UNITED STATES v. HAAR (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-25No. No. 20-10272

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of compassionate release, finding no abuse of discretion in the lower court's application of the statutory sentencing factors.

Sandra Haar sought compassionate release from her prison sentence under federal law, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic posed a significant threat to her health and that the district court improperly applied sentencing guidelines in rejecting her request. The district court acknowledged that while it could consult the relevant sentencing guideline, that guideline was not binding on compassionate release decisions. The court nonetheless thoroughly reviewed Haar's arguments and determined that her release was not justified when weighing the statutory factors, particularly given the severity of her offense and the importance of maintaining deterrence.

Haar also claimed the district court was biased against her, but the appellate court found this allegation without merit. The court applied the standard that a district court abuses its discretion only when its decision is illogical, unsupported by the record, or implausible—a standard Haar's case did not satisfy.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether sentencing guidelines section 1B1.13 is binding on compassionate release motions
Whether the COVID-19 pandemic and its threat to a prisoner's health warrant compassionate release
Whether the district court properly weighed statutory sentencing factors in denying release
Whether the district court exhibited bias

Procedural posture

Haar appealed the district court's denial of her motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Sandra Haar appeals from the district courts order denying her motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Haar contends that the district court erred by improperly assessing the threat posed to her by the COVID-19 pandemic and by relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as an applicable policy statement. We recently held that the current version of § 1B1.13 is not binding as applied to compassionate release motions brought by a prisoner. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021).

The district court followed the guidance of § 1B1.13, but recognized that it did not limit the circumstances the court could consider in evaluating Haars motion. See id. (“The Sentencing Commissions statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district courts discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.”). The court gave full consideration to Haars arguments in support of her motion and concluded that release was unwarranted in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the egregiousness of Haars offense conduct and the need to afford adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (district court must consider applicable § 3553(a) factors); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799; see also United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (district court abuses its discretion only if its decision is illogical, implausible, or not supported by the record).

We reject as meritless Haars allegations that the district court was biased.

We do not consider matters that are not distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.