HAUBE v. HOUSER (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-23No. No. 19-36005

Summary · law.co

Holding. The petition for habeas relief is denied because the state appellate court's conclusion that the trial judge did not coerce the juror's verdict was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Anthony Haube sought federal habeas relief claiming that a trial judge coerced a juror's agreement to a guilty verdict through post-verdict questioning. The appellate court applied the standard that habeas relief is available only when a state court decision conflicts with or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law as defined by Supreme Court precedent. The court found that juror polling is a permissible practice and that the trial judge's clarification of the juror's position, where the juror never retracted her guilty vote and continued to express support for the verdict, did not constitute coercion but rather a legitimate effort to ensure verdict clarity.

The court distinguished between obtaining clarification and exerting coercion, noting that the juror's stated preference was that she would have felt more confident had the defendant testified, not that the judge forced her to vote guilty. The trial judge properly instructed the juror that the defendant's decision not to testify could not be held against him. Haube failed to cite any Supreme Court holding establishing that a trial court's clarification of jury uncertainty amounts to impermissible coercion, and the state court's factual findings were not unreasonable.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether post-verdict jury polling and clarification by a trial judge constitutes coercion
Standards for habeas relief based on alleged juror coercion
Distinction between judicial clarification of a jury verdict and judicial coercion

Procedural posture

Haube appealed the denial of his federal habeas petition challenging a state court conviction on the ground that the trial judge coerced a juror's guilty verdict.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Anthony Haube (Haube) appeals the district courts denial of his habeas petition asserting that the state trial judge coerced a jurors consent to the guilty verdict. On habeas review, we may grant relief only if the state court decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Parker v. Small, 665 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Federal law is comprised of holdings of the United States Supreme Court. See id.

“Clearly established federal law provides that any criminal defendant being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body․” Id. (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial judges post-verdict questioning did not coerce Juror Bs vote was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Lowenfield. See Haube v. State, No. A-10047, 2010 WL 2871078 at *4-6 (Alaska Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2010). Polling the jury is a permissible method of ensuring unanimity. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d). Where, as here, an issue is raised regarding a jurors vote, the trial judge may permissibly clarify that vote. See McCaleb, 552 F.3d at 1058.

There is a distinction between obtaining clarity and coercion. See id. (distinguishing Jenkins). Importantly, the record reflects that Juror B never disavowed the guilty verdict or her vote in favor of that verdict. Rather, Juror B consistently expressed that she would have been more comfortable with the verdict if Haube had clarified “what he was doing” during the relevant time period. The trial judge carefully explained that Haubes decision not to testify could not be used against him, and Juror B never stated that she voted to convict Haube due to his failure to testify.

Haube has not identified any Supreme Court case holding that a trial courts clarification of uncertainty in a jury verdict constitutes coercion. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (“[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court․”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Haube also failed to demonstrate that the Alaska Court of Appeals made an unreasonable factual determination. Haube contends that the trial judge neglected to consider the “context” of Juror Bs response. However, that more than one interpretation of the record exists does not render the interpretation adopted by the state unreasonable. See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010).

PETITION DENIED.