MORA CONTRERAS v. PETERS (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-24No. No. 20-35476

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's judgment dismissing all claims is affirmed.

Two inmates challenged their transfer to segregation units and related disciplinary actions through a federal civil rights lawsuit against Oregon Department of Corrections officials. The district court dismissed all claims, and the appeals court upheld that dismissal. The court found that the inmates failed to show their segregation conditions were unusually harsh compared to general prison population conditions, which is required to establish a constitutional violation. The court also rejected arguments that extended solitary confinement is inherently unconstitutional and determined that the defendants qualified for immunity because the legal rights the inmates claimed had not yet been recognized by any court at the time of the incidents.

The appellate decision clarifies that prison segregation claims require a fact-specific comparison to conditions elsewhere in the facility and that merely being placed in segregation, without more, does not automatically trigger constitutional protections. Additionally, the court noted that certain First Amendment protections for prisoners—specifically the right not to be forced to inform on other inmates or provide false statements—were novel legal theories not yet established in the Ninth Circuit at the time of these events.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether transfer to segregation implicates a protected liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment
Whether extended solitary confinement constitutes inherently cruel and unusual punishment
Whether inmates possess a First Amendment right not to serve as informants or provide false information
Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

Procedural posture

Plaintiffs appealed from a district court judgment dismissing their § 1983 civil rights claims against Oregon Department of Corrections employees.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Rafael Mora-Contreras and Shane Staggs (Plaintiffs) appeal from the district courts judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against various Oregon Department of Corrections employees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process claims. Transfer to a segregation unit implicates a protected liberty interest only if the conditions in the unit “impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). This context- and fact-specific inquiry requires comparing the conditions in the segregation unit to the conditions in general population within the specific prison. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the operative second amended complaint does not allege any facts about the conditions in general population or that conditions in the segregation units arise to an “atypical and significant hardship” relative to the general population. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 445 n.3, 448–49, (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no protected liberty interest where complaint did not allege that conditions were worse in the SHU than in administrative segregation or general population).

Plaintiffs also do not allege that they were denied the procedural protections described in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Plaintiffs do allege facts that could support a fabrication of evidence claim under Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2001), but without first establishing a protected liberty interest, the fabrication of the evidence claim fails. See Costanich v. Dept of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (deliberately fabricating evidence violates due process “during civil investigations which could result in the deprivation of protected liberty or property interests” (emphasis added)).

2. The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs assert that extended solitary confinement is inherently cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. This argument is contrary to the law of the Supreme Court and this circuit. See e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–88, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 289–90, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of rehg, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995).

3. The district court properly found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment compelled speech and retaliation claims. Plaintiffs allege that their First Amendment rights not to be compelled to inform or falsely testify were violated, and that they were unlawfully retaliated against for exercising those rights. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context). But those rights were not established in any circuit at the time of the alleged incidents, and still are not established in our circuit. See Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2018) (establishing, as a matter of first impression, that “the First Amendment protects both a prisoners right not to serve as an informant, and to refuse to provide false information to prison officials,” but noting that “neither the Supreme Court nor any other circuit court” had previously found those rights exist).

AFFIRMED.