MEPPELINK v. Hidden Acres Homeowners Association; Occupants of the Premises, Counter-defendants. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-29No. No. 20-35667

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's partial summary judgment, concluding that Wilmington, as the holder of the promissory note, was entitled to pursue judicial foreclosure under Washington law.

Meppelink appealed a district court's partial summary judgment favoring Wilmington Savings Fund Society in a foreclosure action on her home. Under Washington law, the court found that Wilmington, as the holder of Meppelink's promissory note, had the legal right to pursue judicial foreclosure on the deed of trust securing that note. The rules governing nonjudicial foreclosures do not restrict a lender's ability to choose judicial foreclosure instead.

Meppelink raised several objections to the district court's decision, including claims that the partial judgment created improper piecemeal litigation and arguments raised for the first time on appeal. The appellate court rejected these contentions as either procedurally barred or without merit, and also declined to consider claims not included in the district court's Rule 54(b) certification order.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a note holder may elect judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust
Whether the district court's Rule 54(b) certification created improper piecemeal litigation
Scope of appellate jurisdiction over claims not certified in the Rule 54(b) order

Procedural posture

Meppelink appealed pro se from a district court's partial summary judgment on a lender's counterclaim for judicial foreclosure, with appellate jurisdiction based on a Rule 54(b) certification.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Ayna Amanda Meppelink appeals pro se from the district courts judgment on defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSBs counter claim seeking judicial foreclosure on Meppelinks home. Because the district court certified its interlocutory order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the grant of partial summary judgment. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly granted partial summary judgment on Wilmingtons counterclaim because under Washington law, Wilmington is the holder of Meppelinks promissory note and entitled to enforce it by commencing a judicial foreclosure. See Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.1-201 (21)(A) (defining a holder with respect to a negotiable instrument); Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Slotke, 192 Wash.App. 166, 367 P.3d 600, 601, 604 (2016) (noting that “the holder of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust has authority to elect to commence a judicial foreclosure of that deed of trust[;]” provisions of the Deed of Trust Act relating to nonjudicial foreclosures of a deed of trust have “no bearing on a judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust because such a foreclosure, as the statutes make clear, is controlled by the law of mortgages”); see also Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 175 Wash.2d 83, 285 P.3d 34, 38-39, 42-44 (2012) (en banc) (requirements for judicial foreclosure).

Contrary to Meppelinks contention, the district courts entry of partial judgment under Rule 54(b) did not create an inappropriately piecemeal litigation. See Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of review and criteria for Rule 54(b) certification).

We lack jurisdiction to consider claims other than those certified in the district courts Rule 54(b) order. See Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 179 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (no appellate jurisdiction exists over claims the district court did not include it is Rule 54(b) order).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as without merit Meppelinks contentions that the district court ignored state court rulings, was biased against her, or showed favoritism towards the defendants.

AFFIRMED.