Akida Williams, federal prisoner # 75251-097, appeals the district courts transfer of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to this court, arguing that the district court erred in characterizing it as an unauthorized successive motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The district courts transfer order is an appealable collateral order over which we have jurisdiction. See United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2015); 28 U.S.C. § 1631; 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We review de novo whether the district court properly construed Williamss purported Rule 60(b) filing as a successive § 2255 motion. In re Coleman, 768 F.3d 367, 371 (5th Cir. 2014). As an initial matter, we deny the Governments motion to dismiss the appeal as barred by Williamss plea agreement waiver of appeal and collateral review because the Government did not seek to raise it—and the district court did not sua sponte enforce it—in any of Williamss postconviction proceedings. See United States v. Del Toro-Alejandre, 489 F.3d 721, 722-24 (5th Cir. 2007).
While Williamss Rule 60(b) motion purportedly challenged the integrity of his habeas proceedings, it explicitly sought vacatur of his sentence rather than to reopen his § 2255 proceedings. However, Rule 60(b) is not a proper vehicle for challenging a criminal judgment; rather, challenges to a criminal judgment are properly brought under § 2255. See United States v. Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, because Williamss Rule 60(b) motion sought substantive relief on the basis of claims unsuccessfully raised in prior § 2255 motions, the district court properly construed it as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). Because Williams had not obtained prior authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. See United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000).
Williams further argues that the district court did not warn him, pursuant to Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003), that it intended to recharacterize his Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion. However, Castro only applies to first § 2255 motions, not second or successive § 2255 motions. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 383, 124 S.Ct. 786. In this case, the district court recharacterized Williamss Rule 60(b) motion as a second or successive § 2255 motion, not an initial § 2255 motion.
We, therefore, DENY the Governments motion to dismiss and AFFIRM the district courts order transferring the § 2255 motion to this court under § 1631.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
Per Curiam:*
FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.