Solomon Nuru, an Ethiopian native and citizen, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judges (“IJ”) decision ordering his removal.
Nuru argues that he wasnt removable because he has derivative asylee status as a beneficiary of an IJs grant of asylum to his mother. But U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) terminated his mothers asylee status in 2013, which in turn terminated Nurus derivative status. And although Nurus mother was again granted asylum in 2018, that grant was based on a new asylum application that she filed in 2016.
Nuru didnt qualify for derivative asylee status when his mother filed her new asylum application because he was an adult at the time. And he didnt seek any other relief from removal. The IJ thus correctly found Nuru removable, and the Board properly affirmed. We therefore deny Nurus petition for review.
I.
Nurus mother came to the United States from Ethiopia in November 2003 and applied for asylum through USCISs Asylum Office. The Asylum Office granted her application the following month. She subsequently petitioned for derivative asylee status for her minor children, one of whom was Nuru. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) granted these petitions, and fourteen-year-old Nuru was admitted to the United States in 2006.
Five years later, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate Nurus mothers grant of asylum, suspecting fraud in her 2003 asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1) (“[A]n asylum officer may terminate a grant of asylum made under the jurisdiction of USCIS if, following an interview, the asylum officer determines that ․ [t]here is a showing of fraud in the aliens application such that he or she was not eligible for asylum at the time it was granted.”). USCIS terminated Nurus mothers asylee status in 2013, which likewise terminated Nurus derivative status. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(d) (“The termination of asylum status for a person who was the principal applicant shall result in termination of the asylum status of a spouse or child whose status was based on the asylum application of the principal.”). Nurus mother, Nuru, and Nurus siblings were issued Notices to Appear and placed in removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(e) (“When an aliens asylum status or withholding of removal or deportation is terminated under this section, [USCIS] shall initiate removal proceedings.”).
Nurus proceedings began in Baltimore, Maryland, where he initially appeared together with his mother and siblings. Nurus venue was later changed to Arlington, Virginia after he was arrested in Maryland and was subsequently taken into DHS custody in Virginia. Because Nurus arguments on appeal are largely based on what occurred in his mothers proceedings, we start by describing both proceedings.
A.
At her first hearing, Nurus mother admitted the factual allegations in her Notice to Appear and conceded removability. She also requested a hearing to adjudicate her claims for relief from removal: asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. But rather than filing an application for that relief, she first made the argument that Nuru makes on appeal.
Specifically, Nurus mother argued that she didnt need to file a new application because the Asylum Office had referred her 2003 asylum application to the immigration court pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c).
1
The government responded that her application hadnt been referred, but was instead terminated by USCIS pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1). Thus, the government argued, she was required to file a new application before her claims could be adjudicated.
The IJ agreed with the government, finding that the 2003 asylum application was terminated, not referred. The IJ found the following undisputed facts: (1) the Asylum Office granted Nurus mothers asylum application on December 15, 2003; (2) she received a Notice of Intent to Terminate on November 24, 2011; (3) she attended a hearing during which USCIS terminated her asylum status; and (4) she never received a Notice of Referral.
“Based on the foregoing,” the IJ explained, the 2003 application “was clearly terminated.” ECF No. 54-2, at 157. And, the IJ reasoned, “[n]either the regulations nor the case law grants an alien the option to pursue a previously terminated asylum application in immigration court.” Id. Instead, such an alien may reapply for asylum when placed into removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(e). Id. (citing Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 893 (B.I.A. 2012); Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2011)). Thus, the IJ concluded, if Nurus mother desired relief from removal, she needed to file a new application.
Nurus mother, together with her children, filed an interlocutory appeal of the IJs decision.
2
While the appeal was pending, Nurus mother filed a new asylum application on behalf of herself and Nurus sister, who was still a minor. Several months later, the Board issued a written decision declining to exercise jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, reasoning that it didnt “fall within the limited ambit of cases” in which the Board deems it appropriate to do so.
3
ECF No. 54-2, at 120. The Board ordered that the record be returned to the IJ without further action. Neither Nurus mother nor any of her children petitioned for review of the Boards decision.
Twenty months later, the IJ issued an oral decision granting Nurus mothers new asylum application. The application, filed in 2016, requested asylum on both the grounds (and evidence) originally presented in her 2003 asylum application and, alternatively, on new grounds (and evidence) presented for the first time. As the record before us doesnt include a transcript of the hearing, its unclear upon which ground the IJ based his grant of asylum. No one appealed the IJs decision; thus, Nurus mother regained asylee status in 2018.
B.
