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HERNANDEZ SANCHEZ v. WILKINSON (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-02-05No. No. 18-70604

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Margarito Hernandez-Sanchez seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision. Petitioner argues substantial evidence does not support the BIAs denial of his application for withholding of removal or request for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.

1

First, substantial evidence supports the BIAs determination that Petitioner did not establish the requisite nexus between any alleged harm and his membership in his proposed particular social group (PSG) of family. See Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).

2

The record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIAs determination that revenge, and not Petitioners family membership, motivated the cartel members familys actions toward Petitioner and his cousins. See Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). Petitioner all but concedes as much by acknowledging that the cartel members family sought revenge by seeking to kill several younger members of Petitioners family—all cousins—that they thought to be involved in the cartel members murder. See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 45 (BIA 2017) (“[N]exus is not established simply because a [PSG] of family members exists and the family members experience harm. Thus, the fact that a persecutor has threatened an applicant and members of his family does not necessarily mean that the threats were motivated by family ties.”), overruled on other grounds in 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (2019). The cartel members familys focus on revenge, as opposed to any motivation to harm the family per se, is further supported by the fact that Petitioners grandparents continue to reside safely in Mexico. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Substantial evidence ․ supports the [BIA]’s finding that [the petitioner]’s mothers continued safety in his hometown undermines his well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his family membership, and we deny his petition based on this claim.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he persecutors motive is critical and the applicant must come forward with some evidence of motive, direct or circumstantial.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)).

3

Because revenge is not a protected ground, substantial evidence supports the BIAs determination that Petitioners family was not “a reason” for his alleged harm. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359–60 (9th Cir. 2017); Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017); Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

4

Second, substantial evidence supports the BIAs determination that the record, in its entirety, does not establish that Petitioner faces a clear probability of torture upon his return to Mexico. See Guo, 897 F.3d at 1212; Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1033. The record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIAs determination that Petitioners prior kidnapping did not give rise to a clear probability of future torture, as his former captors lack any means of contacting him, nor have they expressed any interest in doing so. See Bellout v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (substantial evidence supported agencys denial of CAT relief where the petitioner testified about a single incident of police abuse which occurred ten years prior), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2009).

While Petitioner argues that all his past incidents combine to establish a probability of torture from a revengeful family of the cartel member, the BIA properly reviewed Petitioners arguments, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion that his cousins death in the United States and the stabbing at a political event bear no connection to the cartel members family beyond mere speculation, thereby diminishing a probability of future torture based on those incidents. Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying CAT claim because claims of torture were speculative). In the one incident that bore any relation to the cartel members family, where Petitioner received a warning to leave a wedding due to the cartel members familys proximity, Petitioner left without harm after a few minutes of waiting in a backroom. And Petitioners grandparents’ continued safety in Mexico further undermines the probability of continued harm based on a family dispute. See Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 748.

Finally, Petitioners generalized evidence regarding Mexicos country conditions, which the BIA considered as part of the entirety of the record, fails to establish a particularized risk of torture. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Where Petitioners have not shown they are any more likely to be victims of violence and crimes than the populace as a whole in Mexico, they have failed to carry their burden.”); Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (concluding the country reports “do not indicate that [the petitioner] would face any particular threat of torture beyond that of which all citizens of [that country] are at risk.”); see also Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e do not require that the BIA ․ discuss each piece of evidence submitted. Unless clear indications exist that the IJ or BIA did not consider the documentary evidence, general language that the agency considered all the evidence before it is sufficient.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)).

PETITION DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1

.   The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not repeat them here.

2

.   The BIA determined Petitioner waived any challenge to his second proposed PSG of “those who were kidnapped, extorted, and branded by a drug cartel,” and Petitioner does not raise this proposed PSG in his petition, so we do not address it here. Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1987).

3

.   The record also reveals that several incidents from which Petitioner alleges past harm—including the murder of his cousin in the U.S. and Petitioners injury at a political event—bear no connection to any proffered motivation (revenge or family), given Petitioners admissions that he does not know who perpetrated these incidents. Petitioners attempt to link these incidents to the basis for his withholding of removal claim is based entirely on speculation.

4

.   We do not reach Petitioners various arguments under his withholding of removal challenge that go beyond the scope of the BIAs nexus determination. See Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We cannot affirm the BIA on a ground upon which it did not rely.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).