MEMORANDUM **
David Daleiden again appeals the district courts reinstatement of a preliminary injunction under Washingtons Public Records Act (“PRA”), Wash. Rev. Code ch. 42.56, this time only as to Doe plaintiffs 1, 2, and 6. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not repeat them here. We have jurisdiction to review the district courts reinstatement of the preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.
We review the district courts grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2009), affd 561 U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010). A district court abuses its discretion “if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Id.
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Since we previously concluded that “the balance of hardships tips precipitously in the favor of the Doe plaintiffs,” Does 1-10 v. Univ. of Wash., 798 F. Appx 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2020), they may also satisfy the first Winter factor if they can “show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits,” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The parties dispute only the first Winter factor, namely whether Does 1, 2, and 6 have shown they are likely to succeed on the merits—or that there are serious questions going to the merits—of their claims that the First Amendment requires redaction of their personally identifying information under the PRA.
The district courts determination with respect to the first Winter factor was based on its factual finding that there was a “particularized, personal link” between Does 1, 2, and 6 and their claimed First Amendment protected activities. That finding was not “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Accordingly, we affirm the district courts reinstatement of the preliminary injunction with respect to these Does.
We are not persuaded by Daleidens other arguments. Reinstatement of the preliminary injunction as to Does 1, 2, and 6 did not violate the rule of the mandate or the law of the case, and the Doe plaintiffs’ motion to reinstate the preliminary injunction was not a successive motion. Contrary to Daleidens contention, they have sought but one preliminary injunction and continue to litigate the scope of that injunction on account of Daleidens successive interlocutory appeals. Finally, Daleiden waived his argument that reinstatement of the preliminary injunction as to absent class members misapplied the First Amendment and violated the law of the case—an argument that, at bottom, challenges the district courts class certification order—either by failing to raise it below or, if he did raise it below, by failing to appeal the district courts refusal to consider the issue of decertification.
AFFIRMED.
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FOOTNOTES
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. We deny Daleidens request for reassignment to a different district judge.