DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bernard J. Graham, J.), dated August 9, 2018. The order granted the motion of the defendant Elliot Riegelhaupt for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Elliot Riegelhaupt for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him is denied.
The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, alleging that the defendants departures from good and accepted medical practice delayed the diagnosis of ulcerative colitis in the plaintiff Shaya Wiater (hereinafter the injured plaintiff), resulting in him sustaining a perforated colon and requiring a permanent ileostomy. The defendant Elliot Riegelhaupt, the injured plaintiffs primary care physician, moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appeal.
On a motion for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action alleging medical malpractice, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that there was no departure from good and accepted medical practice or that any alleged departure did not proximately cause the plaintiffs injuries (see Roca v. Perel, 51 A.D.3d 757, 758, 859 N.Y.S.2d 203). In order to sustain this prima facie burden, the defendant must address and rebut any specific allegations of malpractice set forth in the plaintiffs complaint and bill of particulars (see Wall v. Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 78 A.D.3d 1043, 1045, 912 N.Y.S.2d 77). If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact, but only as to those elements on which the defendant met its prima facie burden of proof (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572; Sheppard v. Brookhaven Mem. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 171 A.D.3d 1234, 1235, 98 N.Y.S.3d 629; Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 30, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176).
“Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions” (Feinberg v. Feit, 23 A.D.3d 517, 519, 806 N.Y.S.2d 661). On a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion is entitled to every favorable inference that may be drawn from the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties (see Rosario v. Our Lady of Consolation Nursing & Rehabilitation Care Ctr., 186 A.D.3d 1426, 128 N.Y.S.3d 906; Nicklas v. Tedlen Realty Corp., 305 A.D.2d 385, 759 N.Y.S.2d 171). “Conflicting expert opinions raise credibility issues which are to be resolved by the factfinder” (Elmes v. Yelon, 140 A.D.3d 1009, 1011, 34 N.Y.S.3d 470).
Here, Riegelhaupt satisfied his initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that he did not depart from good and accepted medical practice and that any alleged departure did not proximately cause the injured plaintiffs injuries. Specifically, Riegelhaupt submitted his medical records for the injured plaintiff; the medical records of the defendant Blair Lewis, the injured plaintiffs treating gastroenterologist; and the affirmation of an expert, who opined that Riegelhaupt, who was aware that the injured plaintiff was under the care of Lewis, appropriately deferred to Lewis to work up and manage the injured plaintiffs gastrointestinal issue (see Savage v. Quinn, 91 A.D.3d 748, 749–750, 937 N.Y.S.2d 265).
However, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to whether Riegelhaupt departed from good and accepted care and whether such alleged departures caused the injured plaintiffs injuries by submitting their experts affirmation (see Gachette v. Leak, 172 A.D.3d 1327, 1329–1330, 101 N.Y.S.3d 432). Contrary to Riegelhaupts contention, the plaintiffs expert, who is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology, was qualified to give an opinion of Riegelhaupts care of the injured plaintiff in Riegelhaupts capacity as the injured plaintiffs primary care physician. Moreover, there are triable issues of fact as to whether Riegelhaupt assumed a duty to assist in the treatment of the injured plaintiffs gastrointestinal issue, and whether Riegelhaupts alleged departures delayed the diagnosis of the injured plaintiffs ulcerative colitis and decreased his chances of having a better outcome. Whether a diagnostic delay affected a patients prognosis is typically an issue that should be presented to a jury (see Neyman v. Doshi Diagnostic Imaging Servs., P.C., 153 A.D.3d 538, 546, 59 N.Y.S.3d 456).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied Riegelhaupts motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
LASALLE, P.J., DILLON, IANNACCI and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.