Jamal Dontae Burnell appeals the district courts order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. We vacate the courts order and remand for further proceedings.
Motions for compassionate release may be filed by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and, after the passage of the First Step Act, by “the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendants behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendants facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020). “[A] court may reduce a defendants sentence if the court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and that the reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, and if the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors merit a reduction.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 275 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court determined that Burnell could bring a motion on his own behalf because the warden of his facility had failed to respond to his request for compassionate release within 30 days. The court, however, concluded that Burnell had failed to identify extraordinary and compelling reasons for granting his motion. In so ruling, the court stated that it was bound by the Sentencing Commissions definition of extraordinary and compelling reasons outlined in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1, p.s., which do not cover the circumstances described in Burnells motion.
We have recently held, however, that USSG § 1B1.13, p.s., is not an applicable policy statement in the context of a motion for compassionate release filed by an inmate and, thus, does not circumscribe the category of extraordinary and compelling reasons a district court may consider in granting an inmates motion for compassionate release. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 280-83. In fact, “the Commission has yet to issue a policy statement that applies to motions filed by defendants under the recently amended § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id. at 275. District courts, therefore, may “consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.” Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the district court did not have the benefit of McCoy when it denied Burnells motion for compassionate release, we vacate the courts order and remand for further consideration. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
PER CURIAM:
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.