In a blocked-off alley in downtown Des Moines, barbs became blows when Anthony Mitchell swung at Georan Churchill. After that fight, the district court
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revoked Mitchells supervised release and handed down a 24-month sentence. We affirm.
I. Background
After serving a 48-month sentence for unlawful firearm possession, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Mitchell began a 36-month supervised-release term. Mitchell faced revocation if he committed another federal, state, or local crime during this term.
In late September 2019, Mitchell and two friends drove into a Des Moines alley, not realizing it was blocked off. Moments before, Churchill and a friend had walked into the same alley.
Churchill and Mitchell disagreed about much of what happened next, including whose friend “started” the fight and how. But they agreed that their friends exchanged harsh words and, while both Mitchell and Churchill tried, neither managed to prevent their friends from exchanging punches. Churchill captured a twenty-six-second video of the escalating tension on his phone.
According to Churchill, Mitchell grabbed him from behind, threw him to the ground, and then kicked his face repeatedly. He also testified that he never swung at Mitchell nor turned toward him. Churchill said that he left the alley with a concussion, broken bones in his face, and a cut on his face which required stitches. A photo taken soon after the fight shows swelling, stitches, and cuts on his face. In court, while Churchills eye still looked swollen and red, he said that an intervening fall caused his on-the-stand appearance.
Mitchells testimony differed. He thought that one friend screamed for help while multiple people attacked his other friend. While running to help his friends, Mitchell saw Churchill turning around with his hand “flying towards” Mitchells face. Mitchell responded by punching Churchill in the nose and then “kept running.” Mitchell denied kicking Churchill.
When the government learned about the fight, it asked the district court to revoke Mitchells supervised release. The government alleged that Mitchell violated Iowa law by willfully injuring Churchill. See Iowa Code § 708.4(2). After hearing evidence and arguments, the district court found that the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mitchell violated his supervised release. That finding relied on Churchills testimony, which the district court viewed as “credible in every respect.” It pointed to Churchills video, a 911 call, and Mitchells admissions as corroborating evidence. In the district courts view, Churchills video, his injuries, and his conduct contradicted Mitchells testimony.
At sentencing, the government asked for a 24-month sentence, which the parties agreed fell within the appropriate range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, as well as a 6-month supervised-release term. Mitchell asked for “much less” but did not ask for a specific sentence.
The district court decided on 24 months with no supervised release. In doing so, it considered “good things[,]” like Mitchells strong work ethic. It also considered Mitchells “history of problems[,]” including his “repeated” and “escalating” supervised-release violations. And because Mitchells “conduct” and “not the classification” guided its sentencing decision, the district court said that it would “do the same thing” even if the conduct did not amount to a willful injury under Iowa law.
II. Discussion
Mitchell asks us to reverse the district courts supervised-release revocation and the sentence it imposed. This record does not support either request.
A. Willful Injury
Under Iowas willful-injury statute, “[a]ny person who does an act which is not justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another commits willful injury[.]” Iowa Code § 708.4(2). The statute then assigns different state felony classes based on the injury caused—a class C felony for causing a “serious injury” and a class D for causing a “bodily injury[.]”
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Id. § 708.4(1)–(2).
Another provision in the same chapter defines “serious injury” to include a “bodily injury.” Id. § 702.18(1)(b) (cleaned up). A “bodily injury”: (1) “[c]reates a substantial risk of death”; (2) “[c]auses serious permanent disfigurement”; or (3) “[c]auses protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ[.]” Id. The Iowa Supreme Court has broadly read “bodily injury” as meaning “to cause ‘physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.’ ” Jima v. Barr, 942 F.3d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1981)); accord State v. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1997).
B. Revocation
The district court had discretion to revoke Mitchells supervised-release term if it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he violated a condition of that term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review the district courts revocation decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Boyd, 792 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 2015). And we review its underlying fact-finding—whether Mitchell violated his supervised release by committing a new state crime (Iowa Code § 708.4)—for clear error. Boyd, 792 F.3d at 919.
Mitchell argues that insufficient evidence supported the revocation decision because, as he asserts, the government did not prove the underlying state crimes intent and injury elements.
First, in asserting that he acted in self-defense, Mitchell argues that the government needed—but failed—to prove that he intended to seriously injure Churchill.
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Even if we agreed with Mitchells premise, sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the intent element. The district court viewed Churchills testimony as unequivocally credible. See United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003). By determining that other evidence (e.g., the video, the 911 call, Mitchells admissions, and Churchills injuries) corroborated Churchills testimony and contradicted Mitchells, “the district court implicitly found that [Churchills] testimony was credible and that [Mitchells] was not credible.” Id. “Because credibility determinations are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal,’ ” Mitchells first argument fails. Id. (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 281 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 2002)).
Next, Mitchell argues that the government did not prove the serious-injury element. He highlights the absence of any medical witnesses. He also notes that while Churchills face may have looked injured at the revocation hearing, Churchill hurt himself subsequent to the alley fight.
We conclude that the record contains enough evidence to satisfy the serious-injury element via the broad definition for “bodily injury.” See McKee, 312 N.W.2d at 913. Mitchell admitted to punching Churchill in the face. And the post-fight photo shows Churchills face—with swelling, stitches, and cuts—before he injured himself.
For these reasons, Mitchell has not shown that the district court clearly erred in its finding that he, more likely than not, committed a new state crime. As a result, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his supervised release.
C. Sentencing
Mitchell next challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 24-month sentence. Because we presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable, Mitchell must rebut that presumption and show that he should have received a lower sentence. See United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 926 (8th Cir. 2013).
Mitchell argues that his employment during his supervised release should have factored more heavily into his sentence. The district court recognized Mitchells strong work ethic and his consistent employment. It also considered his repeated supervised-release violations and his conduct in the alley fight. Even though Mitchell may have preferred for the district court to give more weight to his work ethic and employment status, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in weighing other factors more heavily. See United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782, 808 (8th Cir. 2021).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district courts judgment.
FOOTNOTES
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. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
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. After first charging Mitchell with a class D felony, the local police, in consulting with the county attorney, later bumped it up to a class C felony.
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. We decline the invitation to raise the burden of proof from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
GRASZ, Circuit Judge.