SUMMARY ORDER
James Bernard Curry appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Foschio, M.J.), which affirmed a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security. In a decision dated August 8, 2017, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) acting on the Commissioners behalf denied Currys application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The ALJ found that Curry, who has a back condition, does not qualify as disabled under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, and refer to them only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
In deciding an appeal from a denial of disability benefits, we conduct a plenary review of the administrative record and ruling. See Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019). We will not set aside the Commissioners disability determination unless we find that it is based on either legal error or factual findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. The “substantial evidence” standard “means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019).
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“[I]t is ․ a very deferential standard of review—even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). In particular, it requires our deference “to the Commissioners resolution of conflicting evidence.” Cage v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). On such review, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
In support of his SSI claim—and central to this appeal—Curry submitted a two-page Medical Source Statement (the “Statement”) dated May 2, 2017. The Statement was prepared by Dr. David Cywinski, an orthopedist who provided medical treatment to Curry on a sporadic basis between October 2007 and the date of the Statement. As of May 2, 2017, Dr. Cywinski had last seen Curry over six months earlier. In the Statement, Dr. Cywinski opined that Curry could not engage in full-time competitive employment on a sustained basis. R. 521.
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Dr. Cywinski further gave his view (through a checkbox form) that if Curry were to work on a full-time basis, he would be “ ‘off-task’ or otherwise less productive” for more than thirty percent of the workday or workweek. Id. In the form, Dr. Cywinski indicated that his general opinion was based on his specific recommendation that Curry engage in “no heavy carrying/lifting, no bending, stooping, [words illegible] sit to stand,” and symptoms described as “pain” and “discomfort into R[ight] leg.” Id. Dr. Cywinski reported that as of that writing, Curry could sit only for “about two hours” in an eight-hour working day (with normal breaks) and could “stand/walk” only for “about four hours” in total “since at least December 2014.” Id. 522. He “referred [Curry for] spine surgery.” Id. At the same time, he noted that Curry “should not be absent [from work] if restriction[s] were met.” Id.
The ALJ considered Dr. Cywinskis opinion in his review of Currys application for disability benefits for the period from December 2014 through August 2017 (the “relevant period”). In the ALJs assessment of Currys residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ assigned only partial weight to Dr. Cywinskis opinion and concluded that Curry has the RFC to perform certain “sedentary work ․ with additional exertional and postural limitations” as prescribed by Dr. Cywinski, and that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Curry] can perform.” Special Appx 11-12, 15. Thus, the ALJ found that during the relevant period Curry was not disabled under the Act.
On appeal, Curry argues primarily that the ALJ did not give Dr. Cywinskis opinion the weight it was due by law.
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In reviewing such a challenge, we consider whether the ALJ properly applied the two-step framework articulated in Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2008). Under Burgess, the ALJ must (1) decide whether a treating physicians medical opinion merits “controlling weight” and, (2) if it does not, then “determine how much weight, if any, to give it” based on certain factors such as length of treatment and type of health care provider, as we discuss in detail below. Estrella, 925 F.3d at 95-96; see Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129. At both steps, an ALJ must provide “good reasons” for its decision. Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96.
Reviewing the ALJs step one decision, we conclude that the ALJ did not err by declining to assign controlling weight to Dr. Cywinskis opinion. Under the “treating physician rule,” Dr. Cywinskis opinion regarding the “nature and severity” of Currys impairment is entitled to controlling weight only “so long as it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2); see generally Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157 (instructing that “determining the substantiality of evidence” requires a “case-by-case” inquiry). In Currys case, the ALJ explained that his decision to assign less than controlling weight to Dr. Cywinskis statement rested on substantial gaps in Currys treatment by Dr. Cywinski over the relevant period; evidence that the pain caused by Currys alleged impairment responded to treatment; Currys own statements and record of independent activities; and treatment notes by Dr. Cywinski and others. Considered together, as the ALJ found, these observations undercut Dr. Cywinskis May 2017 summary statement. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJs finding that Dr. Cywinskis opinion is not entitled to controlling weight.
Looking next at how much weight Dr. Cywinskis opinion merited, at step two of the Burgess analysis an “ALJ must consider, inter alia, the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the relevant evidence ․ , particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, supporting the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and whether the physician is a specialist in the area covering the particular medical issues.” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). We identify no error in the ALJs analysis of these factors and determination of the weight to afford to Dr. Cywinskis opinion.
Again, the ALJ provided good reasons for his decision to give Dr. Cywinskis opinion partial weight. In a satisfactory functional application of the Burgess factors, the ALJ considered the fact that Dr. Cywinski is an orthopedic specialist, which favored giving his view some weight. The ALJ also considered the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship between Curry and Dr. Cywinski: although Dr. Cywinski had begun seeing Curry in October 2007, the record as a whole revealed “large gaps in [Currys] orthopedic treatment.” Special Appx 15. Particularly, in the six months before Dr. Cywinski rendered the May 2017 opinion that became central here, Curry had not consulted with Dr. Cywinski at all, again undercutting the weight due that opinion. Id.
The ALJ also considered the amount and quality of evidence supporting Dr. Cywinskis May 2017 opinion and whether the opinion was consistent with the relevant record evidence. In affording reduced weight to the opinion, the ALJ cited various treatment records that undermined Dr. Cywinskis statement. Id. 14 (citing the administrative record). For example, the evidence that the ALJ identified as inconsistent shows that in October 2016, Dr. Cywinski considered Curry to be “doing well enough at this time to do nothing further” and that Curry himself then informed Dr. Cywinski that “he is at the point now where he wants nothing further done.” R. 429. This evidence cannot easily be squared with Dr. Cywinskis May 2017 opinion that Currys impairments had been consistently severe since “at least December 2014.” Id. 522. In addition, the ALJ focused on the observation that the medical record “reflect[ed] that overall, [Curry] had full muscle strength of his lower extremities and negative straight leg raising-tests,” Special Appx 14, a finding that the ALJ reasonably found in tension with the May 2017 assessment. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the ALJ adequately supported his step-two conclusion.
Finally, we deny Currys request for further development of the administrative record because he has failed to show that the record is not complete. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999). Because we sustain the ALJs determination that Curry was not disabled during the relevant period, we reject as moot Currys request for a remand for calculation and payment of benefits.
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We have considered Currys remaining arguments and find in them no basis for reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. Unless otherwise noted, in quoting caselaw this Order omits all alterations, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks.
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. “R.” refers to pages of the certified administrative record filed in the District Court.
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. Curry also argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by basing its RFC determination on its own lay opinion rather than on record medical evidence. We reject this argument. An RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ, as the Commissioners regulations make clear. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The ALJ did not draw medical conclusions; instead, and pursuant to his statutory authority, the ALJ considered the medical and other evidence in the record in its totality to reach an RFC determination. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c)(3), 416.945(a); see also id. § 404.1545(a)(3) (“We will consider any statements about what you can still do that have been provided by medical sources, whether or not they are based on formal medical examinations.”).