MEMORANDUM ***
Defendant Derian Eidson appeals her 108-month sentence upon resentencing for convictions of money laundering conspiracy and attempted money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and (a)(1)(B)(i). Finding no error, we affirm the district courts sentence.
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1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level increase for obstruction of justice under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 3C1.1. See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (we review the district courts application of the guidelines for abuse of discretion). The district court properly determined that Eidson impeded the grand jury investigation by withholding invoices which were highly probative of the schemes criminality. The district court permissibly concluded that she also impeded the grand jury by providing the putative 2004 assignment contract which had been created and altered in 2009.
2. The district court did not err by declining to hold another evidentiary hearing on whether the obstruction enhancement applied. The court gave Eidson an adequate opportunity to argue against the obstruction enhancement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4).
3. The district court did not err by denying Eidsons request for a minor role adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2. The district court permissibly concluded that Eidson clearly did not play a minor role in the fraudulent scheme that lasted several years where Eidson helped co-defendant Steven Zinnel hide millions of dollars from the bankruptcy court and the family court.
4. The district court did not err by increasing Eidsons guideline range for the use of a special skill as a trained attorney under USSG § 3B1.3. During the FBIs investigation, Eidson was recorded touting her status as an officer of the court and using her position to manipulate her co-defendants business partner.
5. The district court did not err by imposing a two-level enhancement for sophisticated money laundering. The court properly considered Eidsons use of a shell company and the schemes method of passing funds through her client trust account to impose the enhancement. See USSG § 2S1.1(b)(3) & Application n.5(A).
6. The low-end guideline sentence of 108 months was substantively reasonable. See United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 700 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, thoroughly evaluating the circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
7. Eidsons remaining procedural and constitutional challenges under the Sixth Amendment fail. Under United States v. Treadwell, the Sixth Amendment is not violated when the sentencing court considers circumstances not found by the jury so long as such consideration does not result in a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. 593 F.3d 990, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2010) partially overruled on other grounds by United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095, 1103 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Raygosa-Esparza, 566 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, Eidsons sentence was below the statutory maximum so her argument is without merit.
Lastly, Eidsons contention that the sentencing enhancements should have been found by clear and convincing evidence fails. This argument was not raised with the district court, so it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Gallegos, 613 F.3d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010). Eidson does not demonstrate how the courts findings had a disproportionate effect on her sentence, a requirement to trigger the heightened standard. See United States v. Pike, 473 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, the district court did not plainly err.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. The government requests leave to admit an audio recording that is not part of the district courts electronic docket. Because we are able to resolve the appeal without reference to this item, the governments motions, ECF Nos. 34 & 38, are DENIED AS MOOT.