Like his mother, Nuru admitted the factual allegations in his Notice to Appear and conceded removability. Specifically, Nuru conceded that (1) hes not a United States citizen or national; (2) he is an Ethiopian native and citizen; (3) he derived asylee status as a beneficiary of a Refugee and Asylee Relative Petition (I-730) approved on June 16, 2005; (4) he was admitted as an asylee on August 12, 2006; (5) his asylee status was terminated on August 14, 2013 because he was the dependent of an applicant whose asylee status was terminated; and (6) he remained in the United States beyond August 14, 2013 without authorization.
Two years later—while his mothers interlocutory appeal to the Board was pending—Nuru filed his own asylum application with the IJ. But he didnt pursue that application at his hearing. Instead, Nuru argued that he had regained his derivative asylee status because his mothers 2003 asylum application was referred to the immigration court and granted.
The IJ rejected Nurus argument and held that he wasnt an asylee. The IJ reasoned that Nurus derivative asylee status was terminated when his mothers status was terminated and that, under Matter of A-S-J-, the IJ didnt have jurisdiction to review that termination.
4
Further, the IJ specifically rejected Nurus argument that 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) required USCIS to refer Nurus mothers 2003 asylum application to the immigration court after it terminated her asylum status in 2013. Thus, the IJ found, Nuru was properly in removal proceedings and could proceed with (or update) his own application for relief from removal. Nuru requested time to decide what he wanted to do, so the IJ continued the proceedings.
Nuru subsequently withdrew his asylum application and indicated that he didnt have an asylum claim. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Nuru removed to Ethiopia. Nuru appealed the removal order to the Board, where he continued to argue that his removal proceedings should be terminated because he regained derivative asylee status when his mother was granted asylum in 2018.
The Board affirmed the IJ and dismissed Nurus appeal. The Board explained that Nurus derivative asylee status was terminated when his mothers asylee status was terminated in 2013. The Board rejected Nurus argument that his mothers 2003 asylum application had been “referred” and instead found that Nuru didnt qualify for derivative status when she filed her new application in 2016. Though Nuru was entitled to file his own asylum application, he chose to abandon his application and forgo any other relief from removal. Thus, the Board held, the IJ correctly found Nuru removable. Nuru timely petitioned for review of the Boards decision.
II.
On appeal, Nuru continues to argue that he has derivative asylee status because his mothers 2003 asylum application was referred to the immigration court in 2013 and thus must have been granted in 2018. We uphold a Board decision regarding a removal order unless it is manifestly contrary to law. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2006).
The fundamental problem with Nurus argument is that its belied by the record in his mothers proceedings. Despite his mothers attempt to persuade the immigration court to consider her 2003 asylum application in adjudicating her claims for relief from removal, the IJ required her to file a new application for consideration instead. And theres no question that she filed a new asylum application in 2016—which served as the basis of her 2018 asylum grant. Because Nuru was over twenty-one years old when his mother filed her 2016 asylum application, he cant have obtained derivative asylee status when that application was granted.
5
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (defining “child” for purposes of derivative asylee status as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age”).
To the extent that Nuru is arguing that USCIS should have referred his mothers 2003 asylum application to the immigration court in 2013, that ship sailed when (1) no one petitioned for review of the Boards order denying the interlocutory appeal where Nurus mother made that argument, and (2) no one appealed the IJs decision granting Nurus mother asylum on the basis of her 2016 asylum application.
As a respondent in his mothers proceedings at the time, Nuru could have petitioned for review of the Boards interlocutory order but failed to do so. And theres simply no legal basis for unwinding, remanding, or revoking his mothers later grant of asylum when no one appealed the IJs decision in her case.
6
* * *
Because the record plainly contradicts Nurus sole basis for contesting removability, we have no reason to disturb the Boards decision. Nurus petition for review is therefore
DENIED.
FOOTNOTES
1
. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) provides that, if an asylum officer doesnt initially grant asylum to an applicant, “the asylum officer shall deny, refer, or dismiss the application.”
2
. This included Nuru, as the appeal predated his arrest and the transfer of venue in his proceedings.
3
. The Board also noted that each respondent, including Nuru, had filed their own asylum applications with the immigration court and thus would be able to appeal if subject to an adverse order.
4
. A sister circuit has held that USCIS lacks statutory authority to unilaterally terminate an aliens asylee status. See Nijjar v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2012). However, we dont have jurisdiction over this issue because Nuru didnt raise it to the IJ or the Board. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”); Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n aliens failure to dispute an issue on appeal to the [Board] constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies that bars judicial review.”). Nuru also waived this issue on appeal by conceding (in his opening brief) that USCIS properly terminated his mothers asylee status. Appellants Br. at 8, 11. We therefore express no opinion on this question.
5
. Theres also no indication that Nurus mother included Nuru in her 2016 application or has since petitioned for derivative asylee status on his behalf.
6
. Nor is it clear that Nurus mother would have been granted asylum in 2018 based on her 2003 asylum application, as her 2016 asylum application included grounds for asylum (and related evidence) that her 2003 asylum application didnt.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.