; and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction of all civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and citizens of different states are involved).
We note that Precisions amended complaint also asserted a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against LFC. However, Precision filed the amended complaint after the trial court denied LFCs motion to dismiss, and nothing in the materials before this Court indicates that LFC has moved the trial court to dismiss that claim. Accordingly, we are not concerned with that claim in this opinion, and nothing herein should be construed as a commentary on that claim.
To be clear, we offer no opinion on whether Nautilus is an indispensable party to Precisions claims against LFC. We simply note that, even if it is, the trial court, to this point, has had no duty to dismiss the state action for failure to join Nautilus and, thus, cannot be held in error for refusing to perform a duty it was never required to perform.