Trey Kimbrell pleaded guilty of being a convicted felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm and was sentenced, at the top of the guideline range, to 37 months’ imprisonment. Kimbrell appeals the guideline calculation. He contends that the district court erred when it assessed a criminal history point under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) for a 2017 burglary charge that was disposed of under Texas Penal Code § 12.45. Specifically, Kimbrell avers that a disposition under § 12.45 is not a “conviction” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4), so that disposition did not yield a “prior sentence” justifying the assessment of a criminal history point. That is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d 196, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1998).
Kimbrell asserts that the “only” issue is “whether an unadjudicated Texas offense disposed of via Tex. Pen. Code § 12.45 constitutes a ‘conviction’ for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4).” But that argument misconstrues the district courts ruling. The record reflects that the court adopted the governments theory that a criminal history point was assessed correctly under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f). Thus, the court concluded that the burglary charge disposed of under § 12.45 was a “diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt” and assessed a criminal history point accordingly. U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(f).
Kimbrell fails to address that conclusion at all, much less engage with “the district courts reasoning ․ or explain how [its] rationale was erroneous.” Thompson v. Bank of Am. Natl Assn, 783 F.3d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, he has forfeited the only issue on appeal. See id.; Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“The appellants brief must contain ․ the argument, which [in turn] must contain[ ] appellants contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies[.]”).
1
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
1
. Although we “ha[ve] the discretion to consider inadequately briefed claims,” Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2019), we opt not to do so here. The issue properly on appeal is whether a charge disposed of per § 12.45 constitutes a diversionary disposition for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f). That is an important res nova issue that we decline to address without the benefit of adversarial briefing. See Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014) (“[T]he adversarial process leads to better, more accurate decision-making.”).
Per Curiam:*
FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.