DHINGRA v. UNITED STATES (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-07-26No. No. 19-16957

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Dhingra's action, concluding that he failed to state a plausible claim for relief and that his claims were barred to the extent they rested on the invalidity of his conviction.

Rakesh Dhingra appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the International Megahertz Law as applied to him. The court reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that Dhingra's complaint failed to allege sufficient factual details to establish a plausible legal claim under applicable standards. Additionally, to the extent Dhingra's arguments depended on proving his underlying criminal conviction was invalid, those claims were barred by the Heck doctrine, which prevents civil suits that would effectively overturn convictions without first securing post-conviction relief.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether Dhingra pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible constitutional claim
Application of the Heck doctrine to bar claims that implicitly challenge criminal convictions
Due process and religious liberty challenges to sex offender registration requirements

Procedural posture

Dhingra appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his constitutional challenge to the International Megahertz Law under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM ***

Rakesh Dhingra appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging constitutional violations arising from the application of the International Megans Law (“IML”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Dhingras action because Dhingra failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”); United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the requirements for substantive and procedural due process claims and concluding that individuals convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from sex offender registration requirements).

The district court correctly found that to the extent Dhingras claims rest on the implied invalidity of his criminal conviction, they are Heck-barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ․ the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).

We reject as without merit Dhingras contentions regarding Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-cv-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Dhingras request to stay this appeal, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.