HAUBE v. HOUSER (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-23No. No. 19-36005

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court denied the habeas petition, concluding that the Alaska Court of Appeals did not apply established federal law unreasonably in rejecting the defendant's claim that post-verdict judicial questioning coerced the jury's verdict.

Anthony Haube sought federal habeas relief contending that a trial judge coerced a juror's guilty verdict through post-verdict questioning. The court reviewed the Alaska Court of Appeals' rejection of this claim under the standard requiring reversal only if the state court decision contradicted or unreasonably applied established federal law.

The court found no basis for relief. While federal law guarantees that jury verdicts must be uncoerced, polling jurors and clarifying their votes represents a permissible judicial practice distinct from coercion. The record showed that the juror never retracted her guilty verdict and did not claim she voted to convict based on the defendant's decision not to testify—an assertion the judge had properly instructed was improper. The defendant identified no Supreme Court precedent establishing that a trial court's attempt to clarify jury uncertainty constitutes coercion, and the state court's factual findings were reasonable even if alternative interpretations of the record might exist.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether judicial questioning of a juror after verdict constitutes coercion under federal habeas law
The distinction between permissible jury polling and verdict clarification versus coercive conduct
Application of the clearly established federal law standard in habeas review

Procedural posture

The petitioner appealed a federal district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging the Alaska Court of Appeals' affirmance of his conviction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Anthony Haube (Haube) appeals the district courts denial of his habeas petition asserting that the state trial judge coerced a jurors consent to the guilty verdict. On habeas review, we may grant relief only if the state court decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Parker v. Small, 665 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Federal law is comprised of holdings of the United States Supreme Court. See id.

“Clearly established federal law provides that any criminal defendant being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body․” Id. (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial judges post-verdict questioning did not coerce Juror Bs vote was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Lowenfield. See Haube v. State, No. A-10047, 2010 WL 2871078 at *4-6 (Alaska Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2010). Polling the jury is a permissible method of ensuring unanimity. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d). Where, as here, an issue is raised regarding a jurors vote, the trial judge may permissibly clarify that vote. See McCaleb, 552 F.3d at 1058.

There is a distinction between obtaining clarity and coercion. See id. (distinguishing Jenkins). Importantly, the record reflects that Juror B never disavowed the guilty verdict or her vote in favor of that verdict. Rather, Juror B consistently expressed that she would have been more comfortable with the verdict if Haube had clarified “what he was doing” during the relevant time period. The trial judge carefully explained that Haubes decision not to testify could not be used against him, and Juror B never stated that she voted to convict Haube due to his failure to testify.

Haube has not identified any Supreme Court case holding that a trial courts clarification of uncertainty in a jury verdict constitutes coercion. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (“[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court․”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Haube also failed to demonstrate that the Alaska Court of Appeals made an unreasonable factual determination. Haube contends that the trial judge neglected to consider the “context” of Juror Bs response. However, that more than one interpretation of the record exists does not render the interpretation adopted by the state unreasonable. See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010).

PETITION DENIED.