SUMMARY ORDER
5055 Northern Boulevard LLC (“Plaintiff”) sued the Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, its Board of Trustees, and several municipal officials (collectively, “Defendants”) in New York state court, alleging that Defendants violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by denying Plaintiff a building permit. After Defendants removed the action to the Eastern District of New York, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint as barred by res judicata, holding that Plaintiffs claims were or could have been raised in a prior New York state-court proceeding that was litigated to a final conclusion. Plaintiff now appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
“[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). “In New York, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars successive litigation based upon the same transaction or series of connected transactions if: (i) there is a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (ii) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party to the previous action, or in privity with a party who was.” People ex rel. Spitzer v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 105, 863 N.Y.S.2d 615, 894 N.E.2d 1, 12 (2008) (cleaned up).
On appeal, Plaintiff disputes only one aspect of the district courts res judicata analysis, arguing that the first state-court action did not result in a “judgment on the merits.” We disagree.
The prior action was a “hybrid” Article 78 proceeding in which Plaintiff brought an Article 78 claim along with plenary causes of action, all arising out of the building permit denial. See Newton v. Town of Middletown, 31 A.D.3d 1004, 820 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 n.2 (2006) (noting that a “hybrid proceeding is appropriate” where “the same subject matter ․ underlies all of [the plaintiffs] contentions”). The state-court order disposing of that proceeding granted partial relief as to Plaintiffs Article 78 claim. It then concluded that “[a]ny portion of [Plaintiffs] hybrid petition/complaint not granted is denied” and reiterated that “[a]ny relief not expressly granted herein i[s] denied.” Appx at 56.
Plaintiff asserts that this disposition was not a judgment on the merits as to its non-Article 78 claims, but as the district court noted, “Plaintiffs Hybrid Article 78 Action was decided in an order that expressly granted or denied all requested forms of relief.” Appx at 200. Although the state court could have said more explicitly that its decision was “on the merits” or “with prejudice,” New York law “does not require that the prior judgment contain the precise words ‘on the merits’ in order to be given res judicata effect.” Strange v. Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 59 N.Y.2d 737, 463 N.Y.S.2d 429, 450 N.E.2d 235, 236 (1983). Instead, “it suffices that it appears from the judgment that the dismissal was on the merits.” Id. We conclude that the state-court order—which specifically identified and then rejected the non-Article 78 claims raised in Plaintiffs complaint—satisfied this requirement. See Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is entirely possible for a court to consider and reject a particular claim presented to it without any express discussion of or allusion to that claim.”); cf. Sheffield v. Sheriff of Rockland Cnty. Sheriff Dept, 393 F. Appx 808, 813 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that dismissal without discussion of Title VII claims in hybrid Article 78 proceeding precluded subsequent litigation of those claims).
Plaintiff also appears to argue that the state court violated New York procedural rules by “denying” the non-Article 78 claims in the prior proceeding, and that the resulting judgment thus could not have been “on the merits.” But the proper course for a party that believes a court committed legal error is to take a direct appeal of the courts decision—as Plaintiff initially did before voluntarily dismissing its appeal.
1
In any event, “[w]here a complaint served by plaintiff in a second suit is virtually identical to the one dismissed for insufficiency, res judicata will be the basis for the seconds dismissal.” Grinstein v. Off. Laura Branigan Fan Club, 174 A.D.2d 545, 571 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as the district court noted, the complaint in the second action “is almost identical to the Hybrid Article 78 Action complaint.” Appx at 198. Res judicata prevents Plaintiff from bringing a new suit raising essentially the same claims that were decided in the prior state-court proceeding.
We have considered Plaintiffs remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Defendants’ motion for judicial notice and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OHagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
FOOTNOTES
1
. Defendants ask this Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiffs stipulation withdrawing its state-court appeal and the Appellate Divisions order deeming Plaintiffs appeal withdrawn. We grant the motion. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that “courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts”).