UNITED STATES v. BELTON AKA (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-21No. No. 19-30267

Summary · law.co

Holding. The district court's denial of Belton's motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act was affirmed, and the court's correction of the judgment to reflect the powder cocaine statute was a proper clerical correction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.

Chris Belton appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act, which applies only to crack cocaine convictions. Belton claimed he qualified for relief because his original sentencing judgment cited the statute covering crack cocaine offenses. However, the district court corrected the judgment to reference the powder cocaine statute instead, which Belton argued was beyond the court's authority. The appellate court found that the correction was proper and remained within the court's discretion. The court determined that Belton's plea agreement and the judge's oral statements at both the guilty plea hearing and sentencing clearly established that he was convicted of distributing powder cocaine, not crack cocaine. The written judgment correction was merely clerical—it aligned the document with what had been orally announced without changing his actual prison sentence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the First Step Act applied to Belton's conviction
Whether the district court had authority to correct a judgment reference under Rule 36
Whether the judgment correction was clerical or substantive

Procedural posture

Belton appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act and its correction of the sentencing judgment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Appellant Chris A. Belton (Belton) appeals the district courts denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. The First Step Act applies only to convictions for offenses involving cocaine base, sometimes referred to as “crack cocaine.” See United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussing impact of First Step Act on cocaine base and powder cocaine convictions). Belton argues that he was convicted of a “covered offense” under the Act because his original judgment referenced 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which covered crack cocaine offenses of 50 grams or more. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2005). Invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, the district court corrected the judgment to reference only § 841(b)(1)(B), which addressed powder cocaine offenses of 500 grams or more. See § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2005). Belton maintains that the district court lacked authority to amend the judgment.

The district court acted within its discretion in denying Beltons motion to reduce his sentence, and its correction of the judgment was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Chaney, 581 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing denial of a motion to reduce sentence for abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Dickie, 752 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (adopting clearly erroneous standard for review of orders entered pursuant to Rule 36). Belton was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 500 grams or more of powder cocaine, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and marijuana. Belton was unambiguously convicted only of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of powder cocaine in violation § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), as evident from the plea agreement and the courts oral pronouncements during the change of plea and at sentencing. The courts correction under Rule 36 was clerical rather than substantive, because it simply conformed the written sentence to the oral pronouncement without altering the period of incarceration. See United States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Kaye, 739 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Rule 36 may be used to correct a clerical error (omission of count numbers) but not “to add a period of incarceration that the record does not indicate was previously authorized”); cf. United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the district court lacked authority under Rule 36 to change a five-year sentence to a ten-year sentence).

AFFIRMED.